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
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
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Monterey, California



THESIS

INDOCHINA: THE FEDERATION FACTOR

by

David C. Harrison

December 1982

Thesis Advisor:

C. A. Buss

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Indochina: The Federation Factor

by

David C. Harrison
Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.S., United States Naval Academy, 1976

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

Removed from its historical setting, the concept of "Indochinese Federation" has assumed an unintended connotation. Ambiguity and incomplete documentation surrounding the origins of the concept compounds this dilemma. Consequently, the usage of "Indochinese Federation" to explain recent developments in Southeast Asia infers biases which merit careful consideration. When these deficiencies of context and ambiguity are ignored, the consequence emerges that Vietnamese actions in Indochina are potentially being interpreted within a limited spectrum of possible Vietnamese intentions. This analysis proceeds along two planes; it examines the historical trend toward regional integration in Indochina, and it examines the specific concept of an Indochinese Federation. While a trend toward greater regional associations has been observed - both historically and during the recent past - this trend does not necessarily spell federation.

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I. FEDERATION: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE

However long it takes, Hanoi is determined to head an Indo-China federation. That was Ho Chi Minh's dream in 1930, when he founded the Communist Party of Indo-China, now the Worker's Party of Vietnam. That is Hanoi's goal today.¹

A. INTRODUCTION

Vietnam's December 1978 invasion of Kampuchea rekindled concern about Hanoi's potential threat to and intentions regarding Southeast Asia. As a consequence of recent Vietnamese actions, the validity of the much criticized Domino Theory has been reassessed. In the context of the Vietnamese-Kampuchean conflict the notion that Vietnam is attempting to establish an "Indochinese federation" has once again gained prominence.

Countless volumes have been written on the conflict(s) in Indochina. The numerous aspects of warfare; its execution, effects, and lessons have been explored and evaluated. No doubt that with the perspective only time can impart (and with the declassification of additional documents) more volumes will be written. For this there exists a need.

But this analysis is not an account of the wars in Indochina per se. Instead, this study has been designed to explore the themes of expansion and regional integration -- themes deemed fundamental to both historic and present-day Indochina. In pursuit of this design the following analysis has chosen to focus on the "federation factor".

The federation factor receives its name from the concept of the "Indochinese federation". As this study will demonstrate, the notion of a federation in Indochina has implied different things at different times: It was a notion in the grand schemes of the Comintern-directed Indochinese Party during the decade of the 1930s. Federation was a formula agreed upon between Ho Chi Minh and the French Republic in 1946. In addition, it has emerged as an accusation lodged against Hanoi by Pol Pot's Democratic Kampuchea -- an accusation sustained and parroted by the Peoples Republic of China, Thailand, and various elements of American society; government, academia, and the press, etc. It is from this last element, the U.S. press, that the introductory quote was excerpted.

This analysis proceeds along two planes. First, it examines the historical trend toward regional integration in Indochina. In this trend federation is but one option. And in this dimension factors are examined which tend toward or away from a federal formula for association between the Indochinese federation is deeply rooted in this historical trend.

Second, this analysis specifically looks at the origins of the notion of an Indochinese federation. This dimension seeks to answer such questions as:

- 1) What is the notion of an Indochina federation?
- 2) Was Ho Chi Minh's "will", his "age-old dream", in fact the establishment of an Indochinese federation?

- 3) Why did Vietnam, devastated by years of war, economic chaos, and presumably bent on efforts to effect reconstruction and national solidarity, invade Kampuchea in 1978? Was the invasion an effort to establish such a federation?
- 4) Do Vietnam's present relations with Laos and Kampuchea spell federation?

As was stated above, the notion of federation has changed with time. Wrestling with this fundamental issue has, in effect, defined the methodological framework employed by this study. It is the thesis of this analysis that problems of context, ambiguity, and perspective have rendered the present-day accusation that Vietnam is attempting to establish an "Indochina federation" largely irrelevant.

This belief does not contradict the perceived trend toward regional integration; instead it focuses on it. This belief does, however, implicitly reject the common notion that Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea was an attempt to establish a federation. Consequently, this writer views with some caution the corrolary implication generally held by those who support the federation idea -- i.e., that Vietnam poses an imminent military threat to the remaining non-communist nations of Southeast Asia.

B. FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY

The body of this study has been sectioned into four main areas. This first section introduces the basic concept of federation in international relations theory. It defines the relevance of this concept to the domain of this study, Indochina.

This introductory section also constructs an operational definition of federation and identifies attributes which will be alluded to throughout the remainder of this analysis. The second section of this analysis develops a historical perspective of Indochina in which the trend toward federation is examined. This section also specifically explores the origins of the concept of an "Indochinese federation". The third section examines recent developments in Indochina. This examination is conducted in two parts. In the regional setting, it surveys Vietnam's bilateral relations with Laos and Kampuchea. It addresses the present trend toward regional integration and identifies factors which augment or militate against this trend. Specifically, it surveys the role China and the Soviet Union play in Vietnam's Indochina policy. The fourth and final section of this study provides a qualitative summary of the trend analysis and provides conclusions regarding the specific nature of "Indochina federation". Such conclusions may prove valuable in consideration of U.S. policy regarding Southeast Asia.

Before proceeding with the definition of federation, a word is necessary regarding the methodology selected to pursue this study.

One of the first problems encountered in the course of this study was the selection of a methodological framework. A common framework used to assess events in Indochina since the Second World War has been to divide the period into three

sections; namely, the First Indochina War, the Second Indochina War (also known as the Vietnam War), and the Third Indochina Conflict. Yet, such a framework proved deficient in addressing the demands of this study, for it had a tendency to neatly compartmentalize what from the Vietnamese perspective must be seen as a continuous event, i.e., the constant challenge to Vietnamese national security and integrity from external powers since World War II.

What was desired in this analysis of the trend toward regional integration with its specific focus on the notion of federation in Indochina, was a conceptual framework that facilitated an examination of change over time. And yet, an open-ended framework that permitted one to look toward the future was also sought. Thanks to the valuable suggestion proffered by Douglas Pike, the methodologies of Herman Kahn were examined. It is the spirit of his trend analysis model, (i.e., the Basic, Long-Term Multi-Fold Trend Model) -- not its specific methodology -- in which this examination of the trend toward regional integration is grounded.

The following final section of this introductory chapter will address the theory and problems regarding federation's definition. It will complete the linkage of federation in Indochina from theory to practice.

C. FEDERATION

Federation has many connotations, and often these have been used casually. Federation is also multi-dimensional. It serves as a theoretical framework, and has practical application. Being both a process and an end result, federation is a concept which has proven to be difficult to define, troublesome to operationalize, and painstaking to implement.

The intent with which this chapter was written (and consequently, the spirit with which it should be read) was to spend the minimum amount of time necessary to examine the concept of federation. The intent is not to resolve the difficulties mentioned above; the purpose is to provide an acceptable, not exhaustive, definition.

While a definition of federation is necessary and relevant to all chapters, it is also but of minor overall importance. One step in answering the question: "What is the Indochina Federation?" is to address the nature of federation itself. The problems of comprising the web in which Indochina is entangled, which the purpose of this thesis is to explore, far transcend the definition of federation.

The following paragraphs will survey some of the difficulties associated with definition. A general definition will be proposed, and elements characteristic of federation will be examined. It is these factors/elements which will serve as the foundation for future analyses concerning the trend toward federation in Indochina. Possible alternatives to federation will also be addressed. Finally, objectives of federation will be presented.

The succeeding discussion will provide an understanding of the basics of federation to serve as a benchmark for comparison and contrast. The basics presented here will provide the reader with the tools necessary to analyze critically events transpiring in Indochina - and evaluate the nature of the trend. Is the trend toward federation, or is it not?

1. Federation - Working Definition

The process of definition involves a number of steps: the first is stating what something is, the second is identifying the significant characteristic elements, and the third is indicating how it can be measured or detected, i.e., the operational definition. All three elements prevent rather sticky problems.

As stated earlier, federation is multi-dimensional. The definition must address its dual nature of "federation-as-process" and "federation-as-condition" (or end result). Viewed as a process, federation in a broad sense, can be conceived of as movement and/or motivated by free consent, coercion, or use of (military) force. The end result of the process may be either a loose or tightly structured association of communities. With respect to federation-as-condition it is useful to think in terms of a broad spectrum of alternatives of associated states with varying degrees of tightness.

Regarding the operational definition; when viewed as a process, elements identified as being characteristic of

federation should be considered "factors". This will facilitate later analysis of Indochina Federation which will be examined with an eye toward how a factor advances or retards the process, or how a factor tends toward federation or toward other alternatives. When considering federation-as-condition characteristic elements are to be considered as "pre-conditions". Current events in Indochina will be evaluated in terms of how they fulfill, or fail to fulfill, the requisite standards of federation.

Federation as a process demands a few qualifying comments. Combining territorial communities can result from free choice, coercion, or forcible aggregation. The process is usually the result of all elements.² Forcible aggregation of territorial communities against their will also goes by the name of imperialism.³ Certainly the process of federation involves a struggle for power; a juggling of the status quo. Defined in this manner,⁴ imperialism in no way compromises the broad definition of federation; it is not a matter of either-or. Imperial federation, be it process or condition, is no stranger in the annals of history.⁵ Indeed, it is this process of imperial federation to which much attention will be devoted in subsequent chapters.

Finally, fundamental to the definition of federation as a process is recognition of the problem of analyzing change over time.

Numerous definitions are available which serve to focus the concept of federation as a condition. The purpose here,

however, is to establish a broad functional definition.

All definitions appear to contain two basic points:

First, in a federation the political authority is territorially divided between two autonomous sets of separate jurisdictions, one national and the other provincial, which both operate directly on the people.

Second, the existence of a single, indivisible yet composite federal nation is simultaneously asserted.⁶

A federal system entails a constitutional division of power between one general government (that is to have authority over the entire national territory) and a series of subnational governments (that individually have their own independent authority over their own territories).⁷ In summary, a federation is a system of government in which power to make and administer laws is divided between a central authority and a number of unit authorities.⁸ Federations are entered into when a number of regions desire union but not unity.⁹

Federation then is a sharing of power, ideally an equitable distribution of power. In theory, this is easily stated, but it is difficult to actually achieve in practice. No member to a federation can rule out the possibility that one state may emerge dominant. Federation demands sacrifice of power and many compromises; quite probably this is federation's Achilles' heel.

Can federalism, which was conceived in an era of free economy, maximum private initiative and local responsibility, and minimal role of government in the economic and social fields,¹⁰ exist within a communist system? Some experts

assert that it can. Duchacek in his work on comparative federalisms examines the Soviet Federal Union. He maintains that the polyethnic, multi-level Soviet federalism gives recognition to the cultural and linguistic heterogeneity of the USSR, but at the same time, ensures that linguistic and cultural autonomy does not interface with the monolithic unity of the party and the state, both dominated with Russians.¹¹ While the use of analogy is likely to be misleading, the relevance of Duchacek's comments to Indochina becomes clear if Vietnam is substituted for the Soviet Union. This scheme, along with the hazards of comparing federal systems, will be developed further later.

In countries where the means of production have been largely collectivized, proposals for "federalization" of the collective ownership of the means of production are sometimes encountered.¹² Duchacek warns, however, that the term federalization of collectivized economy should be understood as meaning: "first, that the ownership and control of the means of production have been transferred from private hands to public authorities and, second, that the ownership and management are not in the hands of one single central authority but have been decentralized".¹³ Territorial units such as provinces, or functional groups such as agricultural or industrial cooperatives own and run these means of production.

Federation, then, is not necessarily incompatible with communist systems, nor is it unreasonable to speak of federations in communist systems.

Federal relationships in which one member has emerged dominant are known as asymmetrical federations. The fear of the weaker units is that the dominant member may transform the federation into an imperial structure, into a master-servant or patron-client relationship. This historical proclivity (but certainly not inevitability) of federation has been pessimistically, yet succinctly, summarized by one scholar of politics as: "Who says Federation, says domination of one over the others."¹⁴ This problem translated into Indochina context would simply result in a Vietnam writ large.

In a pattern similar to the discussion of federation-as-process above, the absence of consent distinguishes a forcible territorial association, usually called empire, from a voluntary association whose forms and degrees of cohesion vary. The following paragraphs will describe variations of federation as a function of cohesion. An examination of these variations of federation will serve to further refine our definition. Is it a prerequisite to answering the question: Is the trend toward federation, or is it not?

2. Alternatives to Federation

Since no single definition of federation has proved satisfactory to all,¹⁵ it is not surprising that it is difficult to get even the most general agreement as to whether a federation means something generally different from a treaty of alliance or association.¹⁶ While the following paragraphs will not resolve such problems, they will offer some generally acceptable points of contrast.

a. The Unitary System

The spectrum of alternatives on the subject of power distribution presents extreme opposites, from a totalitarian system on one hand to a loose confederation on the other. For the purposes of this general discussion, the "tightest" association to be examined is the unitary system. In a unitary form of government, all power resides in a central "parliament" which normally delegates authority. In this system the central authority is sovereign. This differs from a federal system where there is no sovereignty except that which resides in the constitution. In a federation, sovereign powers are then divided between central and regional authorities.¹⁷ Unitary systems have been adopted by democratic, authoritarian, imperial, and fully totalitarian systems.¹⁸ The central authority, in the unitary system, determines how much of its power may be delegated. The bottom line, in the discussion of unitary systems - be they communist or otherwise - is that the (theoretical) total elimination of provincial autonomy distinguishes the unitary system.

b. Confederation

Proceeding in the direction of looser associations (and by-passing federation proper, which has already been discussed) leads us to a consideration of confederation. Confederation may be the first step or the end result in formalized cooperation among territorial communities. The power to

conclude treaties with foreign states on the part of lesser units is identified to be one characteristic of a confederal system.¹⁹ The right of succession is a second characteristic of confederation which further distinguishes it from federation proper.²⁰ A confederation is also characterized by a central authority which is either politically or financially dependent on its component units to the point where its acts are constrained.

c. Alliances

Alliances are looser associations yet. The definition of alliance, while also very broad, usually describes a voluntary association of territorial communities primarily for the purpose of military defense of their common interests. What constitutes defense, however, is often controversial. Germane to this debate is the problem of distinguishing "offensive defense" from "defensive defense".²¹ This dilemma, which is only introduced here, has important consequences for the countries of Southeast Asia.

Modern alliances are not constrained to military affairs or defense. The provisions of alliances have expanded to cover such non-traditional concerns as social and cultural affairs. Such complex alliances unite territorial units to form "communities" or "blocs", or confederations. Other usual features of modern alliances are:

1. They are nonperpetual; providing for renewal about every twenty years.

2. The right of "succession" is guaranteed.
3. The principle of unanimity (by negotiated compromise as opposed to formal vote).
4. Alliances are directed against a common enemy.²²

3. Federation and Alternatives - a Summary

Where has this discussion of federation and its alternatives led us? First, it rejected the argument that imperialism contradicts federation. Second, it sustained the argument that federations and communist systems are not mutually exclusive. Third, it provided some criteria by which to assess the events and trends to be examined in following chapters. It has provided some aid in answering the question: "Is the trend toward Federation, or is it not?" All three elements demanded examination before the problem of an Indochina Federation could be addressed.

Federation and its alternatives fall into the broad category of regional integration. Integration is a subset of International Relations Theory. Regions, regional integration, like the concept of federation, is an elusive target in theory and practice.²³

Before proceeding with the final step of the definition process, the operational definition, some possible objectives of federation merit consideration.

4. Federation - Possible Objectives of:

Although the reasons why states enter into federation are many, only a few will be discussed. Federation itself

may be a means to an end, it may be a pragmatic solution to problems of trade, population movement, defense, or foreign policy. Anthony Birch in his study of federation provided the following objectives:

1. Protection against external pressures, especially military dangers, can be achieved. We have already noted the aggregative effect of an external threat. Subversion by the imperialist tactics of "divide and rule" may often be neutralized by a defensive federal compact.
2. Benefits to all may be derived from bringing the diplomatic and military assets of member units into a common pool - benefits that may be translated into greater internal security and progress or, possibly, external expansion.
3. Economic advantages may accrue to all from planning, working, and exchanging products in a larger market and production area.²⁴
5. Federation - the Operational Definition

The function of the operational definition is to present factors which will facilitate later analysis of Indochina Federation. Empirical data are collected for each of these factors and evaluated either as tending toward federation, or tending away. The trend toward federation is a function of these characteristic elements. The objective is to develop an qualitative equation for federation in Indochina, evaluate the variables and determine if their sum equates to federation.

Philip Jacob and Henry Teune, in their study of the integrative process, lumped preconditions and factors together. In practice they are nearly impossible to segregate.²⁵ Each of these factors is essentially a collection of possibly

relevant characteristics, and the list provided is by no means comprehensive. Nevertheless, it does have the virtue of providing a "check-list" with which to attack the problem. Their list of ten "factors" that may exert integrative influence contains:

1. Geographical proximity.
2. Social homogeneity of the peoples involved.
3. Transactions, or interactions, among the peoples involved.
4. Mutual knowledge of each other among the peoples involved.
5. Shared functional interests.
6. The communal character of a people - is it disposed toward integration?
7. The structural frame or system of power and decision-making in the emerging community - democratic or authoritarian, decentralized or centralized.
8. Degree of sovereignty-dependency of the community.
9. Governmental effectiveness.
10. Previous integrative experience of the peoples and government involved.²⁶

Other scholars have also attempted to operationalize federation. Franck, in his analysis of why federations fail, sought the common factors which brought each federation to its doom. In doing so, however, he realized that these same factors offered some clues as to the necessary preconditions of success. It led Franck to the tentative conclusion that the sharing of such things as culture, language and standard of living, are helpful to the cause of federation.²⁷ The

below matrix lists Franck's factors; it provides factors making for federation and goals sought to be achieved by federation-building.

THE FACTOR-GOAL COMPONENTS IN FEDERATION MOTIVATION

Goal-Factor Factors	Factors	Goals	Contribution to Success of Federation
Primary	Ideological federalism Popular or elite charisma Supremacy of the political federal value	Federation for its own sake Manifest destiny National greatness	The prerequisite needed to ensure against eventual failure
Secondary	Common language Similar values culture Complementary economies Common colonial heritage Common enemies Common challenge	Federation for the sake of mutual economic advantage Security against attack Opening up the frontier More important role in international affairs Common services	These factors may bring federalism into being and thereafter engender the primary factors. The factors of common challenge and common enemies appear to stand the best chance of affecting the transition to primary factors. If so, the federation is likely to succeed; but it is by no means certain that this sequence will occur. If it does not, the federation is susceptible to failure despite the favorable motivation based on secondary factors and goals.
Tertiary	Ethnic balance Hope of earlier independence Colonial power's need to rid itself of uneconomic colonial territory	Prevention of racial/tribal friction Independence Solvency	The motivation based on these factors and goals may bring about a federation but, unless rapidly replaced by secondary and primary goal-factor motivation, these tertiary goals can be said to contain the seeds of their own defeat. In themselves, these factors rarely engender the development of secondary and primary factors.

Franck's definitions of primary, secondary, and tertiary are not immediately relevant to this study.²⁸

These factors, identified by Jacob and Teune, and Franck, translated into the environment of Indochina, will provide the basic building blocks out of which the trend toward federation in Indochina will be assessed. Ultimately it will be a subjective evaluation.

In summary, this chapter has stressed the "shades of gray" in the nature of federation. Its purpose has been to serve as the fullest possible introduction to the problem of federation in Indochina. There is no complete definition of federation, nor are there black and white distinctions between federation and its alternatives. Franck stated that: "What this definitorial problem suggests is not that a single, highly structured definition is needed. Rather, it is that there be greater understanding of the nearly infinite number of variations that can be played on the federal theme...[and] that the concept of federalism is flexible enough to bend with the realities."²⁹ This notion of flexibility, to which Franck refers, is the test of subsequent chapters.

While this research generates reliable data which allows us to make qualitative judgements regarding the components of the federation process, they do not as easily allow us to integrate them and state with certainty whether a system is federal or some other political system.³⁰ It is a task which doesn't lend itself easily to quantification.³¹

This preliminary chapter lays the groundwork for examining the problem of federation as it applies to Indochina. It serves as the foundation for that which follows -- examination of the Indochina Federation.

II. VIET NAM: THE TREND TOWARD FEDERATION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

History is much more the product of chaos than of conspiracy.

Zbigniew Brzezinski³²

This chapter serves to provide a historical background for the forthcoming analysis of Indochina Federation. Of the many reasons for developing such a backdrop, three stand out: Primarily, such a background contributes the added dimension that can only be gained by familiarity with relevant historical events, i.e., the historical perspective. Benefits gained from such a perspective are a sense of pattern (if one exists) and foundation for comparison. Historical pattern might possibly be the window to the future.

Secondly, a historical background is necessary for a proper understanding of causal relationships; of cause and effect. A review of past events serves to remind us of what is known at the time -- so that present discussions are not invalidated by the third eye of hindsight.

Finally, a review of historical events might yield their "lessons". In this context, the rationale for providing a historical survey is the desire to avoid past mistakes and to manage future circumstances more wisely.

In pursuit of the first objective, the following section will summarize the continuity of events in Indochina. Milton

Osborne, a respected scholar of the Asian scene, acknowledged this need in April 1978:

For a student of Indochinese history there is an almost irresistible temptation to see in the major armed clashes that have taken place between the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and Democratic Kampuchea (Cambodia) a confirmation of past historical patterns and a reflection of deep-seated ethnic enmity. The fighting that burst into prominence at the end of 1977 and has continued into 1978 fits readily into a historical context that has seen Cambodia and Viet Nam as rivals at best and enemies at worst, for three hundred years. Such a historical pattern cannot be easily dismissed in any discussion of the immediately contemporary situation.³³

Appendix A contains a chronological listing of some major events. It extends back beyond the past three hundred years to which Osborne refers, to Viet Nam's early ethnic origins. The reader is urged to review the chronology, as its purpose is to supplement the following discussion.

A. EXPANSION AND INTEGRATION: RECURRING PATTERNS

What patterns emerge from two thousand-plus years of Vietnamese history?³⁴ All sorts of patterns emerge. This analysis chooses to focus on but five. It is believed that these themes provide a useful perspective, and foundation for comparison. Their secrets contain valuable lessons.

Endemic to Indochina is the first pattern, conflict. Life -- the very act of survival itself -- has been a struggle in Indochina. Specific societal patterns have developed and have been adapted to ensure its continuity. Yet, what has emerged is an equilibrium which can easily be upset; the

consequence is death.³⁵ Conflict, in a borderline subsistence society where instability means famine for millions, has an enhanced cutting edge.

Coupled to conflict is the second pattern of reversal. A popular Chinese proverb validates this generalization: "Nobody stays rich for three generations, nobody stays poor for three generations."³⁶ Victors soon become the vanquished.

Has such a pattern inspired a feeling of compassion towards one's less fortunate neighbor? Perhaps - but the evidence is inconclusive. Tending to contradict it is the ferocity of the recent ethnic clashes, but at the other extreme peace in Indochina has not been of Carthaginian-style either.³⁷

Since the latter 13th century, Laos and Cambodia have been pawns in the alternating advances of Siam and Viet Nam. Kampuchea, the present-day descendant of the once glorious Angkor, is presently on the horns of a terrible dilemma. It is the story of ebb and flow.

A third pattern is that of "march to the south" - "nam-tien" in the Vietnamese language. The original population of Nan-yueh had migrated from the north, from what are now the southern provinces of China. And under the guise of a dynastic quarrel, Chenla's conquest of Funan was the first episode of this southern drive in Cambodia.³⁸

Yet it is the push to the south of the Yueh of Tonking which sets the precedent for the present pattern of Vietnamese migration. The nature of this expansion has been neither

homogeneous nor fluid. The impulse for this drive has resulted from a variety of causes: Demographic pressures have triggered periods of growth.³⁹ State-directed expansion has been another causal factor. In addition, territorial aggrandizement has been the booty of war, and the bridesprice of romance.⁴⁰

A corollary of nam-tien is the fourth pattern of the retreat of Indianized states before the Sinic culture. Indochina has been a crucible for the clash of these two cultures. Since its mostly easterly advance in the 12th century, touching the shores of the South China Sea, Hindu culture in Indochina has been in a near continual state of retrenchment.

Yet Georges Coedes maintains that the cultural influence of China has been "insignificant" compared to that of India in their respective neighboring areas.⁴¹ Why? Differences in method, type, and administration of colonization offer some explanations.

Regarding the method of colonization, it can generally be maintained that India advances her influence through peaceful means. China, by contrast, resorted to conquest.⁴²

Chinese civilization did not spread beyond the area of her military conquests.

Indian influence demanded no political dependence on the mother country. The Hinduized "type" of colonization was based on equality. Suzerainty and tribute, on the other hand, were the prices of China's imperialism.

Administrative structures under Indian influence were governed by independent sovereigns of native origin or mixed heritage. The responsibilities of Indian counselors were primarily cultural. This differed greatly from the territories of the Chinese empire which were governed by a hierarchical structure dominated by Chinese governors.

In this general context, the Indianization of the states of Cambodia was, in a sense, a process of assimilation. The Sinic advance, by contrast, was one of domination.

The fifth pattern to emerge has resulted from the onset of Western colonialism, it is a consequence of the Franco-British contest for influence throughout the globe. This is the pattern of the desire for a buffer state. It lies at the root of the present-day Indochina conflict.

During the 18th and 19th centuries Siam served as such a buffer state between the British sphere of influence to the west and the French colonies of Indochina to the east. This buffer zone served to maintain the regional balance of power. Boundaries between spheres were drawn with disregard for primordial factors such as language, race, culture, etc.

The disintegration of the colonial empires at the end of the Second World War set the stage for a new dynamic of nationalism. Thailand and Viet Nam emerged as regional powers; the dubious responsibility of buffer states shifted to Cambodia and Laos.

Viet Nam's subsequent domination of Laos and occupation of Kampuchea has destroyed this buffer, and has consequently

sent forth shock waves disturbing the regional balance of power.⁴³

1. History as a Foundation for Comparison

Thus Viet Nam's December 1978 invasion of Kampuchea seems to confirm the patterns of conflict, nam-tien, and the retreat of Hindu culture before Sinic advance. The low frequency pattern of reversal has a long period indeed; it seems likely that Cambodia and Laos are destined to remain expendable pawns in the regional struggle for power for the foreseeable future.

Where will the buffer zone reappear next, if at all? The future resolution of this questions will to a large degree determine the regional balance of power.

2. Historical Origins of Causal Factors

This summary of historical trends and patterns in Indochina, and the appendix that supplements it, has identified five broad categories of causal factors relating to Vietnamese expansionism. All these factors will be developed further in Part II of this study. It is the intent only to introduce them here.

Vietnamese expansion has been influenced by geostrategic factors such as mountains, deltas, and rivers (particularly Mekong), and geopolitical factors such as borders. Security considerations, particularly their political, economic and military dimensions, are a second category of causal factors. Primordial factors, such as ethnic conflicts, also have a causal function; as does the fourth category of

demographic factors. The final category alluded to in conjunction with "spheres of influence" is the "proxy" relationship as a causal factor in Vietnamese imperialism.

An assessment of the lessons of history will be deferred until Part III where they will be incorporated with the trend identified in that section into recommendations for U.S. policy formulation.

While the above paragraphs have generally examined Indochina as a region, the unique characteristics of Vietnamese society remain to be explored. This will be examined in the following final section developing the historical perspective.

B. THE VIETNAMESE POLITICAL TRADITION

An appreciation of the Vietnamese political tradition can provide clues for an analysis of Vietnamese political behavior and Vietnam's foreign policy decision-making process. The purpose of this section is to survey briefly the characteristics of the Vietnamese political tradition.

Historically, the political tradition of Viet Nam has been an expression of Confucian political thought. Confucian political thought is rigidly authoritarian; the governing patterns it created established a distance between the ruler and his subjects. Nevertheless, the Confucian political system reserved the right to intervene directly in village affairs.

Yet, the Confucian state bureaucracy was a coordinator and not an executive.⁴⁴ By means of bureaucratic

coordination, balance was established between the ritualistic state and the autarchic village.

Traditional concepts of individual responsibility demanded two orders of duty. Responsibility to one's family and village was a man's first obligation. A peasant's second obligation was the ritualistic observation of traditional rights that ensured the favor of heaven and harmony with nature.⁴⁵

Contrasting the Vietnamese and Chinese Confucian models of administration, Alexander Woodside has identified two traditions as being characteristic of the Vietnamese monarchy.⁴⁶ One Vietnamese school of thought, which was derived from the Chinese model, stressed that political harmony could only be assured through the vertical accommodation of social differences, through the Confucian principle of hierarchy. This was the filial piety relationship extended to the socio-political system.

The second traditional school of thought idealized the Vietnamese monarch. According to Woodside, "The ideal Vietnamese ruler... should be able to resist the political domination of the Chinese court. He should be able to preserve the people's livelihood and well-being. And he should be able to introduce and domesticate Chinese culture. He should be part rebel, part guardian of agricultural fertility, and part cultural innovation".⁴⁷

The principal problems of Vietnamese society with which the Vietnamese political tradition had to cope must be viewed

from the perspective of the village. Central to this view is Paul Mus' belief that there is a rhythm to the life of the peasants synchronized around the cycle of growing rice in the fields. The fields have provided the basis for a stable social structure, a discipline for work, and a pulse for communal ritual. In such a society Western concepts of time become largely irrelevant, moreover, the seeds of instability were sown when these concepts were introduced.

Traditionally, the Vietnamese have looked to the past as a model for the future -- the ideal to be achieved lay in the past. Social ills were a consequence of neglect of the Confucian model; their rectification lay not so much in individual achievement or innovation, but rather in conformism and refined application of the model.⁴⁸ In such an environment Western future-oriented concepts of technological improvement, and Western concepts of individual achievement, further threatened the balance of society.

Concerning Vietnamese expansion and integration, Mus makes references to most of the pattern summarized earlier, stating:

The harmony between the Vietnamese - who entered history in 208 B.C. somewhere around the southern edge of China--and their environmental conditions has proved to be so deep that no race has been able to resist their advance, nor has any force subsequently managed to wrench them from the land. The historic southward advance of the Vietnamese from the Red River Delta was facilitated by military operations. But it was consolidated by the peasantry who extended their network of villages and destroyed all the vestiges of the defeated Kingdom of Champa, which lay in the path of the southern movement. In the eighteenth century a large part of Cochin China had been similarly taken away from the Cambodians,

who were driven farther and farther back toward the west. Had the French not arrived, the remaining portion of Cambodia would have been the reward to a victor in a war between Viet Nam and Thailand. Vietnamese history thus poured down through Indochina like a flood sweeping away the other peoples wherever they inhabited flat land on which there were rice fields or which was favorable to the development of rice fields.⁴⁹

Mus also acknowledges the geostrategic constraints of nam-tien, stating that Vietnamese expansion has stopped at the foothills of the highlands.⁵⁰

Concerning the 20th century Vietnamese revolution two factors are particularly relevant to this discussion of the Vietnamese political tradition and its implications for regional integration. First is the belief that the struggle to change the values by which the people live was the central issue on which the revolution was based, i.e., revolution in Vietnam was a crisis of values.⁵¹ Second, is that Vietnamese political tradition maintains that only revolutions which effect a complete change are authentic and legitimate.⁵² Only a complete change signals to the people the passage of the Thien minh, the Mandate of Heaven.

Thus the Vietnamese political tradition was an authoritarian system whose legitimacy rested in a reactionary identification with the Confucian ideal. It was an administrative system in which governmental policy, both domestic and external, was viewed in terms of a series of concentric circles emanating from the center of the imperial court--each defined in step-like fashion as an extension of the filial piety relationship. It was a system in which expansion and integration

were sanctioned, subject to the above norms. It was a system that for centuries had been in harmony with its environment--yet, the environment had changed, a change which signaled the start of the Vietnamese revolution.

1. The Vietnamese Political Tradition in Transition

The advent of the West in Indochina, primarily in the form of Christian missionaries and French colonialism, upset this Confucian balance and eroded its framework. Western concepts of time and the introduction of a currency-based economy were principal actors in this struggle between East and West. It was in this weakened state--when the legitimacy of the Confucian system was being questioned--that notions of communist ideology first begin to appear in Indochina.

2. Vietnamese Confucianism and Hanoi's Communist Political Culture

The purpose of this section is to survey briefly the issue of Confucianism and Marxism in Viet Nam--the link between Viet Nam's political tradition and Hanoi's Communist political culture.

There exists no simple equation relating the variables of Confucianism and Marxism in Hanoi's political culture. Various scholars have assigned them alternative coefficients and have combined them in different fashions.

Scholars who have attempted to explain Viet Nam's political behavior--be it domestic or external--have chosen to focus on these or other factors. The decision to focus on the communist nature of Vietnamese expansionism was the fundamental tenant of the Domino Theory.

The issue of Confucianism and Marxism in Viet Nam has been addressed in some detail by both Vietnamese and Western writers.⁵³ Dr. Nguyen Khoc Vien (editor of the multi-volume Vietnamese Studies, and responsible for all DRV foreign language publications in the early 1970's) offers a Vietnamese view sympathetic to communist ideals. As such, Dr. Vien tends to emphasize the commonality of Confucianism and Marxism.

Vien prefers to root the conversion from Confucianism to Marxism in the village culture--as opposed to portraying it as an elite-imposed change--thereby establishing its proletarian legitimacy. He maintains that Marxism in Viet Nam offered the people a political and social doctrine that enabled them to solve their problems.⁵⁴ This doctrine--by its very (comprehensive) nature--was similar to Confucianism. But Vien also asserts that Marxism was more than a doctrine; it was an instrument of liberation.

Marxism, like Confucianism, addressed itself to the problems of here-and-now, and not to the the hereafter. Vien further illustrates their complementary nature by citing Marxist texts in which: "The passages would not be out of place in an anthology of Confucian writings, and in them one can clearly perceive the political morality of Confucianism."⁵⁵

Because Confucian teachings stressed social discipline as a virtuous element of one's personality, Vien maintains that the Confucian man could make the transition from a traditional society to a socialist one. A society schooled in Confucian

discipline was not hostile to the principle of collective discipline.⁵⁶ While Vien believes that Confucianism has now passed permanently from the scene, he fully acknowledges the effects of its legacy on the Vietnamese national heritage:

Today Marxism has replaced Confucianism as a doctrine of political and social action, and a new revolutionary ethic has replaced Confucianism in Vietnam. Any attempt to revive Confucianism is useless. But, contrary to what pseudo-revolutionaries believe, Vietnamese Marxists consider Confucianism and the work of the scholars part of their national heritage, to be assimilated by the new society.⁵⁷

A recent analysis has attempted to distinguish the views of Paul Mus and Dr. Nguyen Khoc Vien on this subject by alleging that Mus derives Vietnamese affinity for Marxism directly from the Confucian mandarin elite.⁵⁸ While this may be so, Mus nevertheless addressed its relationship to the peasant society. Mus firmly believed that whatever form of leadership ultimately prevailed, subsequent to the Vietnamese revolution, it would have to adopt their administrative policies to the traditional expectations of the Vietnamese peasants.⁵⁹ Mus maintained that:

Among the many reasons for Communist success the most essential one is the relevancy of their values to the lives villagers must lead. This relevancy springs from a conception of society as a communal as distinct from a secular organization--a conception which offers a comprehensive explanation for a new sense of community in which rural people can participate.⁶⁰

In this sense the views of Paul Mus and Dr. Nguyen Khac Vien run parallel.

Stephen B. Young, in an ambitious assessment,⁶¹ believes that Marxism is but a transition in elite ideology, and is

antagonistic to the Vietnamese peasant population. In his view Communism has succeeded not so much because of its similarities to Confucianism, but because the Vietnamese communists, as mandarins, knew best how to manipulate a power structure to play on the dependency needs of the Vietnamese people. He sees Vietnamese Communists as Viet Nam's new mandarins.

The present writer views with caution this proposal that the Marxist elite in Hanoi are but new mandarins, even though this assessment would make easy the attempt to link Viet Nam's present expansionism with its historic pattern. Yet at the other extreme, there are hazards in assuming that Viet Nam and the Soviet Union are of one mind concerning the application of Marxist international ideology.⁶²

Vietnamese decision making reflects the influences of its national heritage and communist ideology. In a sense, communism in Viet Nam is a veneer that Hanoi is trying to unite with the fabric of Vietnamese society. Because of communism's similarities to traditional Confucianism, its prospects for success are perhaps good. Yet, there are inherent contradictions. Marxism itself is a Western ideology. In this respect Viet Nam has adopted but another colonial mantle. Time will be the test of how and to what degree these social doctrines will be assimilated.

For the present, the distinction between Hanoi's communist culture and Viet Nam's political tradition is important to recognize. As of yet, it remains an imperfect assimilation,

despite their areas of confluence. Analysts examining Viet Nam's decision making process should bear in mind Viet Nam's national heritage and the recurring patterns of its long tradition. The trend toward regional integration in the present period is a consequence of the ill-defined mix between Viet Nam's political tradition and its communist culture.

C. VIETNAMESE CONCEPTS OF INTEGRATION: ORIGINS AND THE ICP

Generally speaking, the external relations of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (DRVN) have found expression in two principal forms: political action and military conflict. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the former. The military dimensions of Hanoi's policies, while important, have been discussed in detail elsewhere; and, although references will be made to military campaigns in conjunction with this discussion of political policies (or for reasons of balance and completeness), it will not be the focus of this chapter.

Almost exclusively, the political dimension of the DRVN's regional relations has been guided by the manifesto of the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP). In addition, the core cadres of the Viet Minh had come from the ranks of the ICP. The present-day Viet Nam Communist Party, and its predecessor --the Viet Nam Workers Party--have been alternate forms of the Indochinese Communist Party. The ICP has been the pulse of communist activity in the region since its founding in 1930.

The very name, Indochinese Communist Party, suggests the intention to establish a single communist regime throughout Indochina. This desire is well documented. The degree to which this intention was an expression of Vietnamese desires, and the degree to which this intention found fulfillment, are the objects of this chapter's analysis. The search for an answer demands a careful examination of the origins of the ICP, and an assessment of its political statements. These two areas form the major sections of this chapter.

The extent to which Vietnamese concepts of federation were, in fact, a product of the ICP's political platform, and consequently subject to pressures bearing on the ICP, provides the rationale for the forthcoming detailed analysis of the development of the Indochinese Communist Party.

1. The ICP and Origins of Communist Concepts of Integration

Vietnam has not abandoned its idea of an Indo-China Federation. It has been implementing this idea systematically through continuous planning and operations since 1930.

Pol Pot⁶³, 1978

The Communist Party of Indo-China is founded. It is the Party of the working class. It will help the proletarian class to lead the revolution in order to struggle for all the oppressed and exploited people.

Nguyen Ai Quoc⁶⁴, 1930

Conflict, once again, plagues Indochina. Democratic Kampuchea maintains that conflict in Indochina is a consequence of Hanoi's attempt to establish an Indochina Federation. The PRC echoes this claim. Viet Nam denies it.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the historical origins of the concept of an Indochina Federation. It will survey Vietnamese concepts of federation. It is the thesis of this analysis that problems of ambiguity and context render present-day allegations of Federation irrelevant.

a. Ho Chi Minh and the ICP

The roots of Vietnamese concepts of federation rest, in part, in the origins of the Indochinese Communist Party. That the leaders of Democratic Kampuchea believe this to be true is suggested by the introductory quotations above.

Events themselves do not tell the full story of the founding of the ICP. This added dimension can only be provided by a sense of the spirit of the times in which they unfold. The discussion of the ICP and external factors will strive to present such a blend between events and historical background

There is a tendency to view the origins and development of the Indochinese Communist Party as having occurred under the protective direction of Ho Chi Minh, then known as Nguyen Ai Quoc. While this is to a large extent true, it is a simplification that demands qualification. The course of the ICP and the career of Nguyen Ai Quoc are certainly bound up with one another. Yet, it is a history that is marked by divergence and confluence; and its course has been neither fully logical nor inevitable.

One path, that of the Indochinese Communist Party itself, has been punctuated by bends and breaks. Founded in Hong Kong

in 1930 as the Vietnam Communist Party, the party shortly thereafter changed its name to the Indochinese Communist Party. The ICP was not permitted to function legally and openly in Indochina until 1936. Forced to go underground once again in 1939, the Party suffered continued harassment until its dissolution in November, 1945. Its core cadres, members of the Indochina Association of Marxist Studies, re-emerged as the Lao Dong, or Vietnam Workers Party, in 1951. After national reunification, the VWP changed its name to the Vietnam Communist Party in December, 1976.

The second path is that of Ho Chi Minh. As an agent of the Comintern, and a fervent nationalist, it is reasonable to believe that conflicting interests, on occasion, arose. Yet it is apparent that Ho handled these difficulties with the same dexterity that would later mark his close association with the feuding Soviets and Chinese.

Bernard Fall maintains that throughout his whole life, Ho never quite reconciled within himself the conflicting demands of overall Communist strategy and his own love for his country. Yet Fall believes that Ho Chi Minh's patriotism overrode his allegiance to international Communism.⁶⁵

The need for this distinction between the development of the Indochinese Communist Party, and the career of Ho will become apparent as the following paragraphs examine the notion of federation in its Vietnamese context.

b. The ICP and External Influences

Unfolding events in China during the 1920's spelled high opportunity for the revolutionary cause throughout Asia. Nationalist fervor and social revolution, dominated the social atmosphere of the elites in Indochina. Amidst this backdrop of anticolonial unrest Vietnamese communism was born in Canton in 1925.⁶⁶

Communism in Vietnam during the late 1920's was racked by factionalism. Debate centered primarily on the issue of the formation of a true communist party; prior to this time revolutionary leagues were a common organizational unit.

Conservative elements believed that Marxism in Vietnam was not yet sufficiently mature to warrant the transformation from a revolutionary league to a communist party, and that the multitude of members were but patriots with ideas of nationalism and little commitment to Marxism and social revolution. Douglas Pike, a noted Indochina scholar, maintains that Ho reportedly "argued in Moscow in the summer of 1927 against formation of a communist party in Vietnam on the grounds that no one in Vietnam understood the word 'communism'"⁶⁷

Conversely, proponents in the debate argued for compliance with the Comintern's Sixth Congress which "had given clear indication that revolutionaries in Asia should prepare to transform themselves into formal communist parties as soon as conditions were met".⁶⁸

Communist disunity and contention in Indochina, which smacked of personality conflicts and petty rivalries, was

a source of serious concern for Moscow; and an irritation for the Comintern. In response to the formation of an Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) by one faction, others followed suit forming the Annam Communist Party (ACP) and the Indo-chinese Communist League (ICL). Each petitioned the Comintern for recognition. The response to these requests was a caustic Comintern directive that ordered formation of a single unified party:

Divisions among various Communist groups...cannot be tolerated...the most urgent important task of all Communists in Indochina is to form a revolutionary party with a proletarian class base, that is, a popular Communist Party of Indochina. It should be the only Communist organization in Indochina...The Indochina Communist Party should bring together all Communist groups.⁶⁹

Recent Soviet analysts confirm the Comintern's direction of events:

The Comintern gave them its recommendations which proved very valuable. The Comintern wanted Indochina to have one strong and united Communist Party, and in its letter, 'On the Establishment of a Communist Party in Indo-China' (October 27, 1929), it said: "Divisions and controversy among these groups can have a very bad effect on revolutionary agitation in Indo-China. The key problem facing all Indo-Chinese Communists, a problem which brooks no delay, is to establish a revolutionary proletarian party, that is, a massive Communist Party--a single Communist organization for the whole of Indo-China."⁷⁰

The Comintern subsequently directed Nguen Ai Quoc to effect a unification between the factions. Proceeding from Siam, where he had been working secretly to organize 30,000

Vietnamese living there into a nationalist association, he arrived in Hong Kong in January 1930.⁷¹

Under Nguyen Ai Quoc's direction a solution was rapidly achieved, and the Vietnamese Communist Party was formed on February 3, 1930. It was to be considered a new organization, not just a continuation of previous parties.

The Vietnamese communist movement subsequently became integrated into the regional and world wide communist system. At the lowest (or national) level, the Party was equal to the Siam and Malay Communist parties. These parties were subordinated to the Southern Bureau of the Comintern Far Eastern Bureau which was directed from Moscow.

The Comintern, however, was not yet satisfied. According to Pike, "Being oriented toward pan-Asian rather than toward national-level communism, it was particularly displeased with the parochial choice of name: The Vietnamese Communist Party."⁷² An official party history describes the concern as follows:

After studying the documents of the Unification Meeting, the communist international immediately sent a letter with instructions to the Viet Nam Communist Party amending a number of points in the line and tasks of the Vietnamese revolution and with suggestions about the question of changing the Party's name to Indochinese Communist Party.⁷³

"Apparently over the demure of Ho Chi Minh", the Party Central Committee changed the name to the Indochinese Communist Party in October, 1930.⁷⁴ It was awarded national section status by the Comintern in April, 1931.⁷⁵

Central to the purpose of this analysis is the relationship between Vietnamese Communists and those of Laos and Cambodia. While most of the organizational relationships remain a mystery, some facts are known. For example, the ICP directed party activity in Laos and Cambodia. It founded the Laos Regional Party Committee in 1930 and chapters in Vientiane, Savannakhet, Thakhet, and Pakse had emerged in 1933. The Cochin Chinese Regional Party Central Committee apparently administered Party activity in Cambodia during the 1930's.⁷⁶

The preceding paragraphs serve to illustrate the degree to which the ICP was initially molded to conform to Comintern interests. The incident regarding the name change is not offered as proof that Ho Chi Minh did or did not seek to control the communist parties of Laos and Cambodia. By itself it contains insufficient evidence to be argued for either case. What is valuable to note is the positive control assumed by the Comintern in directing this name change--and that it was the Comintern and not Ho that demanded the formation of a unified Indochinese Communist Party.

Communist activities during the early to mid-1930's were guided by a Vietnamese-drafted "Program of Action". It was adopted in 1932 with Moscow's approval. The Program included a section on "Basic Tasks of the Indochinese Revolution". While similar to Nguyen Ai Quoc's Ten Point Manifesto of 1930, the Program went well beyond it. Self-determination for the Laotians, Cambodians, and other nationalities in French Indochina was assured in the "Program of Action."⁷⁷

Comintern control of the ICP quickly reemerged. The appearance in 1934 of the "right to separate" campaign--which proposed self-determination for the minority peoples in Indochina--incurred the Comintern's wrath. Instead of seeking a close union of Annamites with the Cambodian's, Laotians, and other nationalities,⁷⁸ which would have paralleled Moscow's rapprochement with France pursuant to Hitler's anti-Soviet policy, the right to separate challenged it. The desire of some Vietnamese Communists to link the "right to separate" to the "right of Cambodian, Laotian, and other nationalities to self-determination" was not tolerated by the Comintern.⁷⁹

During this period of strict Comintern control the Indochinese Communist Party held a meeting in March, 1935. The Party's resolution on policy regarding nationalities as quoted in The Kampuchea Dossier, published in Hanoi, 1978, stipulated:

After driving the French imperialists out of Indochina, every nation will have the right to self-determination; it may join the Indochinese Federation or set up a separate state; it is free to join or leave the Federation; it may follow whichever system it likes. The fraternal alliance must be based on the principles of revolutionary sincerity, freedom and equality.⁸⁰

The Comintern's demand for unconditional adherence to Moscow's line, its demand for iron discipline, and the stress placed on the "monolithic leadership" within the Indochinese Communist Party, was itself a result of this new shift in Moscow's diplomacy. It was dictated by the need to ensure Indochinese allegiance to the Comintern as Moscow began a policy of rapprochement with France, i.e., a united-front policy in response to the anti-Soviet policy of Hitler.⁸¹

2. Summary and Assessment

During the decade of the 1930's external factors heavily influenced the policies of the Indochinese Communist Party. It was an infant organization that depended on the guidance and support of the Comintern.

The Comintern adopted policies which did not always run parallel to Indochina's interests. The instances of Comintern influence in selection of the party name, and Comintern throttling of the "right to separate" movement illustrate but two examples of Moscow's overlordship. Consequently, this constraint on the independence of the Laotian and Cambodian communist parties can be viewed as a result of external factors--and not necessarily part of a desire on the part of the Vietnamese dominated ICP to absorb the Laotian and Cambodian committees.

Moscow's eurocentric united front policy was the last major issue in which the Comintern was involved in Vietnam.⁸² By the late 1930's, Comintern interest in Asia began to decline. The Stalin purge trials and the threat of war in Europe were principal factors. William J. Duiker identifies a Soviet source as conceding that Comintern influence in Asia had "practically ended" by the late 1930's--several years before the Comintern's dissolution.⁸³

In 1940 Nguyen Ai Quoc returned to South China and took control of the Party. He returned to Vietnam in 1943, the same year the Comintern was dissolved. During this early period Ho Chi Minh directed the activities of his party while

under the watchful eye of the Comintern. Yet it is not direct relationship between "leaders" and "the lead". During this time Moscow's direction was neither consistent nor uniform. Complicating the relationship is the ambiguous degree to which Ho Chi Minh acted as an agent of the Comintern or as an independent agent bent on pursuing what he perceived to be the Vietnamese national interest.

An agreement in support of the belief that it was Ho Chi Minh's desire to dominate all of Indochina overemphasizes the role and influence of "the man" at a time when Ho lacked the power and political stability to act. While an Indochinese federation may have been a pipe dream, there is clear evidence to support the belief that Ho objected to its colonial implications. How Ho Chi Minh acted when he later had more power and stability will be examined in later chapters.

Before addressing Vietnamese concepts of regional integration, this point in Vietnam's historical development provides a convenient place to shift tracks and examine French concepts of integration in Indochina. The following section will examine the notion of federation in the context of French rule in Indochina.

This section, while germane to a complete discussion of federation in Indochina, should not be equated on par with indigenous Vietnamese efforts toward greater association.

D. FRENCH CONCEPTS OF FEDERATION IN INDOCHINA

Peninsular Southeast Asia was a strategic area in the Franco-British competition for the prizes of empire. France's early interest in the region was largely a function of the scramble for access to the expected riches of China's interior. In this context, the Mekong River was seen as a possible back door free from British interference.

Viewed from the perspective of the river there is a proclivity to regard the territories which form its banks as a single unit. Yet, as was illustrated earlier, the cultures that inhabit the banks of the Mekong are vastly different. As a result of these cross-cutting factors, the political creation of French Indochina was highly artificial.

The French administrative structure in Indochina was complex. Cochín China was the only territory which was a colony in the narrow constitutional sense. Arrangements concluded in 1884 created a protectorate over Tonkin and Annam. After 1887 all five regions (the above three plus Laos and Cambodia) were brought together under the cognizance of a single governor-general to form the Union Indochinoise.⁸⁴ The trend of French administration was toward centralized control. Paul Doumer, the energetic Governor-General from 1897 to 1902, was a key figure in this centralization process.⁸⁵

The relevance of this trend toward centralization to the discussion of the concept of federation in Indochina emerges in the period of the Second World War.

When France yielded to German occupation in June, 1940, the repercussions from the fall of the Republic were quickly felt throughout Southeast Asia. The arrival of Japanese troops in northern Indochina in September, 1940 spelled the end of an era for French colonialism in Indochina.

During the Japanese occupancy of Indochina, the French and Japanese engaged in a political struggle in which the Indochinese people were reduced to the role of pawns. Admiral Jean Decoux, who had replaced Governor-General Georges Catroux in July, 1940, promoted the development of the five Indochinese states (Tonkin, Annam, Cochinchina, Laos, and Cambodia) within a federal framework. Initially, the Japanese were content with the framework of French control in Indochina.⁸⁶ This concept of an Indochina Federation - "a mutually beneficial organization of different peoples, each with their separate traditions, held together and directed by France", was put forward to counter the appeal of a Japanese "Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere".⁸⁷

While the Japanese were the actual masters of Indochina, French administrations still governed the countryside and villages until 1945. The Japanese rarely, if ever, stepped foot into the rural areas.⁸⁸

However, the events of the Spring of 1945 ushered in a dramatic change. On March 9, the Japanese dissolved the French government, thereby immobilizing both political and military forces. Announcing that "the colonial status of French Indochina had ended", the Japanese declared Vietnam to

be independent. On March 11, Vietnamese Emperor Bao Dai announced the French-Vietnamese Treaty of 1884 abrogated and reaffirmed Vietnam's independence. He proclaimed Tonkin and Annam to be united. King Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia announced his nation's independence on March 13, as did King Sisavang Vong of Laos in April.⁸⁹

Free French designs on the future of Indochina had been first made public in December, 1943. The De Gaullists issued a statement advocating federalism which proclaimed that the regions of Indochina were to be autonomous states within the French association. While it promised political and economic reforms, it envisioned "nothing more than an autonomous status for Indochina within a larger association of France and her overseas territories".⁹⁰

Anticipating the allied victory over Germany and eventual defeat, the French Provisional Government issued another declaration on Indochina on March 24, 1945. (This statement pre-dated the existence of Ho Chi Minh's provisional government.) Providing for a federal Indochina within the French Union, the nationals of the federation were to have double citizenship and access to all federal posts and positions in Indochina and throughout the Union. While the Federation would have its own armed forces, foreign affairs and defense were to be French controlled. The text of the declaration is reprinted in Appendix B.

A number of hurdles impeded the reestablishment of French control over Indochina. The death of Franklin Roosevelt in

April, 1945 ended U.S. resistance to the reestablishment of French colonial control over Indochina and eliminated one such hurdle. The Truman administration, directed by a European-oriented State Department - which argued that France's colonial possessions were necessary for her post-war recovery - supported France's return to Indochina.

Decisions reached at Potsdam in July, 1945, had determined that Chinese troops would accept the surrender of the Japanese troops north of the 16th parallel, while the British would do the same south of it. The ultimate status of French Indochina had not been determined. At the time of the Japanese surrender in August, 1945 problems of transport delayed the return of French forces to Indochina. During this time period Ho Chi Minh negotiated with the Chinese for control of Tonkin. Although desirous of influence in Indochina, the Chinese viewed Vietnam more as a bargaining chip in their dealings with France. Tonkin was ceded to France in exchange for the relinquishment of French claims in Southern China. In February, 1946, a Franco-Sino Treaty was signed which provided for the withdrawal of all Chinese troops from Viet Nam by the end of March, 1946. The French agreed to renounce all extraterritorial and related rights in China. In essence, the Chinese decided to sacrifice Vietnamese independence for French economic and political concessions.

The British-French Civil Affairs Agreement of October 1945 gave the French full authority to administer Indochina south of the 16th parallel.

Of course, the biggest hurdle blocking France's effective return to control was the resistance offered by the Vietminh, a nationalist-communist dominated revolutionary league formed in 1941 to promote Vietnam's independence. Vietnamese desires for independence had been developing apace and apart from French intentions regarding the future of Indochina. Two days after Japan's surrender, at a meeting of the People's National Congress at Tan Trao, Ho Chi Minh was elected president of the provisional government. Amidst a "genuine popular revolution" that exceeded the expectations of the Vietminh, the Vietminh swept into Hanoi, occupied governmental buildings and took control of the local stores of arms. The Japanese looked on passively.⁹¹

Deferring to student demands, Emperor Bao Dai decided against calling upon the Vietminh to form a new government - which he had been prepared to do on August 22, 1945. Instead he abdicated, granting power to the provisional government formed by the Vietminh. According to I. Milton Sacks, this act "effectively signified to the tradition-minded Vietnamese people that a great historical shift of power had taken place, and that the new Democratic Republic of Vietnam now had the mandate of heaven."⁹²

With Vietnam having declared its independence on September 2, 1945, Ho Chi Minh was now in a position to engage the French. The result of the first series of negotiations was the signing of the March 6, 1946 French-Vietnamese Agreement. The provisions of this agreement, which vaguely

described Vietnam's relationship to France, stated that:

The French government recognizes the Republic of Vietnam as a free state, having its own government, parliament, army and treasury, belonging to the Indo-Chinese Federation and to the French Union.

Concerning the unification of the three (Tonkin, Annam, and Cochin-China), the French government binds itself to carry out the decisions taken by the population through a referendum.⁹³

Negotiations regarding the diplomatic relations of Vietnam with foreign states, and the future status of Indo-China, were postponed indefinitely.

Efforts to address unresolved issues were enjoined at Dalat on April 18 1946. Two principal areas of concern at the First Dalat Conference were the undefined nature of the diplomatic relations of Vietnam with foreign states, and the future status of Indo-China and the north.

In terms of tangible accomplishments, the Dalat Conference yielded little. However, in terms of what France's ideas of a federation were, the conference provides valuable insight.

The French High Commissioner was to remain the prominent figure of the Federation. He was to be both president of the Indochinese Federation and representative of the French Union. His responsibilities included direction of federal services, enforcement of federal laws, and selection of federal commissioners and advisors who would report only to himself.

The Federation would also have an assembly of states. Fifty of the sixty seats would be granted to the five divisions of Indochina (ten each to Tonkin, Annam, Cochin China, Laos, and Cambodia). The remaining ten would be held by French

interests. By this arrangement French control was assured; Tonkin and Annam could have been outvoted by French and French-dominated regimes in Cochin China, Cambodia and Laos.⁹⁴

At Dalat the Vietnamese would only agree with the French that some sort of federal assembly should exist.

By the time of the Dalat Conference, however, tangible evidence of French ideas of federation had appeared in Cambodia (and Laos). France effected a modus vivendi with the kingdom of Cambodia on January 7, 1946. The Commissioner of the French Republic was empowered to maintain order and issue and enforce regulations. He also directed the various French services in the country.

Additionally, the French Commissioner was to be personal advisor to the King, having access to both him and Cabinet meetings. He nominated the French advisors and experts who dominated the bureaucratic structure at all levels.

The Franco-Cambodian Agreement determined a large number of federal services: federal justice, treasury, higher and secondary education, customs, mines, railroads, foreign immigration, and large-scale public works.⁹⁵

Ellen Hammer, basing her evaluation on facts obtained from Journal Officiel de la Federation Indochinoise, assessed the French concept of Federation stating:

The lesson of French policy in Cambodia was that the Vietnamese were not the only people in Indochina to talk federation without practicing it. The intricate administrative structure envisaged by France for Indochina was as remote from Federation as the loose economic understanding favored by the Vietnamese. Federation, implying a division of power between the

various constituent units, on the one hand, and the federal government, on the other, did not exist in pre-war Indochina, where supreme power was divided between the French Governor General and the French Government in Paris. Whatever powers were enjoyed by subdivisions of the federation did not belong to them by right, but were delegated from above by the French central government and were exercised directly or indirectly by French officials. Despite a somewhat wider participation in the administration of the country after 1945, the situation in Cambodia remained much the same as before the war. It was not easy to differentiate between what the French described as a federal structure and what was in fact the machinery of French rule.⁹⁶

A qualitative feel for Vietnamese notions of federation can be gleaned from Ho Chi Minh's statement regarding the conclusion of the conference:

Both our delegations have recognized the need to form an Indochinese Federation. In this Federation all the states concerned will be linked not with hampering bonds, but with unifying and strengthening bonds. We agree on the principle of the creation of a federal organism providing it allows the members of the federation to prosper freely while remaining independent...We must still determine the methods by which this federation is to be realized.⁹⁷

As the dress-rehearsal, Dalat presaged an inauspicious start for the Fontainebleau Conference held during the summer of 1946. As at Dalat, Fontainebleau underscored the extreme differences between French and Vietnamese concepts of federation. The French delegation viewed the French Union as a federation of nations led by France. They insisted on unity of diplomacy, and control of armed forces, finances, and courts.

The Vietnamese advocated a Union in which status would be accorded based on state population. They proposed that the

federation's powers should be limited to making recommendations to the member states.

Chances for what little progress might have been made between the French and Vietnamese were undercut by an ad hoc second Dalat Conference. Ordered by the High Commissioner of France for Indochina, Admiral d' Argenlieu, delegates from Laos, Cambodia, and "southern Annam" were invited to attend. The second Dalat Conference successfully upstaged Fontainebleau and destroyed the Vietnamese negotiating strength.

Refusing to return to Vietnam empty-handed, Ho Chi Minh accepted a modus vivendi. The agreement skirts the issue of Cochin China's relations with the north and once again postpones decision on the nature of Vietnam's relations with foreign countries. The document is contained in Appendix B. It was the last effective negotiation between France and Vietnam until Geneva, 1954.

Having reviewed French plans for federation during the period of French rule in Indochina, this analysis now returns to Vietnamese concepts of federation. The following section picks up with the declaration of independence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

As was stated in the introductory paragraph to this section, it is indigenous Vietnamese concepts of greater association that are the focus of this analysis.

E. THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM: VIETNAMESE CONCEPTS OF INTEGRATION AND STEPS TOWARD FEDERATION

Having thus far examined the origins of the Indochinese Communist Party, the external factors which influenced it, and consequences for the communists of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, the following sections will focus on the Ho Chi Minh-directed policies of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam.

1. The First Official Statement

Having declared independence on September 2, 1945, the Provisional Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam issued its first official foreign policy statement on October 25. The document clearly emphasized the need for the cooperation of Laos and Cambodia in Vietnam's developing struggle with the French:

Our desire to cultivate friendship with Cambodia and Laos on the basis of self-determination of peoples is more earnest as, in the past, in the present juncture and in the future, there have been, are, and will be common features in the respective fates of the three nations. Having been under French domination, we must make common efforts to overthrow the French yoke and avoid taking any separate step which might be prejudicial to the independence of others. Mutual help is necessary to the recovery and maintenance of independence. Furthermore, as Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam will have many economic bounds (sic), the three nations will assist one another to reconstruct their respective countries and advance, side by side, on the path of progress.⁹⁸

Tersely stated, this initial foreign policy statement lays the foundation upon which the Vietnamese desire their relationship with Laos and Cambodia to develop. Of note,

in the above statement is the reference to the fates of the three nations, implying some sense of common destiny. At this early stage Hanoi has explicitly stated that cooperation between the three nations is not to be solely a function of external threat. It acknowledges that Vietnam also recognizes the national self-determination and independence of Laos and Cambodia.

2. Dissolution of the ICP and Implications for Viet-Lao-Khmer Relations

The autumn months of 1945 were frantic ones for the new regime in Hanoi. Amidst the general confusion of November, the Ho Chi Minh government made a startling announcement. At the end of its three-day conference, the Indochinese Communist Party officially dissolved itself. The Party published a communique stating:

1. Whereas, inconsideration of the given historical situation, both internationally and internally, the present moment is precisely an exceptional occasion for Viet Nam to reconquer her unitary independence;
2. Whereas, in order to complete the Party's task in this immense movement of the Vietnamese people's emancipation, a national union conceived without distinction of class and parties is an indispensable factor;
3. Wishing to prove that the Communists, in so far as they are advance guard militants of the Vietnamese people, are always ready to make the greatest sacrifices for national liberation, are always disposed to put the interest of the country above that of classes, and to give up the interests of the Party to serve those of the Vietnamese people;
4. In order to destroy all misunderstandings, domestic and foreign, the Central Executive Committee of the Indochina Communist Party in meeting assembled on November 11, 1945, has decided to voluntarily dissolve the Indochina Communist Party.

Those followers of Communism desirous of continuing their theoretical studies will affiliate with the Indo-china association of Marxist Studies.

CENTRAL COMMITTEE INDOCHINA COMMUNIST PARTY
November 11, 1945⁹⁹

This statement officially dissolving the Indochinese Communist Party is relevant to the discussion of Vietnamese, Laotian and Cambodian relations for three principal reasons. First, it implies the termination of Vietnamese coordination of the Laotian and Khmer revolutionary communist movements. Second, it makes quite clear that liberation and "unitary independence" are Vietnam's primary objectives. Third, Laos and Cambodia are not even mentioned in the text. This implies that in comparison to Vietnam's domestic concerns of liberation and unification, the revolutionary movements in Laos and Cambodia are clearly secondary.

Concern over the implications of this move in the context of Vietnamese support for Laos and Cambodia was apparently well grounded. That such a statement had an impact on party members - particularly those concerned about Vietnam's influence in Laos and Cambodia- is beyond doubt. Evidently at this stage the misgivings were manageable, perhaps because as Ho Chi Minh himself later said: "...in reality it [the Party] went underground and, although underground, the Party continued to lead the administration and the people".¹⁰⁰

Nevertheless, by 1951 on the occasion of the reemergence of the party, and in conjunction with its name change, resentment was clearly manifest among some of the more disgruntled Party members. This incident will be discussed in some detail later.

Observers have long speculated over the motives for this decision to dissolve the Party.¹⁰¹ The common denominator of the various assessments is that the Indochinese Communist Party was sacrificed as a tactical expedient in the neutralization of anti-Communist inspired Viet Minh opposition - and not as a consequence of the "rational susceptibilities" of the Lao or Khmer communists. Apparently in 1945 ethnocentric factors of national identity were not a consideration in the decision to disband the Party.

3. Additional Concepts: Statements and Interviews (1946-1950)

Returning once again to the immediate question of Vietnamese relations regarding Laos and Cambodia, Ho Chi Minh, prior to going to France in the summer of 1946, offered words of support and encouragement to the southern Vietnamese peoples. In doing so, he made a loosely veiled plea for cooperation:

I advise you to unite closely and broadly. The five fingers are of equal length but they are united in the hand. The millions of our countrymen are not all alike, but they are descended from the same ancestors.¹⁰²

This appeal, ironically, came one day before the French announced the formation of an independent state of Cochinchina within the Indochinese Federation and the French Union.¹⁰³ Ho Chi Minh granted a number of press conferences during the summer of 1950. Despite the years of war, the establishment of the People's Republic of China, and the growing U.S. support for the state of Vietnam to the south, the deference to the national independence of Cambodia and Laos initially stated in foreign policy statement of the Provisional Government of the DRVN, was maintained. When asked what he thought of future relations between Viet Nam, Cambodia, and Laos, Ho replied:

These relations will be established on the basis of complete equality and mutual respect, for the national independence of the three countries.¹⁰⁴

Responding to questions regarding U.S. intervention in Indochina, Ho Chi Minh indicated a desire for greater cooperation between the three Indochinese states:

...The Indochinese people...we must oppose the U.S. interventionists...close solidarity between the peoples of Viet Nam, Cambodia, and Laos constitutes a force capable of defeating the French colonialists and U.S. interventionists.¹⁰⁵

4. Rebirth of the ICP and Implications for Viet-Lao-Khmer Relations

In early 1951 the underground remnants of the Indochinese Communist Party publicly reemerged. At the second national Nations Congress of the Party held in February,¹⁰⁶ the Party adopted a new name, the Viet Nams Worker's Party (VWP).

External factors are believed to have had a large influence on the decision of the ICP to reemerge. One such factor was the success of the communist revolution, and the emergence of the People's Republic of China in October 1949. A second factor concerned international recognition of the Hanoi regime. The PRC officially recognized the DRVN on January 18, 1950, and the Soviet Union followed suit on January 30. Thirdly, on February 4, the United States extended recognition to Bao Dai's Republic of Viet Nam. Increased U.S. support of the south (in the form of \$10 million for military assistance approved by President Truman in May, and the establishment of the USMAAG of thirty-five Americans in Saigon that August) emphasized the expanding American involvement in the conflict on the side of the French.

Thus, by 1951, the primary reasons for the DRVN to neutralize its communist appearance (which was assessed to be a primary factor in the dissolution of the ICP earlier in this analysis) had become largely obsolete. Additionally, an open declaration of Communist leadership over the Vietnamese national liberation struggle and public commitment to Marxism-Leninism would appeal to both Stalin and Mao- who were at that time the principal source of Hanoi's support.¹⁰⁷

The selection of the name, Vietnamese Worker's Party, had great significance. The nature of its significance is perhaps best understood in the context of Paul Mus' belief that in Southeast Asia, words are facts.¹⁰⁸ In essence, the name

change itself was a compromise, the new Party hoping to avoid alienating moderates unnecessarily. The change, which was met with doubts (contention had arisen over the abandonment of both the words: "Indochinese" and "Communist"), was explained by Truong Chinh - secretary general of both the ICP (1941-1951) and VNP (1951-1956):

Where does the Viet-nam Workers' Party come from? It comes from the Indochinese Communist Party. According to the above proposal, the Vietnamese section of the Indochinese Communist Party would be detached to become a party specifically in Viet-nam taking the name Viet-nam Workers' Party.

Why must we found a Viet-nam Workers' Party? The announcement of the Central Committee of July 1950 explained it clearly. Here I only present the main reason:

Establishing the Viet-nam Workers' Party is aimed primarily at strengthening the leading role of the working class, consolidating the worker-peasant alliance, linking the working class with other popular laboring strata, unifying the national democratic forces under the Party's leadership, defeating the imperialists and their lackies, completing the national liberation, developing the people's democratic regime, protecting world peace and democracy, and preparing to advance to socialism.

Taking the name Viet-nam Workers' Party is not only advantageous to the unification of the entire people to defeat the invading army, but also advantageous to the anti-imperialist united front of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos against French-U.S. imperialism, and the winning of complete national independence.

...our Party is not convinced that we must take the name communist party, but believe we can take another name, provided that our Party still follows Marxism-Leninism, that the final objective of the Party is still communism, and that the change of name is advantageous for the revolutionary movement, for the development of the Party, into a powerful mass party, the consolidation of the Party's leading role, and the strengthening of relations between the Party and the masses. 109

Evident in Truong Chinh's comments is the reference to the "united front" of Viet Nam, Cambodia, and Laos. As to what was ultimately meant by this "united front" is not altogether certain - but subsequent statements by Ho Chi Minh, and other documentary evidence would help define the nature of the proposed united front.

Relating to this matter of the name change, P.J. Honey, a noted scholar of Vietnam, provides a relevant and illuminating extract from a "Top Secret" document. (This document and its origins will be discussed in more detail later.) It provides not only further justification for the name but also ties it in to Party objectives in Southeast Asia.

If we were to persist in keeping the name "Communist Party", a number of property owners, landlords, progressive intellectuals, and members of religious sects would be unwilling to follow us.

The name "Workers' Party" is more useful than "Communist Party" for gaining ground and spreading among the different classes of the people, particularly among the religious sects in both the liberated and temporarily occupied zones...

On November 11th, 1945, we declared the Indochinese Communist Party dissolved. It is making its official reappearance today, but is adopting another name so as to make propaganda easier.

Not only is it our duty to help the Laotian and Cambodian revolutionaries, but also the revolutionary movements in other South East Asian countries such as Malaya, Indonesia, Burma, etc. These movements are at present under severe pressure from the imperialists. Because the "Communist Party" is prohibited in these countries, the name "Workers' Party" facilitates our actions to help these revolutionary movements.

There are in the world at the present time several Workers' Parties or Marxist-Leninist Parties which have not adopted the name of Communist Party. For example: The Polish United Workers' Party, The Hungarian Workers' Party, The Korean Workers' Party.

The name adopted by the Party is simply a question of tactics and tactics must vary according to time and circumstances."110

The name change, therefore, clearly did not imply a loosening of Hanoi's aid to Laos and Cambodia.

The Second National Congress of the Viet Nam Workers' Party afforded Ho Chi Minh the first opportunity officially to address the issue of Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Laotian relations since its successor, the ICP, had been "dissolved" in November 1945. Proceeding one step - albeit a carefully planned step - beyond his earlier call for "close solidarity", Ho suggests the establishment of a front.

We are waging our war of resistance, the brother Cambodian and Lao nations are also waging theirs. The French colonialists and the American interventionists are the common enemy of our three nations. Consequently, we must strive to help our Cambodian and Lao brothers and their wars of resistance, and proceed to set up a Viet Nam-Cambodian-Lao Front.¹¹¹

In this statement Ho tactfully distinguished between the Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Laotian wars of resistance; and acknowledges the struggle being waged by the "brother" countries. Having paid deference to the "independence" of their resistance efforts, he then proposes the establishment of a united front. With one wave of the wand he is stroking their national pride - with the other he is proposing that they compromise it. It is subtle orchestration.

The platform adopted by the Lao Dong Party at the Second National Conference adds an interesting twist to an assessment of the degree of association actually proposed by the Vietnamese. No Vietnamese text of the platform is available

and the segments below are excerpts from the only known D.R.V. English translation.¹¹²

The document mentions Vietnamese relations with Laos and Cambodia in two distinct contexts. Regarding their relations in the context of the anti-French/anti-American resistance the platform proposes that:

All political, economic, and cultural works must aim to insure military victories and the military struggle must be coordinated with the political, economic, and cultural struggle. Frontal fighting against the enemy must be closely coordinated with guerrilla fighting and sabotage work in the enemy's rear. The liberation war of the Vietnam people must be closely coordinated with the armed resistance of the people of Laos and Cambodia and with the world-wide struggle for peace and democracy.¹¹³

The call for associated struggle, is in fact, quite tame.

Later in the document, in the context of foreign relations, the degree of association desired becomes more specific:

Our policy toward Laos and Cambodia - the Vietnam people must unite closely with the peoples of Laos and Cambodia and give them an (sic) all-out assistance in the common struggle against imperialist aggression for the complete liberation of Indochina and for the preservation of world peace. On the basis of serving the common interests of the three peoples, the Vietnam people are willing to cooperate on long (sic) terms with the peoples of Laos and Cambodia and will strive to bring about single-mindedness between the three peoples.¹¹⁴

In effect, the Lao Dong platform calls for a long term co-operation between the three nations; the objective is to achieve a unified outlook on foreign policy.

The twist comes from a Chinese translation of the document found in a supplement to People's China. While the statements referring to coordinated anti-resistance struggle are essentially the same as quoted above, in the foreign relations context the document refers to the establishment of a federation; if the people of Viet Nam, Cambodia, and Laos so desire:

OUR POLICY TOWARDS LAOS AND CAMBODIA

The people of Viet-Nam must unite closely with the people of Laos and Cambodia and give them every assistance in the common struggle against imperialist aggression, for the complete liberation of Indo-China and for the defence of world peace.

In the common interests of the three peoples, the people of Viet-Nam are willing to enter into long-term co-operation with the peoples of Laos and Cambodia, with a view to bringing about an independent, free, strong and prosperous federation of the states of Viet-Nam, Laos and Cambodia, if the three peoples so desire.¹¹⁵

This is believed to be the first Vietnamese sponsored call for "federation".¹¹⁶

5. Unification of Viet Minh/Lien Viet Congress: Implications for Indochinese Relations

At the Congress for the Unification of the Viet Minh and Lien Viet, held on March 3, Ho Chi Minh alludes to yet greater cooperation between the three states. Having already proposed his desire to see the three nations strive toward singlemindedness, Ho now proclaims they are of one heart and mind. "Surely" a union between the states will be formed.

What makes me even happier is that not only the entire people of Viet-Nam are united, but the entire people of the two brotherly nations, Cambodia and Laos, have also achieved broad unity (Long Applause). The good news of this unity has been personally brought to us by Cambodian and Laotian delegates.

Thus the Vietnamese people have achieved broad union; so have the Cambodian people and so have the Lao people. We shall surely arrive at a broad Vietnamese-Cambodian-Lao union (Long Applause).

Because our three fraternal nations are of one heart and one mind...

Long live the Vietnamese-Cambodian-Laotian great unity.¹¹⁷

As if it were to confirm his predictions on March 3, a joint conference of Vietnamese, Laotian and Cambodian United Front delegates was held on March 11. The Manifesto of the conference adopted the below "steps toward implementation of (the) Indochinese 'federation'".¹¹⁸

Manifesto of the Joint United Front of Viet-Nam,
Laos, and Cambodia

March 11, 1951

The Joint Conference of Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia, attended by delegates of the three National United Fronts of Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia--Lien Viet Front in Viet-Nam, Khmer Issarak Front in Cambodia, and Lao Issara Front in Laos--at its meeting on March 11, 1951, after examining the situation in the world and in Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia, and relations between these three peoples in the struggle against aggression, unanimously declares:

1. The French colonialists and American interventionists are making all-out attempts to conquer Viet-Nam, Cambodia, and Laos, and to enslave these three peoples once again. But the regimes they have set up in Viet-Nam, Cambodia, and Laos are merely puppet regimes, and the independence they have bestowed on these three countries is but a fake independence. The American interventionists are not only plotting to turn these three countries into their colonies but also to use them as bases for aggression on China, for suppressing of the liberation movement of the

peoples in Southeast Asia, and for plunging the world in a new war.

2. In the face of the common enemies, the Joint Conference of Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia has set up an alliance between the peoples of Viet-Nam, Laos and Cambodia on the basis of free choice, equality, mutual assistance, and mutual respect of national sovereignty, with the aim of wiping out the French colonialists, defeating the American interventionists and punishing the traitorous puppets, and gaining genuine independence for the three peoples and contributing to the maintenance of world peace.

The Conference has elected a Joint Committee of Viet-Nam, Cambodia, and Laos, with a view to strengthen friendly relations and realize mutual assistance between the three peoples.

3. The Conference calls on the people of Viet-Nam to unite ever more closely in the Lien Viet Front, on the people of Cambodia to unite more closely in the Khmer Issarak Front, and the people of Laos to unite more closely in the Lao Issara Front, so as to strengthen the alliance between Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia, to bring early victory to the resistance of these three peoples, to consolidate and develop the national and people's power in the three countries.

The Conference calls on peoples of the world and the oppressed peoples to support the alliance between Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia, so that it can fulfill the task of defending justice and gaining freedom. The Conference firmly believes that world peace will certainly be victorious and that the three peoples of Viet-Nam, Cambodia, and Laos will surely achieve genuine independence.¹¹⁹

In addition, the conference adopted a resolution calling for the formation of the Joint United Front.¹²⁰ This conference can be viewed as a major stepping stone in the perceived progression toward federation.

6. The Secret Document

Despite Truong Chnih's reassurances at the Second Party Congress, it soon became apparent that a number of the Party members retained misgivings over the change of name. This group feared that the change from "Indochinese" to "Vietnamese" implied that Viet-Nam was proposing to abandon her influence in Laos and Cambodia. Consequently, in order to shore up their support, the Lao Dong issued a secret directive in November, 1951 to supplement the public manifesto it had issued the previous February.

This document was captured by the French Expeditionary Corps in North Viet-Nam during the spring of 1952. Having been unable to locate a copy of the original,¹²¹ this writer relies heavily on the assessment of P.J. Honey who has reviewed the document. Honey's interest in the document, namely its implications regarding the long-term objectives of the Vietnamese communists, exactly parallels the ultimate concern of this study.

Honey asserts:

The captured directive states that the Laotian and Cambodian Communist Parties continued to receive their orders from the former Indochinese Communist Party, but they did so secretly, and the overt leadership of the two parties was in the hands of Laotians and Cambodians. The captured directive continues: "But later on, when conditions permit this to be carried out, the three revolutionary parties of Viet-nam, Cambodia, and Laos will be reunited to form a single party."¹²²

His assessment is that:

Thus the ultimate aim of the Vietnamese Communist leadership is to install Communist regimes in the whole of Vietnam, in Laos, and in Cambodia, after which they will then rule the three countries. The captured directive does not state, but strongly implies, that the single party will be controlled by Vietnamese Communists in the same way the Indochinese Communist Party was.¹²³

Honey believes that Hanoi's actions to effect the "federation" were motivated by economic concerns. The North's lack of self-sufficiency, particularly in the agricultural sector is a primary causal factor - not only for the liberation of the south, but for all actions toward the stated objectives regarding all of Indochina.

These (Hanoi's) activities are directed toward the achievement of the objectives stated in the captured document, and there are strong indications that the objectives have been neither changed nor modified. This can be said despite shifts in the tactics used to gain these objectives. For example, the northern half of Vietnam was not economically self-sufficient in 1954 when the Communist regime assumed control, and has still not achieved self-sufficiency today despite the aid supplied by other members of the Communist bloc. Hence North Vietnamese actions and tactics for achieving the stated objectives of the Lao Dong Party have been influenced by the state's economic needs, particularly by her insufficient agricultural production.¹²⁴

Mention must be made of the appearance of this document in the context of the course of the Franco-Vietnamese War. In December, 1950 General Jean De Lattre de Tassigney was appointed High Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief of the French Expeditionary Forces in Indochina. He was the first and only man to wield the power of both positions.

De Lattre, one of France's "ablest World War II generals," arrived in Indochina to find the French community in a state of panic, and an army "demoralized, defeated, and decimated".¹²⁵ He set about to reverse this tide of events. The General saw his mission not in terms of reestablishing the French colonial presence in Indochina (which he was critical of), but in the context of an anti-communist crusade.¹²⁶ He revitalized the French forces and formed them into spirited fighting units, and the founding of a Vietnamese national army was initiated under his direction.

The "electrified" fighting corps, under de Lattre's command, handed Giap and the Vietminh their first series of devastating defeats.¹²⁷ forcing Giap to abandon large unit maneuvers and retreat back to guerilla tactics. General de Lattre spoiled the promise made by Giap to Ho Chi Minh that they would be out of their jungle retreat and in Hanoi for the Tet, February, 1951.¹²⁸

The untimely death of de Lattre - at the hands of cancer on January 11, 1952 - marked the end of hopes for a French counteroffensive. The consequence of this event, in conjunction with the unpopularity of the Indochina War in France,¹²⁹ did not escape the attention of the Vietminh military leadership. Thus it was at a crucial period of renewed optimism following a year of set-backs, that the secret document surfaces. Viewed in this context, the document can be read as a call for enhanced coordination and solidarity in the accelerating resistance struggle.¹³⁰

Concluding on a pessimistic note, Honey informs the reader of the implications contained in this document for the whole of Southeast Asia

Before passing from this section on the long-term objectives, it is worth citing one more short extract from the captured directive. Part C, Section 5, reads: "Not only is it our duty to aid the revolutionaries in Cambodia and Laos, but we must also aid the revolutionary movements in the other countries of South East Asia, countries such as Malaya, Indonesia, Burma, etc."¹³¹

Quoting from a mimeograph copy of Honey's work,¹³²

Frank N. Trager reveals additional insight into the degree of control exercised by the Vietnamese communists.

Sections of the Communist Party now exist in Cambodia and Laos (as well as in Viet-Nam as a whole) and are developing; Cambodia and Laos already possess unified Liberation Fronts. At the center of the organizations are groups of faithful Communists who constitute delegations of the Indochinese Communist Party, from which they receive their orders. The Vietnamese Party retains a permanent right of supervision over the activities of the fraternal Cambodian and Laotian Parties. Later, when conditions permit, the three revolutionary parties of Viet Nam, Cambodia and Laos will unite to form a single party.¹³³

Finally, Honey indicates that the secret directive strongly implies, though does not say so in so many words, that the intention of the Vietnamese Communist leaders is to unify the territories of the former French Indochina.¹³⁴ This, of course, would be a tangible step toward federation.

The operative words, however, are "implies" and "intentions". Such non-specific words should be read with caution lest they influence one regarding their author's biases rather than Vietnamese desires.

Assessments as to the reasons why the secret directive to form three separate parties for Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia at the time of the Workers' Conference in 1951 generally vary only in degree. Quoting from an inter-Party memorandum, William Duiker maintains that the decision "was based on the need to observe 'national susceptibilities' (suggesting that Party members of Lao and Khmer extraction were growing restive under direct Vietnamese control)".¹³⁵

This evaluation strongly echoes that of P.J. Honey, who alleges that the change was made to avoid causing offense to Laotian and Cambodian nationalists, who were all too aware that the Vietnamese dominated the senior positions in the ICP.¹³⁶ The Laotian and Cambodian movements were under the ICP's direction, and "lest they resent Vietnamese direction of their movements", the split was ordered.

Gareth Porter believes that by this time, the revolutionary movements in Laos and Cambodia had matured to the point where they needed their own Communist Parties.¹³⁷

7. Ho Chi Minh: What Shall We Do From Now On?

Concluding what in many respects was a landmark year in coordinating its resistance against the French, Ho Chi Minh, in December made an appeal for closer solidarity between the three peoples.

What shall we do from now on to win complete victory? ...Our people will strengthen their solidarity; solidarity among us, solidarity with the Cambodian and Laotian people, solidarity with our brothers: China, the Soviet Union and the new democracies.¹³⁸

8. Summary and Assessment

The purpose of this preliminary summary and assessment is to underscore a few discernable trends and highlight some perhaps less obvious patterns.

A reading of the collection of Ho Chi Minh's writings, Party documents, and unofficial statements has left this writer with two qualitative impressions. The first is the relative infrequency with which statements regarding Laos or Cambodia were made by Vietnamese officials. This is important to note because in a study such as this, which focuses on Vietnam's relations with its neighbors in Indochina, there is a tendency toward tunnel vision. In the great majority of cases, references to Laos and Cambodia - when they were made at all - were made in the context of Vietnam's anti-colonial resistance. During this time period the primary objectives were liberation and unification. While relationships rarely exist solely on one plane, and rarely are geared toward a single objective, it is a tentative conclusion that Vietnamese efforts to enhance its association with Laos and Cambodia were under the influence of the dominant objectives of liberation and unification.

The second impression follows from the excerpts quoted in the previous paragraphs. During the period between 1946 and 1951 there is a discernable trend of calls for closer association on the part of the DRVN. From the desire to "cultivate friendship" expressed in the initial policy statement of

October, 1946, the calls for increased association develop in a step-like fashion. What were calls for friendship in 1946 had adopted a Marxist tone and appeared as pleas for "close solidarity" in 1950. The calls for association quickly accelerated in 1951 as the "brother" countries were urged to form a front, an alliance, and possibly a federation. The possibility of territorial integration is implied.

Yet despite the calls for greater integration, the concepts of equality, mutual respect, self-determination, and national independence were never compromised. Are these concepts contradictory? Perhaps, but it is also entirely possible that these notions of equality and independence reflected the true desires of Ho Chi Minh - a man who had spent his life combating the consequences of racial inequality. The nature of this apparent paradox will be addressed further throughout the remainder of this study.

Also left unresolved by the survey of statements thus far is the question of who the burden of the calls for integration was falling on, i.e., who was the audience? In this regard there are three distinct possibilities: the people, the nation, and the Party.

On the majority of occasions, it was the people who were called on for greater unity; on rare occasions it was the nation. Under the ideals of international communism, it can be assumed that the parties of the three Indochinese states were always expected to seek greater solidarity.

This question, and its implications, will be addressed in further detail later.

Finally, based on the assessment to this point, what can be concluded about the "steps toward federation"? This writer proposes the following ladder:

- 1) recognition of a common threat
- 2) establishment of an "alliance" with the aim of combating the threat
- 3) establishment of a joint committee to coordinate the three distinct communist parties
- 4) call for the people to unite and support the resistance
- 5) call for international recognition

Having examined in some detail official statements proposing cooperation, the reader should by this point have developed a sense of both continuity and context.

The remaining section in Part I will review in a more cursory fashion the events following 1951 up until unification in July, 1976.

9. Additional Concepts: 1952 - Geneva 1954

The ensuing period of time up until the Geneva Conference of 1954 was marked by frequent Vietnamese praise and acknowledgements of greater unity between Indochinese peoples. It was a period of coordinated struggle. And it was a period that climaxed at Dien Bien Phen. Marking the new year, Ho Chi Minh had occasion to review past successes:

In 1951, the Vietnamese people made a big stride forward. In the political field, the founding of the Viet Nam Worker's Party, the amalgamation of the Viet Minh and Lien Viet, the setting up of the Committee of Action for Viet Nam, Cambodia, and Laos, greatly consolidated the unity and enhanced the confidence of the Vietnamese people; they strengthened the alliance between the three brother countries in their struggle against the common enemies - the French colonialists and U.S. interventionists - in order to realize their common goals, i.e., national independence.¹³⁹

On the occasion of the Tet festival of 1952, Ho Chi Minh posed the answer to his own rhetorical question of what the three nations must do in order to achieve further success. Only that task directly relevant to Lao and Khmer relations is quoted below:

What have we to do to make further progress and achieve greater successes?
To this end, it is necessary for us to perform the following tasks:

1. We shall unite more closely, frankly and broadly. Unity of the entire peoples. Solidarity with the Cambodian and Lao peoples. Solidarity with our brother countries. Solidarity with the peoples who are fighting for peace, freedom, and national independence.¹⁴⁰

Solidarity with the Lao and Khmer people was also praised on the occasion of Vietnam's most important national holiday, the anniversary of the August Revolution and National Day, September 2, stating:

the bonds of solidarity between our peoples and the Cambodian and Laotian peoples have been strengthened.¹⁴¹

Anniversaries during the year of 1953 followed much the same pattern. The March 3 celebration witnessed Ho calling for the unity of the peoples and the Parties of the three nations.

Now I am speaking of the work of the Viet Nam Workers' Party. ...It must unite with the friendly parties and unite the organization within the Front ...we must unite with the Cambodian, Laotian and Chinese peoples, and other friendly countries.¹⁴²

On August Revolution Day and National Day, 1953 Ho Chi Minh praised the many successes of the resistance. He acknowledged that the solidarity between the brother countries had become "stronger and stronger".¹⁴³

And in his report to the third session of the First National Assembly - his last official statement regarding Laos and Cambodia prior to the Geneva Conference - Ho acclaimed: "The alliance between Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos has grown closer."¹⁴⁴

10. The Geneva Conference: Implications for Vietnamese-Laotian-Cambodian Relations

The Geneva Conference of 1954 provides occasion for additional insight into Vietnamese, Laotian and Cambodian relations. Of the complex issues considered at the conference, those dealing with Laos and Cambodia were significant - but of a secondary nature. The overriding issue was to produce a settlement to the conflict between France and the Viet Minh. The DRVN's primary interest was to obtain as favorable a solution as possible in Vietnam - the decisions about Laos were important in the context of its security.¹⁴⁵ Cambodia was somewhat less so.

Before Pham Van Dong, head of the DRVN delegation, was willing to present his proposals for peace in Indochina, he asked for discussion on a proposal that acknowledged the

necessity for inviting representatives of the resistance "governments" of the Pathet Lao and Khmer Issarak to the conference. The Soviet representative, Molotov, and the PRC's delegate, Chou En-lai, supported Dong's proposal.¹⁴⁶ In the course of its bargaining, however, the DRVN proved willing to modify its demands with respect to Laos and Cambodia in return for concessions in Vietnam.¹⁴⁷ The decision not to seat the Pathet Lao and Khmer Issarak at Geneva seem to have originated from a realistic appraisal of their weak claim to legitimacy as governments.¹⁴⁸

This decision had a curious consequence. After the agreement to drop the demand for representation of the Khmer Issarak and the Pathet Lao, the DRVN thereafter "represented" these movements on the military commissions for Cambodia and Laos and at the political conference.¹⁴⁹

Concerning the political aspects of the Geneva Agreement, Robert Randle maintains that on the general principles of respect for sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of the three Indochinese states, and on interference in each other's internal affairs, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia while claiming such rights for themselves, did not address themselves to the rights of the others.¹⁵⁰ This is despite their obligation under the agreement to do so.

Regarding the military aspects, the effect on the Cambodian and Lao resistance movements was significant. In the case of the Cambodian cease fire, it was agreed that the

Khmer Issarak should be demobilized on the spot. The generalization that the Khmer Issarak was solely a creature of the Vietminh is not entirely correct. Furthermore, there is reason to believe that the Khmer Issarak freely consented to Vietminh representation in June and to the terms regarding demobilization.¹⁵¹

With the demobilization of the Khmer Issarak and the withdrawal of Vietnamese military units, there was but one government in Cambodia and no insurgent movement challenged its legitimacy.

As for the Pathet Lao leaders at Geneva, Langer and Zasloff maintain that it is difficult to get an accurate sense of their expectations. In view of the degree to which the Pathet Lao were dependent on their North Vietnamese benefactors, the above scholars believe that the Pathet Lao must have realized that their ultimate gains accrued from the gains of their sponsor.¹⁵²

Ultimately, the Geneva Accords served the Pathet Lao well. The Lao communists secured a base area in two strategic provinces from which they built up their political and military strength. Based on interviews of communist defectors Zasloff and Langer believe that while the bulk of Vietminh troops departed Laos, political and military advisors remained in the provinces of Sam Neua and Phong Saly to give technical assistance and advice.¹⁵³ Randal maintains that this de facto division of Laos invited Vietnamese intervention in Lao's internal affairs.¹⁵⁴

An interesting aside to the main events of Geneva - and one whose importance would only be fully recognized after Vietnam's reunification more than twenty years later - was the Cambodian delegate's presentation of a document that reserved Cambodian "rights and legitimate interests " in certain regions of the southern zone of Vietnam. Calling this territory "Cambodian lands in South Viet Nam," the delegate stated:

Cambodia has no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of the state of Viet Nam and associates herself fully with the principle of respect for its integrity, provided certain adjustments and regularizations be arrived at with regard to the borders between this state and Cambodia, borders which so far have been fixed by a mere unilateral act of France.¹⁵⁵

Following the conclusion of the Geneva Conference, Ho Chi Minh in a report to the sixth plenum of the Viet Nam Workers' Party Central Committee stated that the Vietnamese, Cambodian and Laotian peoples were "united". Maintaining that their resistance was growing ever more vigorous, he declared that it was their task to "assist" the Pathet Lao and Khmer forces.¹⁵⁶

Gareth Porter maintains that the Indochinese federation idea, which was supported by the Indochinese Communist Party "since its beginning." was dropped by the Viet Nam Workers' Party after 1954.¹⁵⁷ Recent evidence which shall be discussed in detail in conjunction with Vietnamese-Khmer relations later, tends to confirm this.

11. Post-Geneva to Reunification

To have spent a great amount of effort analyzing Vietnamese statements regarding their relations with Cambodia and Laos during the time period of 1930-1954, and then to turn around and briefly assess their statements during the 1955-1975 period is not without justification.

As was mentioned earlier, the idea of an Indochinese federation was dropped after 1954. The degree to which "secret" party memos may have called for federation is a matter of speculation, but, nevertheless, appeals for solidarity between the three Indochinese states decreased in intensity after 1954.

At the September, 1955 National Day Anniversary, Ho Chi Minh in reiterating the terms of Geneva which had brought peace to the region stated: "We particularly urge the maintenance of peaceful relations with our neighbors, namely Cambodia and Laos."¹⁵⁸

Five years later, at the Third National Congress of the Viet nam Workers' Party, Ho Chi Minh's appeal was noticeably subdued: "We sincerely hope that friendly relations between our country and our neighbors, especially Cambodia and Laos, will be established and promoted in a satisfactory manner."¹⁵⁹

The downbeat tone of the above statement is striking. One can speculate as to the many possible reasons for such a shift. Perhaps Cambodia, and even Laos to a degree, were less vital in the struggle for unification now that the anticolonial

resistance had succeeded. With the French forces gone, it is probable that Vietnam felt less vulnerable from the west (i.e. from hostile forces operating in Laos and Cambodia). Another possible reason was the emergence of the Sino-Soviet split which may have caused Vietnam to reconsider her relations with her fraternal neighbors. And perhaps the tone in part reflects Hanoi's response to U.S. policy advocating independence for Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam.

Subsequent to the 1962 Geneva Conference on Laos, Pham Van Dong, in an interview in which both he and Ho were present, stated that Hanoi would respect the Laos agreements "and at all costs maintain good relations with Cambodia."¹⁶⁰ Adhering to the Laos agreement implied support of a neutral Laos. Once again demonstrations of solidarity and fraternal relations were lacking.

At a special Political Conference held during March, 1964, Ho Chi Minh made a brief reference to the "brotherly" countries of Laos and Cambodia. Concerning the Kingdom of Cambodia, Ho stressed that Hanoi "consistently stood for the establishment of good, neighborly relations." The Chairman also disclosed that the DRVN supported and was willing to participate in an international conference (proposed by Norodom Sihanouk) which would guarantee the neutrality and territorial integrity of Cambodia.¹⁶¹

One year later, at the Second Session of the Third National Assembly of the DRVN, Hanoi's support for her Indochinese

neighbors was once again on the apparent rise. Ho Chi Minh stated that:

With regard to the Lao and Cambodian peoples who are valiantly struggling against the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen, our people constantly strengthen our solidarity with them and wholeheartedly support them.¹⁶²

On April 15, 1956 in a speech entitled "US Imperialists Get Out of South Viet-Nam", Ho Chi Minh addressed the subject of Indochinese relations stating:

With regard to the Laotian and Cambodian peoples... our people constantly strengthen solidarity with them and unreservedly support them.¹⁶³

As was the case earlier, one can only speculate as to the possible reasons for the apparent shift in verbal support. Yet, the parallel occurrence of this reversal with the build-up of U.S. troops in South Vietnam, and increased hostile activity directed against the North from throughout Indochina, cannot go without notice.¹⁶⁴

The above statement was quite likely one of Ho Chi Minh's last public, official statements regarding Vietnamese support for Laos and Cambodia.¹⁶⁵ While Ho Chi Minh's "Testament" makes reference to the world revolution, none is made regarding Laos or Cambodia.¹⁶⁶

During the mid-1960s statements made by Pham Van Dong generally echoed those of Ho Chi Minh. The Prime Minister's statements also reflect the shift toward increased solidarity between the three Indochinese states. However, statements made between 1965 and Vietnam's unification some ten years

later reveal a shallow oscillation about the norm of calls for fraternal and militant solidarity. There was no apparent step-like sequencing toward federation as was witnessed during the early 1950s.

Figure 1 presents a summary of Pham Van Dong's statements regarding Vietnam, Laotian, and Cambodian relations during this 10-year period. The purpose of this matrix is to provide a qualitative summary of the nature of Pham Van Dong's statements.¹⁶⁷ While representative, the summary does not reflect an exhaustive analysis of all speeches and all references regarding Indochinese relations. It does, however, serve to illustrate the assessment stated above.

Two considerations not illustrated by Figure 1 merit mention. As was previously illustrated for the period during the 1950s, Vietnamese calls for solidarity were not solely a function of the external threat - in that case French colonialism. That the close relationship between the three countries during the 1960s and 1970s would continue beyond the elimination of the U.S. imperialist threat was confirmed once again in 1974 (i.e., after the Paris Peace Accords of 1973).

It also must be mentioned that recognition of mutual respect for the other nation's sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence, i.e., the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence, or Panch Shila, had been acknowledged in most, if not tacitly in all,

statements since Geneva, 1954. This was generally consistent with Ho Chi Minh's statements of the 1930s regarding the equality of peoples, illustrated earlier.

	April 5, 1965	May 24, 1968	June, 1970	March 27, 1972	September 2, 1972	May, 1973	September 2, 1973	September 2, 1974	September 2, 1975
<u>Cooperation</u>									
Support				X	X			X	
Assist			X	X					
Coordination				X					
Consolidation	X	X							X
Unite			X	X					
<u>Fraternal relationship</u>									
Neighborliness	X	X	X						
Friendliness/friendship		X		X				X	X
Fraternal people					X	X	X		
Fraternal/militant solidarity	X	X	X	X				X	X
Side by side/shoulder to shoulder				X		X			
Mutual understanding/ of one mind			X	X					
Respect				X					
Gratitude					X				
Love				X					

Figure 1.

III. VIETNAM: THE TREND TOWARD FEDERATION - RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

The purpose of this chapter is to focus on recent developments in the trend toward federation in Indochina. Like the previous section, it will proceed on two planes. It will identify factors in the regional and extra-regional systems which tend toward or away from federation. In addition, it will specifically address the notion of Indochinese Federation as it reappeared after a twenty-five year absence. Although the discussion of the Lao-Vietnamese relationship extends back beyond "recent developments", it is included here as a possible model for present-day Vietnamese actions in Kampuchea.

A. INTEGRATION IN THE REGIONAL CONTEXT

It would be a great mistake to assume that under the umbrella of "special relationships," Vietnam's relationship with Laos and its relationship with Kampuchea are similar. Each has been the product of different circumstances; each bilateral relationship has characteristic features.

The purpose of this section is to assess the nature of Lao-Vietnamese relations. The reason is two-fold. First, the Laos-Vietnamese relationship forms two sides of the federation triangle. Any analysis of the prospects for federation must address this relationship. In addition, the

Laos-Vietnamese relationship has cultivated a much greater degree of inter-dependence than Vietnam's association with Kampuchea. An analysis of the former relationship - particularly in the areas of organization and assistance; might not directly translate into the Vietnamese-Kampuchean context. However, it might provide some insight into the nature of the association that is presently developing between the latter. Thus this study of the Lao-Vietnamese relationship, both historical and current, has an enhanced significance.

This section on the bilateral relationship serves an additional purpose. Throughout the analysis factors will be identified which either detract from, or serve to enhance this relationship. These are factors which ultimately influence the trend toward regional integration - and define the nature of Indochinese federation.

1. Lao-Vietnamese Relations: Background

The nature of the Lao-Vietnamese relations is complex and diverse; it has extensive historical antecedents. The following section seeks only to highlight some aspects of the relationship which impact upon the general trend of regional integration and are thus relevant to this discussion of Indochina federation.

Geography has significantly influenced the nature of Laos' foreign policy. Laos is a small, land-locked, mountainous country which shares its eastern border with Vietnam. Lacking direct access to the sea, Laos has had to cultivate

relations with her neighboring nations in order to market her products. Vietnamese ports have figured prominently in this process. Ties between the Lao and the Vietnamese extend down to the tribal level. Laos' mountainous topography has exacerbated the ethnic diversity of the nation's mountain tribes. Many of the tribes of Laos share a cultural affinity with the peoples of Thailand and/or Vietnam. Ethnic groups straddle the borders - borders created by the French with the parameter of administrative ease, not ethnic continuity, the principal concern.

In an effort to enhance its relationship with Laos, Vietnam has capitalized on this ethnic affinity. Towns in Laos generally number more Vietnamese than Lao inhabitants and commercial and administrative contacts with Vietnamese are numerous.¹⁶⁸ As a consequence of deep mixing at all levels, Lao children develop a familiarity and attachment for Vietnamese culture, products and institutions.¹⁶⁹

Yet, perceptions of this association should not be carried to an extreme. Lao resentment of their dominant partner is far from uncommon. This pro-Vietnamese/anti-Vietnamese sentiment has had a polarizing effect on Lao society. One scholar of Laos has maintained that the political culture of Laos "--extreme underdevelopment, a polyethnic society, the Theravada Buddhist/animist value system--strongly militates against the mass 'Vietnamization' of Laos."¹⁷⁰

The more than thirty years of anti-colonial/anti-imperial resistance struggle has forged a close relationship between the communist parties of Laos and Vietnam. Two consequences of this close relationship have been the development of an organizational framework to execute a Vietnamese aid and assistance program for Laos. The following sections will examine the relationship between the Communist Party of Laos and that of Vietnam, its organizational framework, and Vietnamese assistance to Laos.

2. The Communist Party of Laos: Associations with Vietnam

Apparently, there were no Lao or Cambodian communists at the formation of the Indochinese Communist Party in 1930.¹⁷¹ And it is believed that it was not until 1945, when the ICP went underground, that the Vietnamese Communists recruited a small number of Lao members.¹⁷² A small cadre of Lao and Camabodian leaders were invited to attend the meeting founding the Vietnamese Workers' Party in February, 1951. The following month the formation of a Vietnamese-Laotian-Cambodian alliance was made public--but no public announcements were made regarding the formation of separate Lao and Cambodian communist parties.

Evidence supports the belief that former Lao members of the ICP were instrumental in the formation of the People's Party of Laos (PPL).¹⁷³ A captured training document sheds light on the nature of this relationship, emphasizing that the PPL was to continue the "thought and spirit" of the ICP:

...the Laos who were members of the (Indochinese) Communist Party led the Lao people in their continuing struggle.

Though it had been organized and expanded some-time before, the PPL was proclaimed on 22 March 1955. Based on these facts, it can be said that the PPL, as the successor of the ICP, carries out the tasks of that party.¹⁷⁴

The Lao revolutionary movement, commonly referred to as the Pathet Lao, has been blessed by leadership of remarkable longevity. This cadre has developed interlocking relationships with both the Vietnamese people and Vietnamese Communist leaders.

Many veteran Pathet Lao leaders have close personal and family relationships with Vietnamese, most speak the language. Head of State (President), prince Souphanouvong, and Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister, Nouhak Phoumsavan, have Vietnamese wives. Prime Minister Kaysone Phomvihane's father is Vietnamese. Souphanouvong and Kaysone were both educated in Vietnam.¹⁷⁵

With such close personal ties, Vietnamese aid and assistance is accepted with less suspicion and is perhaps perceived as something less than "foreign".

3. Organization: Parallel Structures in Laos and Vietnam

During its resistance war with the French, Hanoi established extensive organizational structures to control party activities and military operations in Laos.

The Vietnamese Advisory Group, known as Doan 959, was responsible for coordinating political and administrative affairs in Laos. It was situated approximately two and a

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
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
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half miles from Hanoi. This Group directed a forward command post, also known as 959, located in Sam Neuan Province, Laos. Doan 959 had a provincial headquarters for political affairs (i.e., party affairs) and administrative affairs (i.e., communications, economic affairs, NLHS work, irrigation, and police). This structure had a parallel framework set up in Laos to administer and advise the Pathet Lao at the province level. Zasloff and Langer believe: "Very likely, this North Vietnamese forward command post in Laos performs an advisory mission with the Central Committee of the People's Party of Laos."¹⁷⁶

The military advisory effort was handled through a separate North Vietnamese hierarchy. This structure controlled the NVA (North Vietnamese Army) Military advisors to the LPLA (Lao Peoples Liberation Army), the NVA "volunteer forces," and the NVA mobile forces. It had a parallel structure extending down to the company level in Laos. Normally, each LPLA battalion was assigned one Vietnamese military and one Vietnamese political advisor.

4. Assistance

Hanoi's assistance, advice and support for the Pathet Lao has been extensive and diverse.¹⁷⁷ Vietnam's policies - both foreign and domestic - shape the policies of their allies in Laos. In the execution of its policies, Vietnamese assistance has taken the forms of training, logistic support, medical assistance, technical aid, communications support and propaganda.

Vietnamese in Laos have served as administrative and political advisors. Administrative advisors have given assistance in such areas as policy formulation, decision-making economic affairs, agriculture, irrigation, and education. Vietnamese political advisors have helped the PPL organize the masses, and have assisted in Party recruitment. In addition to specific services, the Lao communists have benefited from Vietnamese experience, discipline and competence.

Hanoi has also provided the Pathet Lao an extensive military advisory effort. Vietnamese communists have trained personnel and supplied weapons. Vietnamese influence has extended to planning of individual operations, making intelligence estimates, and assessing logistic needs.

5. The Lao-Vietnamese Relationship: Recent Developments

While the preceding paragraphs provide food for speculation regarding possible Vietnamese organizational frameworks and assistance employed during its present occupation of Kampuchea, it is not directly relevant to present-day Lao-Vietnamese relations. The purpose of the following paragraphs is to examine the present relationship.

Hanoi's influence in Laos has grown under the tacit approval of Prime Minister Kaysone. After 1975, over 2500 cadres with anti-Vietnamese views were purged.¹⁷⁸ In July, 1977, a 25-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed between the two countries.

There are perhaps as many as 50,000 Vietnamese troops stationed in Laos - and it is believed that the underlying reason why the Lao Liberation Army never exceeded 10,000 men under arms was pressure from Hanoi.¹⁷⁹ In addition, there are approximately 6,000 Vietnamese officials serving in country, and reports indicate that as many as 100,000 Vietnamese civilians have resettled in Lao provinces. It is suspected that 800 Vietnamese secret police arrived in Laos in late 1978.¹⁸⁰

In a further effort to consolidate the views of the two communist parties, the party history of the Lao Communist Party is being rewritten to emphasize independence from China, and to include the "historical necessity" of the solidarity of the Vietnamese-Lao-Kampuchean peoples against the French, American, and Chinese threats.¹⁸¹

In fulfillment of its obligations under the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, Laos, albeit belatedly, verbally attacked the PRC during the Sino-Vietnamese border dispute of February/March 1979.

Yet, can the LDPR be written off as a satellite of the SRV? Geoffrey Gunn, in an attempt to answer such a question, identified three interpretations of Lao foreign policy rationale: patriotic-independent, federal, and doctrinaire internationalist. Gunn concludes that such interpretations are not mutually exclusive - and that advocates of the three postures only serve to put a strain on LDPR unity.¹⁸²

Despite the apparent tightness of the relationship, factors are clearly present which work against federation. While the LDPR affirms the "special relationship" with Vietnam, it has never abandoned its own sense of independent nationalism. Laos' controlled trading with Thailand and its capitalist trading system serve to underscore its independence from Hanoi. Visitors have noticed the difference between the Vietnamese "model" and Lao practices, and the low degree of mass mobilization in response to the party's appeal to solidarity with Hanoi. The political culture of Laos and the continuance of Lao-Chinese relations also mitigate against the belief that Laos is a satellite of the SRV.

It is also significant to note that Laos has not followed Vietnam's lead in joining COMECON, nor is it specifically bound to the USSR by any formal military agreement.

While it is fashionable to view Vietnam's prominent position in Laos as a manifestation of Hanoi's desires for regional domination, the role of Laos' desires in establishing the existing partnership must, nevertheless, be acknowledged. And in this dimension the present relationship is in no small part a function of Lao acquiescence to, if not express desire for, Vietnamese guidance and assistance.

While Vietnam and Laos share a common border, some 200 miles distanced Cambodia from North Vietnam's southern border at the 17th parallel. Although perhaps not significant by Western standards, this gulf is a factor which helps to explain why Vietnamese-Lao and Vietnamese-Kampuchean relations

developed so differently. The following section will examine the Vietnamese-Kampuchean relationship and its relevance to the notion of an Indochinese federation.

6. Khmer-Vietnamese Relations

After a respite of nearly 25 years, the concept of an Indochina federation reemerged in December, 1977. It reemerged in the context of a developing border conflict between Kampuchea and Vietnam. The interim period had heralded striking changes. French and American forces had been driven from Indochina. Communist regimes had assumed control in Laos and Kampuchea. South Vietnam had been liberated and was being consolidated under Hanoi's control. Ho Chi Minh was dead. And the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China were the bitterest of enemies.

The dust of decades of resistance fighting had not settled before internecine conflict erupted between the fraternal brothers, Kampuchea and Vietnam. It was a time when the surge of war-time solidarity was yielding to the forces of assertive nationalism.¹⁸³

It was amidst the confusion of an accelerating border conflict that the current notion of an Indochina federation gained prominence. In this context it became infamous, not as a goal of solidarity toward which the three Indochinese states should strive, but as a Democratic Kampuchea accusation lodged against the perceived intent of Vietnam's regional foreign policy. In a series of indictments released on

December 31, 1977, Phnom Penh accused Vietnam of compelling Kampuchea to submit to the formation of such a Federation.¹⁸⁴ The documents concluded with the temporary termination of diplomatic relations between Democratic Kampuchea and the SRV.

The fact that the concept of an Indochina federation re-surfaced at a time when Kampuchea and Vietnam were engaged in an escalating border conflict - a conflict that would ultimately be resolved by a massive invasion and occupation of Kampuchea by Vietnamese forces - necessarily influenced the way in which the concept of federation would be viewed. The linkage of the notion of an Indochina federation to Vietnam's December 1978 invasion is a simplification which neglects to address the complexities of the bilateral relations as they had developed since the victory of communist forces in April/May, 1975. Allegations that Vietnam invaded Kampuchea in 1978 to effect a federation are not wholly supported by the cross-cutting and contradictory factors that ultimately led to the overthrow of the Pol Pot regime. Nor are the causal factors of the invasion simply limited to the sphere of Vietnamese-Khmer bilateral relations. The events leading to the invasion transcend the local environment and incorporate regional and international interests. The focus of this section, however, is on the deterioration of Kampuchean-Vietnamese bilateral relations. Regional and international interests, while alluded to in this section, will be addressed in some detail later.

The origins of the border dispute itself tend to contradict Phnom Penh's accusations of Hanoi's aggression and attempted subversion. Conflict along the land and sea borders occurred simultaneously with the victory of the respective communist revolutions in Kampuchea and Vietnam. Kampuchean armed forces launched an attack against Phu Quoc Island, located south of the Brevie line and recognized as Vietnamese territory on May 4, 1975. Kampuchean forces crossed the border between Ha Tien and Tay Ninh in numerous places the same week. On May 10, Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge occupied Tho Chu Island and captured 515 inhabitants.¹⁸⁵ Phnom Penh's response to Vietnamese protests was "ignorance of local geography." Nevertheless, Khmer Rouge forces continued to cross into Vietnamese territory repeatedly during the ensuing two year period.

Available evidence strongly suggests Vietnamese good faith in attempting to resolve the dispute by negotiation.¹⁸⁶ Throughout the period between 1975 and 1977, the Vietnamese proposed the resumption of talks on several occasions. These proposals went unheeded by Phnom Penh. In addition, Vietnam announced that the 600 Khmer prisoners captured in the early period of the fighting would be released. The Kampucheans, however, continued to hold the 515 Vietnamese captured on Tho Chu Island.¹⁸⁷

The border conflict intensified in 1977. In May, 500 ethnic Vietnamese families were rounded up and executed by

Khmer Rouge forces. The dispute also produced a secondary strain on Hanoi. Consequent to Phnom Penh's expulsion of Cambodians of Vietnamese origins, the more than 60,000 refugees from Cambodia were creating a serious burden for Hanoi.¹⁸⁸ This directly threatened Hanoi's reconstruction effort which focused directly on the revitalization of the economy. In this context the conflict caused damage to Vietnam's pet economic project - the establishment of New Economic Zones.¹⁸⁹ In addition, there was the concern that the border conflict might set back the drive to open the nation's "wild west",¹⁹⁰ a population redeployment policy which was the linchpin of Hanoi's battle against poverty.

If Vietnam initiated the border conflict, the effects of the dispute were seriously jeopardizing Hanoi's primary objective of economic recovery. This is but an early indication of the contradictory issues involved in asserting that Vietnam was attempting to establish a federation by means of force.

The perceived causes of the conflict shed additional light on this contradictory relationship. The destruction of Vietnamese property, and the killing of Vietnamese citizens was a causal factor. The challenge that refugees posed to Vietnam's economic recovery was a second factor. The disputed nature of the border itself, which rekindled ethnic animosity, was a third. High on the list of causal factors was the expectations of offshore oil wealth and other unexploited resources in the disputed territorial waters. (Hanoi

had announced its position on the 200-mile territorial waters and economic zone on May 20, 1977. Phnom Penh responded in a pre-emptory fashion by listing 44 islands that were in their territorial sea.)¹⁹¹

Events tend to point to Kampuchea as the aggressor in this early period. Such a picture is mollified only somewhat when the nature of Kampuchea's allegations against Vietnam are examined. The substance of these allegations rests in the resentment accrued by the Khmer Rouge against their dominant partner, the Vietnamese communists. Perceptions more than events form the substance of Khmer Rouge allegations. The following examination of early Khmer-Vietnamese party relations supports the cumulative resentment held by the Khmer Rouge against the Vietnamese.

Evidence of the split between the communist parties dates back to the Geneva Conference of 1954. The Cambodian Communist movement was "shocked" when the Vietnamese Communists failed to insist on their recognition at the Conference. Resentment was manifested by the sacking of the Vietnamese-born Khmer communist party leader Son Ngoc Minh.¹⁹²

Anti-Vietnamese feeling was fanned when Pol Pot assumed the leadership of the communist party in the early 1960s. Pursuant to his rise to power, the Cambodian Communists adopted an ultra-nationalistic line and "completely denied past connections with and the role of the ICP."¹⁹³ The Pol Pot regime dates the founding of the Cambodian Communist

Party not to 1951 - when the national communist parties emerged, as was described earlier - but to 1960. The Khmer Rouge maintain that at the formal dissolution of the ICP, the Vietnamese created one party for each country - but in Kampuchea, the "Revolutionary People's Party" existed only by name.¹⁹⁴

Phnom Penh published its allegations against Vietnam in what has become known as The Black Book of Hatred.¹⁹⁵

The Black Book maintains that revolutionary experience gained by resistance from 1954 to 1969 lead to the founding of the Communist Party of Kampuchea on September 30, 1960. The Congress determined the tactical and strategical line, adopted the Statute of the Party, and elected the Central Committee of the Party.

When Hanoi learned of this development, the Vietnamese Communists allegedly started to launch systematic attacks against Kampuchea's revolution. The document also alleges that Vietnamese secretly organized another party and another organ of leadership.

Political differences between Vietnam and the Khmer Rouge were apparent at the Paris Peace Accords in 1973. On that occasion Hanoi advised the Khmer Rouge to negotiate with Lon Nol's Khmer Republic.¹⁹⁶ The Khmer Rouge viewed such a proposal as a sell-out of Khmer communist interests.

The theme of Khmer distrust of Vietnam was evident in September, 1977 when Phnom Penh formally acknowledged the

existence of the Cambodian Communist Party (KCP). Reports from Phnom Penh again reflected Cambodian sensitivity over its historical links with the ICP, links by which the KCP believed Hanoi might attempt to subvert the Khmer communists. Kampuchea's suspicion did not solely rest with Vietnam. Phnom Penh had clearly implicated the USSR in Vietnam's alleged aggression by October 1977.¹⁹⁷ The verbal assaults against the Soviet Union, however, were couched so as not to totally alienate Moscow. Thus, by the autumn of 1977, the first indications that the local conflict might involve international implications had become apparent.

The Black Book also details the centuries old antagonism between the Khmer and Vietnamese peoples. This antagonism is described in terms of Vietnamese "primeval hatred and pure racism."

Included with the sections describing "The Annexationist Nature of Vietnam", and "The Vietnamese Maneuvers in Kampuchea Aiming at Taking Over the (Kampuchean) State Power", is a chapter entitled "The Strategy of 'Indochina Federation' of the Indochinese Communist Party and its Political Program". This chapter addresses the implementation of the Vietnamese strategy of "Indochina Federation" in Kampuchea during the period from 1930 to 1970. The following paragraphs serve to illustrate Khmer perceptions of Vietnam's federation strategy during this period.

Regarding the implications of "Indochinese" in the name Indochinese Communist Party, Phnom Penh made no reference to its Comintern origin. Instead, it has proposed to validate the name's expansionist implications by stating that "Lenin...has not given his party the name of 'European Communist Party'."

The document maintains that the slogan of the Indochinese Communist Party was to "wage a struggle" for an independent Indochina in order to found an 'Indochina Federation'. Consequently the strategic political program of the Vietnamese Party is the "Indochina Federation." The document also states that this supposedly means only one country, one people and one army.¹⁹⁸

Describing the period from 1930 to 1945, the document states that the reason the Vietnamese were unsuccessful in effecting the federation was because Vietnam was divided, and that the Vietnamese cadres were "busy at home." Allegedly, Hanoi did not have enough cadres to send to Kampuchea, and "the Kampucheas' people as a whole had no idea about communism and that they hated the Vietnamese."¹⁹⁹

During the period from 1945 to 1954, the Black Book asserts that the Vietnamese "kidnapped" Khmers "in order to serve their strategy of 'Indochina Federation' in Kampuchea". It explains that in order to carry out activities in Kampuchea, the Vietnamese organized Kampuchea into territorial zones. In the northeastern section, the Vietnamese allegedly installed their political and military base. The zones were

divided into provinces, which in turn were divided into districts, and finally into communes. The armed forces in these zones were composed almost exclusively of Vietnamese soldiers.²⁰⁰

From 1955 to 1970, the document alleges that the Vietnamese used the term "solidarity" to cover the implementation of their Indochinese federation strategy. And despite the difficulties faced by Vietnam in the face of the growing U.S. threat, "the Vietnamese did not give up this strategy." To further support this claim, the document states that the Vietnamese secretly organized and set up a parallel state power, and "They attacked and ran down the Communist Party of Kampuchea by saying that its policy was wrong, leftist, adventurous, etc. They sabotaged the Kampuchean economy and state food."²⁰¹

The Black Book also refers to a document prepared by Le Duan on the occasion of Pol Pot's visit to Hanoi in 1965 that stated that after Vietnam had achieved victory, it would come to liberate Kampuchea.²⁰²

Concerning Vietnamese recruiting methods the document alleges: "The Vietnamese attracted their Kampuchean followers by duping them, or by corruption, material baits, or through the Indochinese Communist Party."²⁰³

The Communist Party of Kampuchea (KCP) maintains that it had "clearly discerned the true nature of the Vietnamese by 1966, and that by 1969 "friendship and solidarity" were

"empty words."²⁰⁴ The only reason that Democratic Kampuchea waited until December 1977 to publicize their dispute with the Vietnamese was supposedly because they wanted to "safeguard" the friendship with Vietnam. The KCP maintained that based on this "wise and mature" position, they have "always endeavored to peacefully solve the problem."²⁰⁵

Democratic Kampuchea maintained that Vietnam sought to destroy Kampuchea's revolution through a four-part framework:

- 1) by secretly organizing anti-party groups which acted openly against the Communist Party of Kampuchea;
- 2) by organizing secret networks within the ranks of the Communist Party of Kampuchea for their future activities;
- 3) by directly attacking by themselves the Communist Party of Kampuchea;
- 4) by stirring up the people and the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea to oppose the Communist Party of Kampuchea, aiming at creating difficulties to it for the present and launching strategical attacks against it in the future.²⁰⁶

In addition, the Black Book alleges that during the 1970 to 1975 period:

- 1) The Vietnamese wanted to set up mixed commands and mixed organs of power.

- 2) The Vietnamese secretly organized a parallel state power in Kampuchea.
- 3) The Vietnamese secretly organized a parallel army in Kampuchea.
- 4) The Vietnamese secretly organized military training and medical training schools in Kampuchea.²⁰⁷

It also alleges that Hanoi wanted to annihilate the leadership of the KCP through coups and assassination.

Responding to Vietnam's many offers to negotiate, Phnom Penh attacked these offers as being "valueless". In order for progress between the two countries to be made, Kampuchea asserted that the root of the problem would have to be eliminated: "That is to eliminate the Vietnamese ambitions of swallowing Kampuchea and the Vietnamese strategy of Indochina federation."²⁰⁸

While the above paragraphs illustrate the flavor of Kampuchea's polemics, and the xenophobic fervor with which the concept of Indochinese Federation was resurrected, problems of perspective, emphasis, exaggeration, and even contradiction, destroy much of the credibility of the Black Book. Consequently, Phnom Penh's allegations are largely groundless.

The litany of complaints lodged against Hanoi, and the severing of relations on December 31, 1977, marked the acceleration of a pedagogical war that would accelerate in parallel with the mounting border clashes. In response to Phnom Penh's year end proclamation, Hanoi on January 6 released its

most comprehensive statement to date of its position on the conflict.²⁰⁹ The statement publicly defined Hanoi's view of a "special relationship" (which had been developed at the Fourth National Congress of the Vietnam Workers' Party in December, 1976) and provided details on the border conflict. Hanoi addressed the problem by holding a press conference at which a Foreign Ministry Document was released and explained. Forty journalists from twelve countries (including the U.S.) were present at the press conference.

The Foreign Ministry Document of January 6, 1978 unequivocally rooted the origins of the border conflict in the historical context of Vietnamese-Khmer relations. The introduction of the Document stated: "The Vietnam-Cambodia border problem is an historical problem between the two fraternal countries" and that the border question "involves complex issues left over by history."²¹⁰ The press conference concluded by stating that: "The correct path of settling the Vietnam-Cambodian border problem is to hold negotiations on the basis of solidarity and friendship for the sake of legitimate and longstanding interests and in a reasonable, sensible manner."²¹¹

As was mentioned above, the January 6 press conference addressed the definition of "special relationship." Being that Democratic Kampuchea viewed "special relationship" as a codeword by which Vietnam hoped to disguise its Indochinese federation strategy,²¹² its definition as developed by the Vietnamese merits scrutiny.

At the Fourth Congress of the Vietnam Workers Party held in December, 1976, the notion of a "special relationship" was presented in the below context:

In endeavoring to preserve and develop the special relationship between the Vietnamese people and the people of Laos and Kampuchea, we must strengthen the militant solidarity, mutual trust, long-term cooperation and mutual assistance in all fields between our country and the two fraternal countries, in accordance with the principle of complete equality, respect for each other's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, and respect for each other's legitimate interests, so that the three countries, which have been associated with one another in the struggle for national liberation, will forever be associated with one another in the building and defense of their respective countries, in the interests of each country's independence and prosperity.²¹³

The introductory paragraph of the "Statement of the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam on the Vietnam-Cambodia Border Issue" (which was one section of the Foreign Ministry Document) also defined Vietnamese concepts of the "special relationship":

Vietnam and Cambodia are two neighboring countries, two fraternal countries. A great friendship, built and fostered in a long struggle lasting almost a century against colonialism and in the struggle against U.S. imperialist aggressors and their henchmen in particular, has bound the peoples of the two countries and the two communist parties of Vietnam and Cambodia. This special relationship was a decisive factor for the complete victories of the Vietnamese revolution and the Cambodian revolution.

...the Vietnamese people have built with their blood an unbreakable militant solidarity and fraternal friendship.

...we have made all-out efforts to consolidate and strengthen our mutual trust, our sincere long-term cooperation, and our mutual assistance on the principles of complete equality. Of respect for each other's sovereignty and territory and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. The Communist Party of Vietnam

and the Vietnamese people have at all times respected the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and freedom of other countries, considering this a correct policy to defend our national independence.²¹⁴

The Vietnamese have maintained that:

"To preserve and develop this special relationship is our unswerving policy, for with regard to the Vietnamese people, the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Cambodia constitutes a factor of very important significance for the preservation of Vietnam's independence".²¹⁵

Thus the concept of a "special relationship" has become to be viewed as the "theoretical cornerstone" of Vietnamese foreign policy.²¹⁶

Noteworthy in the above statements on special relationship is the distinct reference to the Party's, Government's and People's ties to Kampuchea - a distinction found lacking in earlier documents.

Despite Vietnam's clear assurances to Kampuchea, Hanoi can be criticized for being insensitive to Kampuchea's "national susceptibilities", i.e., its sense of national dignity and pride. In the January 6 Document, Vietnam proclaimed: "Historical and geographic circumstances require that our two countries unite and maintain friendly relations with each other."²¹⁷ Such mention of uniting at this critical stage of Vietnamese-Kampuchean relations could be viewed as insensitive at least - and, perhaps, provocative.

The Foreign Ministry Document concluded with a list of excerpts from messages and statements from leaders of the Communist Party of Cambodia and the Government of Democratic Cambodia concerning relations with Vietnam. These excerpts

which express gratitude for Vietnamese support and assistance contradict the Black Book's description of the development of hostility between the two states.

To underscore the importance with which Vietnam viewed the situation, the January 6 press conference was Hanoi's first authorized Vietnamese News Agency statement in more than two years.²¹⁸

Continuing to express its concern about the Vietnamese "plot" to form an Indochinese federation, Kampuchean media on January 6 stated that the "so-called" border incidents were "just one" of Vietnam's many pretexts to force Cambodia into a federation.²¹⁹ In addition, to fan the flames of conflict the Kampuchean media claimed "sooner or later Kampuchea will recover Saigon."²²⁰

In a January 8 broadcast, Hanoi media addressed the issue of federation for the first time in the Cambodian language. The broadcast, which summarized remarks at the press conference on January 6, noted that the response to newsmen's questions about federation was, in turn, a question in which the reporters were asked when they had ever heard Vietnam mention such a federation. Noting that the official's question was met by silence, the broadcast went on to quote him reiterating Hanoi's dedication to a "special relationship" between the two countries.

As of January 8, 1978, the SRV renounced any specific intention of forming an Indochinese federation. Nevertheless,

Hanoi still maintained its interest in establishing a "special relationship".²²¹ While technically satisfying Phnom Penh's demand that Hanoi renounce plans for an Indochinese federation, Hanoi's action subsequent to January 8 did not assuage Pol Pot's fears that special relationship was a codeword for the alleged federation scheme.

As the Vietnamese-Kampuchea border conflict increased in intensity, it became inseparable from external influences. While these influences shall be discussed in some detail later, it is useful to briefly address the conflict in its external setting at this point.

As of January, Peking media had not commented on the conflict. The only Chinese viewpoint had been expressed by the NCNA when it detailed Kampuchea's allegations against Vietnam on December 31, 1977, and Vietnam's charges against Kampuchea for the first time on January 8, 1978.²²²

The PRC maintained an "even-handed" approach to the issue - and apparently encouraged a neutral stance among its allies until mid-January. In what might be viewed as evidence of its neutral stance, and a sign of good will toward Hanoi, the PRC announced its agreement with Vietnam on a mutual supply of goods and payments for 1978. The agreement was concluded in 18 days - as opposed to negotiations of 5.5 weeks the previous year.²²³

Yet, for reasons as of yet undetermined, Peking made an apparent gesture of support for Kampuchea by sending

Chou En-lai's widow to Phnom Penh on January 18, 1978. By the third week of January, while publicly still avoiding taking sides, the PRC blamed Moscow for instigating the trouble between the Vietnamese and Kampuchians.

Soviet media had pledged support for the SRV throughout the building conflict.²²⁴

On January 8, 1978, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski characterized the conflict as a "proxy war" between the USSR and China.

Thus by mid-January, 1978, a conflict which had apparently originated as a border conflict assumed the broader implications of an international struggle for power. And in this context, the seeds of suspicion were sown that would erupt into the February, 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War.

In February Hanoi made an attempt to neutralize Phnom Penh's charges that Vietnam desired to incorporate Kampuchea into an Indochinese federation by proposing a three-point plan to settle the conflict. An illuminating concession was the absence of the usual Vietnamese reference to special relationship. At a press conference announcing the Plan, then Vice Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach repudiated Kampuchean allegations regarding the federation issue. He stated that Vietnam had not raised the issue for more than twenty years.²²⁵ Thach also reaffirmed Vietnam's commitment to Cambodia's independence and territorial integrity. To underscore the credibility of its desire to terminate the

conflict, Hanoi proposed its readiness to accept some form of international guarantee and supervision to seal the pledges of both sides.

This plan, like its predecessors, was rejected by Phnom Penh. Vietnamese impatience and irritation with the continuing dispute was clearly apparent by March. Hanoi dropped all references to Vietnamese-Kampuchean relations in the state-to-state or party-to-party context. The SRV stated that the Phnom Penh regime had lost its popular support and, therefore, its legitimacy was suspect.²²⁶ Vietnam also accused Phnom Penh of using the border war to "side track the Cambodian people" and to "repress the genuine Cambodian revolutionaries."²²⁷

By March, the major issues of the building vortex were:

- a) The contention regarding Vietnamese desires to establish an Indochinese federation
- b) Hanoi's doubts about Phnom Penh's legitimacy.
- c) Moscow and Peking involvement

Thus the dispute was no longer just a border war - but a conflict "deeply rooted in the differing perceptions of the shape post-war [Indochinese] relations should take."²²⁸

In an article published a year after Thach's 5 February 1978 press conference,²²⁹ Far Eastern Economic Review correspondent, Nayan Chanda, proposed a "timetable" for the decision-making process that resulted in Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea. His proposal was based on information provided

by "communist sources close to Vietnam." Chanda maintains that following Kampuchea's rejection of the February 5, 1978 peace proposal, a secret full session Vietnamese Communist Party Central Committee meeting was convened at the end of February. Vietnam's decision to back the rebel movement in Kampuchea, which ultimately swept the Pol Pot regime from power with the assistance of Vietnamese "military might", was made at this time. Chanda basically proposes a five-step framework to explain Vietnam's foreign policy initiatives during 1978:

- 1) A diplomatic initiative to reassure Asean countries (i.e., Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister Phan Hien's and Prime Minister Pham Van Dong's Asean tour).
- 2) The forging of economic and military ties with the Soviet Union (i.e., decision to join Comecon, June 1978; and the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, November 3, 1978)
- 3) Gradual build-up along the Vietnam-Kampuchean border.
- 4) The creation of Kampuchea National United Front for National Salvation (KNUFNS).
- 5) Lightning offensive at the end of December, 1978.

According to Chanda's "comunist sources", Pol Pot's December 31, 1977 accusations and severing of official relations "took Hanoi by surprise, and seemed to confirm the view that the problem with Kampuchea was not just a bilateral issue but the creation of a 'bridgehead of aggression' against Vietnam."

Unfortunately, Chanda's sources do not provide supporting evidence in behalf of Vietnam's claim that Kampuchea was the "bridgehead" of Chinese aggression. Nor does Chanda's timetable address the events which transpired to change the apparently cordial PRC-SRV relations at the time of the signing of the January trade agreement noted earlier, to Vietnam's perception of Chinese hostility a month later.

If Hanoi had decided to support the overthrow of the Pol Pot regime in February, it nevertheless released a lengthy document detailing the history of the Indochinese federation and rejecting its present day relevance - on April 7, 1978.²³⁰ Also, in yet another attempt to settle the dispute between Vietnam and Kampuchea, Hanoi offered a plan to demarcate the border.

Hanoi's document on the Indochinese federation was later published as an Appendix to a two-volume work entitled Kampuchea Dossier. This work provides a useful chronology of SRV-DK relations from 1960-1978. For the most part, the document restates the calls for unity and solidarity based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence that had been expressed throughout the 30+ year resistance period.

In a section entitled "Fromn 1931 to 1951: The Indochinese Communist Party and the 'Indochinese Federation'", the document refers to the March 1935 party meeting, discussed earlier, in which the Indochinese federation was mentioned. In addition, the document states:

The June 1941 Resolution of the 8th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party stressed: "After driving out the French and the Japanese, we must correctly carry out the policy of national self-determination with regard to the Indochinese people. It is up to the peoples living in Indochina to either organize themselves into a Federation of Democratic Republics or remain separate national states."²³¹

Referring back to the French colonial policy of "divide and rule", the April 7 Document states:

In these circumstances, the founding of the Indochinese Communist Party was a historical necessity. It met the pressing demands of the liberation struggle of all peoples who lived together in "French Indochina", whose destinies were bound together, and who had to concentrate all their forces on defeating the common enemy and foiling the latter's vile plan to use Indochinese to fight Indochinese. The Party's slogan, which was raised in this context, that of 'making Indochina completely independent and advancing toward an Indochinese Federation', was based on the exercise of the national right to self-determination, conformed to the situation in the 1930's and 1940's, and aimed at uniting the peoples of Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea against the French colonialists and the Japanese fascists.²³²

The document also refers to the February, 1951 decision to establish separate national parties, stating:

In February 1951 at the Proposal of the Vietnamese Communists, the Indochinese Communist Party Disbanded. Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea Each Set Up Their Own Parties, Governments, Armies and National United Fronts, Completely Independent from One Another; Meanwhile, They United in Struggle on the Basis of Free Choice, Equality, Mutual Assistance and Respect for Each Other's Sovereignty. The Question of an Indochinese Federation Was Never Raised Again...

The correct line of the Congress was followed up on March 11, 1951 by the convening of a Conference of representatives of the Viet-Khmer-Lao People's Alliance, including representatives of the three countries' respective National United Fronts, namely the Lien Viet of Vietnam, the Itsala Front of Laos and the Itsarac Front of Kampuchea; the Conference adopted a resolution "to form the Viet-Khmer-Lao

Peoples' Alliance based on the principles of free choice, equality and mutual assistance" in order to "carry on the long struggle..."²³³

Regarding the pre-1975 period, and by way of conclusion it states:

After the 1951 Congress of the Indochinese Communist Party, and following the 1954 Geneva Conference in particular, the "indochinese Federation" question passed into history, as did French Indochina. Like Laos and Kampuchea, Vietnam has never referred to the Indochinese Federation question again.²³⁴

The third section of this document, which details the SRV's rebuttal to Phnom Penh's allegations that Vietnam is presently attempting to establish an Indochinese federation, is reprinted in Appendix C. This section summarizes Pol Pot's accusation as out of context, distorted, and "completely groundless".

On 13 April 1978, Pol Pot held an interview on the Kampuchea-SRV conflict. In this press conference he explained Kampuchea's perception of the relationship between Vietnam's policies of Indochinese federation and special relationship:

Vietnam has not abandoned its idea of an Indochinese federation. It has been implementing this idea systematically through continuous planning and operations since 1930. At first Vietnam desired to have an Indochinese federation composed of one single state--to have one party, one people, one army and one country in Indochina. Later, the Vietnamese pretended to raise the possibility of forming a special friendship and special solidarity of agreements or treaties for cooperation--particularly in the fields of domestic and foreign policy--without any borders. Since liberation in 1975, Vietnam has raised this question again, preserving the same form.

The essence of Vietnam's Indochinese federation is to abolish the border in order to weld Cambodia to Vietnam as part of its Indochinese federation. By so doing Vietnam would be able to control and dominate

our party, state power, military, economy, and domestic and foreign policy, turning Cambodia into a part of Vietnam and the Cambodian people into a minority nationality of Vietnam.²³⁵

Implicit in the suggestion that the "essence" of the federation concept is the elimination of borders is the question of territorial integrity. This was first alluded to in Honey's assessment of the captured secret document cited earlier. Despite Honey's assessment and Pol Pot's raving, no evidence has been reviewed by this writer which would support such a claim.

Pol Pot's response to Vietnam's call for negotiations was that the negotiations have only been proposed to conceal Vietnam's "aggressive face", and that "everyone knows this is aimed at deceiving Vietnamese and world opinion in order to launch further aggression to sieze Cambodia."²³⁶

Pol Pot's statements concerning the demarcation of borders and border changes serves to clarify the source of the dispute between the Khmer Rouge and the SRV:

Speaking of the right to demand the revision of border documents and changes in the demarcation of land and sea borders, only Democratic Cambodia has the right and countless justified reasons to do so, including the demand for the resettlement of the Kampuchea Krom (Cochinchina) issue and the issue of Cambodian islands which the French colonial regime annexed to Cochinchina and Ngo Dinh Diem and past Saigon administrations took away by force. With regard to the sea border alone, if Democratic Cambodia wants to revise (saeu reu) the documents, we have all the legal rights as well as reasons of land demarcation to bring the Cambodian border even farther south of the Brevie line.²³⁷

The reference to Kampuchea's right to the territory of Kampuchea Krom reflects an unchanging demand since the 1954 Geneva Accords, when the Cambodian delegate laid claims to "Cambodian lands in South Vietnam". Phnom Penh's magnanimity in refraining from reviving old border issues, i.e., Cochinchina, must have struck the Vietnamese as ludicrous.

Concluding the interview, Pol Pot stated that settlement of the border disputes was conditional upon Vietnam's recognition of Kampuchea's sole right to decide the fate of the disputed territories, and Vietnam's renunciation of its plan of an Indochinese federation:

Democratic Cambodia holds that in order to make friendship between Cambodia and Vietnam possible, Vietnam must have absolute respect for the aforesaid conditions and must abandon forever all of its Indochinese federation and one party, one country, one people and one army concepts and plans, as well as its concepts and plans to annex and swallow Cambodian territory and exterminate the Cambodian race. This should not be done only in words; it should be put into concrete deeds. Otherwise, the so-called special friendship, special solidarity and negotiations would merely be ploys to fool the Vietnamese public and world opinion.²³⁸

Although accusations and recriminations would continue throughout the Kampuchean-Vietnamese conflict, Pol Pot's interview spelled the beginning of the end of the pedagogical war. The war of words was soon overshadowed by military assaults. And as the military conflict escalated, the dispute which had once had the appearance of a local border war would escalate to the grander proportions of a regional conflict that would polarize the international system.

Having cited earlier instances of Vietnam's denial of the Pol Pot regimes legitimacy, Hanoi extended this to its logical conclusion in May, 1978, when it rejected Phnom Penh's right to claim Marxist-Leninist credentials.²³⁹ (This rite would be repeated in July when the PRC would deny Vietnam's communist credentials.)²⁴⁰

Reports of "uprisings" in Cambodia appeared in the Vietnamese media in June. Also during this period Hanoi initiated broadcasts from Vietnam in the Khmer language to incite rebellion.

In September, Le Duan announced that the Vietnamese people had to be ready for a third resistance war.²⁴¹ Later that month, Cambodia launched a series of attacks into Tay Ninh province which threatened the \$US 110 million irrigation project bankrolled by the World Bank.²⁴²

The following month Phnom Penh adopted the dual strategy of calling for the overthrow of the "Le Duan - Pham Van Dong Clique", while attempting to clean-up its international image.²⁴³ Also during October, Western military intelligence sources reportedly found evidence supporting the belief that Hanoi's main aim was not to physically occupy territory - but to instead knock out the Khmer Army.²⁴⁴

The Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation entered into between Vietnam and the USSR on November 3, 1978 provided Hanoi the support it needed to pursue its military build-up. (This treaty, along with Hanoi's June decision to join Comecon will be discussed later.)

On December 6, 1978 it was announced that a "United Front" had been formed to topple the Pol Pot regime. Hanoi's report about the formation of a Kampuchea National United Front for National Salvation (KNUFNS) had been anticipated since the previous summer. According to one analyst, the patterns of propaganda campaign, armed struggle, the holding of a congress and the setting up of a broad-based national front with a democratic program, the establishment of a radio station and the emergence of KNUFNS was a repetition of the classic Vietnamese pattern seen in the early 1960s. "It was like watching an old movie run at fast speed."²⁴⁵

Vietnam's Christmas invasion of Kampuchea in support of the Cambodian revolutionary armed forces, secured Phnom Penh in 15 days - and the pro-Vietnamese Kampuchean regime of Heng Samrin was proclaimed.

The July 1977 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (TFC) between Vietnam and Laos; the January 1979 TFC between Vietnam and Heng Samrin's Kampuchea; and the Laos-Kampuchea Friendship Treaty, can not be viewed as cementing the "federal" triangle.

The nature of the political relationship between the three Indochinese states is more complex than the above "friendship associations would imply. There is evidence that the states " themselves are not in accord on the specifics of their relationships. Whereas Vietnamese officials were willing to speak

of an alliance between the three states at the Indochinese foreign ministers meeting, this sentiment was echoed by neither Laos or Kampuchea.

In practice, such squabbling has little real value. Vietnam, with the overwhelming mass of its military and demographic attributes, bends her neighbor's external relations to conform to her will by sheer force of gravity. In essence Vietnam's Indochina policy is Indochina's Indochina policy.

Regardless of the name attributed to Vietnam's relations with her western neighbors - be it federation, confederation, or something else - certain key Hanoi concerns must be recognized in her external relations. First in importance is, the critical value Hanoi assigns to Laos and Kampuchea in terms of Vietnam's security. Over thirty years of resistance fighting (following centuries of back and forth conflict over the territories of these two states with the Thai's) has solidly defined Laos' and Kampuchea's position in Vietnam's security system. If Laos and Kampuchea are to be "neutrals", they will be neutral according to Hanoi's definition. The parallel between Vietnam's "bloc" and the Soviet Union's Warsaw Pact is not without substance.

Secondly, Hanoi has a great concern in Laos and Kampuchea because of the value of their economic compatibility. Of the two, Kampuchea is the larger prize. In terms of agriculture, and in particular rice, Kampuchea's potential is viewed as a horn of plenty. Mindful of Vietnam's (particularly the

north's) historic inability to consistently feed its growing population, the potential cornucopia of Kampuchea is seen as an economic necessity.

There is a second major dimension to Laos and Kampuchea's economic value for Vietnam. The three Indochinese states dominate the Mekong River. With the river's hydroelectric power potential, it could easily supply Vietnam's energy needs as the SRV proceeds toward industrialization.

Finally, it is likely that Hanoi views her neighbor states as something akin to a frontier - a sparsely populated region that could help to relieve Vietnam's building demographic pressure.

As a consequence of these key factors, a broad statement of Vietnam's Indochina policy is relatively easy to derive. Vietnam's national interest in Indochina stems from economic, (military) security, and political (even though not addressed) concerns. Hanoi's Indochina policy is designed to ensure Vietnam's ultimate security by protecting her interests in these three dimensions. However, neither these interests nor the factors thus far examined necessarily spell federation.

The preceding discussion has clearly illustrated how the notion of an Indochinese federation reappeared in a context entirely different from earlier plans of federation. Distortion in perception based on this change of context suggests that the belief that Vietnam has a master plan to establish an Indochinese federation be viewed with skepticism.

While little is yet known about Vietnamese administration and direction in Kampuchea, it is useful to compare the cases of Lao-Vietnamese and Kampuchean-Vietnamese relations. Whereas Jacob's and Teune's factors of geography and cultural affinity were elements promoting a greater degree of association with Laos, these factors do not hold the same import for Kampuchean-Vietnamese relations. Kampuchea, unlike Laos, is not dependent on Vietnam for access to the sea. And in contrast to the Lao-Vietnamese case, ethnic enmity can be viewed as the single largest factor militating against a greater degree of association between Kampuchea and Vietnam. Vietnamese-Kampuchean interdependence is unlikely to reach the stage of present Vietnamese-Laos relations.

Finally, the Lao-Vietnamese relationship suggests that in Kampuchea Vietnam will be assisting the Khmers in such areas of party organization, education and training, and medical care. The PAVN will not only serve to combat rebel activity, but also function to maintain internal security and enforce party directives. The establishment of "sister provinces" might be viewed as the first step in Vietnamese efforts to establish a parallel administrative structure in Kampuchea.

B. INTEGRATION AND THE EXTRA-REGIONAL SYSTEM

Vietnamese intentions regarding Indochina - be they federation or otherwise - cannot be executed in an isolated arena. Interests of the other international powers run deep into the region. These interests impact on Vietnam's foreign

policy options. The Peoples Republic of China and the Soviet Union are two international actors which figure prominently in Hanoi's decision-making process. This section will examine the role these powers play in the trend toward regional integration.

1. The Role and Interests of China in Indochina

The previous section described how an initial clash of bilateral interests escalated into a contest between Vietnam and China for influence throughout Indochina.

In reality, the conflict between Kampuchea and Vietnam was never solely a bilateral dispute or later solely a regional dispute between Vietnam and China - crosscutting issues invalidate any such generalization. What changed was the focus; bilateral issues were the focus of interest early-on, followed by an increasing emphasis on regional concerns. The purpose of this section is to briefly survey some aspects of the regional dispute between Vietnam and China.

A step-wise documented resolution of the chicken or egg nature of who initiated the emerging hostilities between Vietnam and China is beyond the scope of this analysis. What is relevant to this paper's concern, however, is the linkage between the escalating Sino-Vietnamese conflict and the notion of an Indochina federation. This linkage will be examined by focusing on three areas: Chinese interests in Southeast Asia, causes of the Sino-Vietnamese conflict, and, finally, the common denominator between interests, conflict, and the notion of an Indochina federation.

Chinese interests in Southeast Asia, and Beijing's determination to protect them is the single largest external constraint on Vietnam's perceived desire to establish a federated Indochina. A recent analysis of China's strategic interests in Southeast Asia has summarized Beijing's concerns as follows:

- to minimize and, if possible, to prevent the penetration of the Soviet Union into the region;
- To encourage regional states to side with China against Vietnam and the Soviet Union;
- To develop economic relations with the region in order to channel trade and investment into the Four Modernizations;
- To maintain reasonably close contact with the Overseas Chinese in order to keep them politically sympathetic and economically active on China's behalf.
- To play down China's support for revolutionary parties;
- To maintain and even improve relations with the United States and Japan in order to cope with the Soviet threat and support domestic economic modernization.²⁴⁶

While the question of under what circumstances the PRC would once again resort to military force to pursue these strategic interests is of speculative interest, it unfortunately digresses from the theme of this analysis and exceeds its scope.

In support of these strategic interests China has adopted what might be viewed as a three-pronged approach toward Indochina:

- 1) Throttling of any Indochinese state which acts contrary to China's perceived security aspirations and regional interests.
- 2) Freeing the region from Soviet influence
- 3) Advancement of policies which ensure the PRC a dominant role in the region.²⁴⁷

The competition for influence in Indochina was the central issue leading to the Sino-Vietnamese conflict of February, 1979. The following list (in the form of a chronology) serves to present but a few of the disputed issues.

1. August 1975: Differing views on hegemonism and the dispute over claims to Paracels and Spratley Islands precludes issuance of a joint communique following Le Duan's visit to China.
2. January 10, 1977: Memorandum on Vice-Premier Li Xian Nian's talks with Premier Pham Van Dong (a Chinese document) states that there are seven major disputed concerns between the two countries:
 - 1) Vietnamese slander against China

- 2) The land boundary
- 3) Railway maintenance
- 4) The Paracel and Spratley Islands
- 5) Tong King Bay
- 6) Overseas Chinese in Vietnam
- 7) Economic Aid²⁴⁸

3. December, 1977: Thai observers note that Hanoi is eager not to be left in the wake of Peking's initiative to consolidate a diplomatic base line running thru Phnom Penh, Bangkok, and Rangoon, which is designed to contain the spread of Soviet influence in South-east Asia²⁴⁹
4. January 10, 1978: Agreement reached on mutual exchange of goods between China and Vietnam.
5. January 11, 1978: Through this date, Chinese media had been pursuing an "even-handed" approach on the Vietnamese-Kampuchean Conflict.
6. February, 1978: Secret meeting of Vietnamese Communist Party Central Committee during which decision to invade Kampuchea in December, 1978 was allegedly made
7. May, 1978: PRC expresses concern over status of Chinese in Vietnam.

8. June, 1978: PRC rebukes Hanoi, cuts aid.
PRC sees sinister Kremlin plot
behind Hanoi's actions.
PRC closes three Vietnamese consul-
ates.
9. July, 1978: PRC no longer considers Vietnam to
be a communist state.
Nhan Dan article traces Peking-Phnom
Penh axis back to Pol Pot's visit
to China in 1960.
PRC offers talks with Vietnam, raise
question of Spratly Islands.
10. September, 1978: PRC effectively signals end of party
ties with Vietnam.
PRC breaks off talks.
Dong's and Deng's ASEAN tours
11. December, 1978: NCNA says root cause of conflict is
Vietnam's attempt to establish an
Indochinese federation
12. February/March Sino-Vietnam Border War
13. November 19, 1980: Beijing deflates ASEAN-Indochina
rapprochement.²⁵⁰

This review of Chinese interests in Indochina plus some
of the events leading to the Sino-Vietnamese War of February/
March 1979 identifies the linkage between interests, conflict

and the notion of an Indochinese federation. Just prior to Vietnam's December invasion of Kampuchea, China started to echo Pol Pot's allegations that Vietnam was attempting to establish its age-old dream of an Indochina federation. Beijing has continued this line to the present time. To this writers knowledge, the PRC has offered no new evidence which might support or confirm that it was Ho Chi Minh's or Hanoi's desire to establish a federal arrangement in Indochina. Nor has the PRC advanced any evidence which conclusively shows that Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea was an attempt to establish such a federation by force.

This review has identified two noteworthy events:

- 1) The aparent existence of a Chinese scheme to establish a Phnom Penh - Bangkok - Rangoon axis.
- 2) PRC actions to extinguish efforts to effect a reconciliation between ASEAN and the Indochinese states.

China's Phnom Penh - Bangkok - Rangoon axis scheme certainly must have triggered Vietnam's historic fear of Chinese encirclement and domination. In fact, there is a remarkable similarity between China's fear of Vietnam consolidating a federation in China's backyard, and Vietnam's argument that "by pushing Kampuchea into publicly attacking Vietnam, China had taken the first step towards its long-standing goal of curbing Vietnam."²⁵¹ The similarity rests in the apparent mutual paranoia felt by China and Vietnam regarding perceived "spheres of interest".

Although by no means conclusive, these facts tend to identify China as the initiator of this snowballing contest of mutual paranoia. It also tends to identify the PRC as an agent acting against regional stability.

In summary, Beijing's accusations that Hanoi is attempting to establish an Indochina federation is merely a parroting of Pol Pot's allegations. No evidence in the course of the Sino-Vietnamese conflict and its cold war follow-on has been unveiled which confirms Kampuchea's charges. China employs the phrase in order to discredit the Vietnamese and gain support for her own interests in Southeast Asia.

2. The Role and Interests of the USSR in Indochina

Observers were quick to identify Vietnam's December 1978 invasion of Kampuchea as a finger in the expanding reach of the Kremlin throughout Asia. Such an identification raises the issue of Moscow's influence in Vietnam's external relations.

This analysis will proceed in three steps: First, the role and interest of the Soviet Union in Indochina will be addressed. Second, the multi-dimensional relationship between the Soviet Union and Vietnam will be examined. And third, mitigating factors in the relationship will be assessed, i.e., internal and external constraints which tend to inhibit coordinated USSR-SRV efforts in Southeast Asia.

a. The Soviet Factor

Whereas the PRC is an external factor which tends to work against Vietnamese desires for greater regional association, the Soviet Union plays the opposite role. Soviet assistance has contributed to Vietnam's capability to pursue her regional objectives. Consequently, the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship will be examined in some detail. Although it is impossible to establish precise coefficients, it is believed that the Soviet variable plays a greater role in influencing Vietnam's foreign policy than does Chinese threats - which might act as a deterrent to Vietnamese foreign policy initiatives.

The following paragraphs will examine USSR assistance to Vietnam and address the issue of influence alluded to above. The purpose of this section is to examine the nature of Moscow's influence in Vietnam's Indochina policy, i.e., how the USSR figures into the trend toward integration - be it toward federation or something else.

This discussion will explore the nature of the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship to a greater degree than the preceding paragraphs on the PRC-SRV relationship. It is the author's belief that in the final analysis of the trend toward federation, the influence and support of the USSR plays a larger role than the Chinese deterrent.

b. The Role and Interest of the Soviet Union in Indochina

Soviet interests in Vietnam can be defined along three principal dimensions: global, regional, and bilateral. It is reasonable to assume that each dimension has a hierarchy of Soviet foreign policy objectives. Yet, that there is little agreement on the specific hierarchy of policy objectives is not surprising - for each structure incorporates the biases of its architect.

The common denominator of all external relations of the Soviet Union is to ensure the USSR's security and integrity. Beyond this fundamental objective, the Soviet state seeks to expand its influence throughout the world. This policy of expanding its influence is conducted under the guise of "proletarian internationalism" and support of "national liberation".

The following sections will review the three principal dimensions of Soviet interest in Vietnam and propose some possible foreign policy objectives at each level.

(1) Indochina as a Function of Moscow's Global Strategy. Of the many regional theaters into which Soviet global foreign policy is divided, the Eastern Europe theater is the primary concern.

Historically, the primary threat to Russia has generated from Europe - the Mongol invasion excepted. Thus, few would deny the primacy of Moscow's Eurocentric foreign policy

objectives. In the context of Moscow's global strategy, Indochina rates a relatively low priority. Yet, Dieter Heinzig, in a most lucid examination of the role and interest of the USSR in Indochina, concludes that in this primary region of the USSR's foreign policy calculation the countries of Indochina serve as "help mates".²⁵² Heinzig sees the expansion of the Kremlin's military base system as serving a supporting function in Moscow's "politico-military shielding of the European Soviet Bloc". Vietnam's Cam Ranh Bay, Danang, and Haiphong serve as important links in this primary Soviet objective.

Concerning the expansion of Soviet influence throughout the world, Donald Zagoria views Moscow's interest in Vietnam to be a function of its new system of alliances in the Third World.²⁵³ The danger of these new alliances is "not so much that Moscow will achieve hegemony in the Third World... [but] rather that the spread of communism and Soviet power will upset tenuous regional balances of power, lead to intensified regional instabilities, and make even more difficult the settlement of a variety of regional clashes that could lead to war."

In summary, Moscow's global strategy is designed to ensure its security and increase its influence. With perhaps the possible exception of Heinzig's "helpmate" hypothesis, the role of Indochina in the global context of ensuring the Soviet Union's security is virtually nonexistent. Regarding

the expansion of Moscow's influence throughout the world, Indochina, and Vietnam in particular, has a function in the emerging system of Soviet alliances in the Third World.

(2) Indochina As A Function of Moscow's Asia Strategy.

Russian fears of the "yellow peril" are incomprehensible to most Westerners. An yet, the perceived threat of the PRC is at the hub of the Kremlin's Asia strategy. Moscow's foreign policy concerning China is not unlike Washington's 1950's containment strategy.

The USSR's goals revolve around the desire to influence, if not dominate, both ideologically and geopolitically the countries bordering China. What the USSR wants in the region is ideological dominance: This is to be achieved without Soviet participation in war. This theme, dominance without war, explains virtually everything the USSR has done in Asia during recent times (Afghanistan excepted).²⁵⁴

Douglas Pike has summarized Moscow's perceived Asia strategy in the policy objectives hierarchy below:

- 1) fill the vacuum left by the United States
- 2) decrease United States' influence in Asia -- eliminate United States' military presence if possible
- 3) woo Asean nations
- 4) increase bilateral relations with Asian nations
- 5) develop a base system in Indochina
- 6) increase Soviet military presence in the region -- ships at sea and bases in Vietnam with a view toward

gaining parity with, or even ascendancy over the United States in the Indian Ocean.²⁵⁵

With the possible exception of number three above, each of the aforementioned objectives can be translated rather straightforwardly in terms of the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship

Finally, any discussion of Moscow's Asian strategy must address the USSR's 1969 proposal of an "Asian collective security" arrangement. In light of subsequent Communist adventures in Asia (i.e., Afghanistan and Kampuchea), the wording of Moscow's Asian policy seems rather ludicrous:

"The right of each people to dispose of its own fate, the impermissibility of annexation of territory through aggression, the inalienable right of every people to sovereign rights over its own natural resources and the realisation of socio-economic transformations, the solution of all international disputes by peaceful means."²⁵⁶

In 1977 Moscow praised Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia as examples of the "spirit" of collective security - blind to the fact that it was precisely these kinds of events transpiring in Indochina that were generating the greatest alarm among the nations of Southeast Asia.²⁵⁷

The preceding paragraphs have served to introduce Soviet interests in Indochina as a function of Moscow's Asia Strategy. This dimension of the Kremlin's interest in Indochina will be referred to and expanded upon throughout the remainder of this analysis - for it is this context in which

Vietnam's 1978 invasion of Kampuchea is viewed as an extension of Soviet influence in Southeast Asia.

(3) Soviet Bilateral Interests in Indochina. Strictly speaking, on a bilateral level, i.e., when the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship is decoupled from third party considerations, Soviet interest in the one-on-one relationship is virtually non-existent. Vietnam produces few goods desired by Russian markets, it offers the Soviet Union no prospects of advancement through technology transfer, and it is not a source of hard currency which the USSR desperately needs. Culturally, in the field of education, and even politically, Vietnam offers minimal returns. Thus, aside from the prestige gained by the advancement of another socialist country following the Soviet model (and even this was tarnished when Vietnam invaded Kampuchea), the Kremlin gains little from its bilateral relationship with Vietnam.

In light of this negative bilateral balance for the USSR, it is third party considerations which will ultimately influence the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship. Cases in the past of Moscow sacrificing Vietnamese interests in order to advance Kremlin designs elsewhere are well known to Hanoi's leaders. Such a relationship is bound to breed contempt and insecurity on the part of the Vietnamese.

(4) Summary Of Objectives Of Soviet Foreign Policy And The Role Played By Indochina. The division of Soviet interests in Vietnam along three principal dimensions - global, regional, and bilateral - and the recognition of Soviet objectives/interests as being either directed toward maintenance of security, or expansion of influence, lends itself to a tabular summary of the role played by Vietnam in Soviet foreign policy.

<u>Soviet Interests</u>	
	Primary Secondary
	Security Influence
global	minimum moderate
regional	none maximum
bilateral	none n/a

The major thrust of the remainder of this analysis will be to examine the nature of the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship as it relates to Moscow's regional objective of expanding its influence in Asia.

When discussing the USSR-SRV relationship in the context of recent developments, it is important to recall that in the Asian subsystem, there is a polarizing tendency for communist nations to follow the lead of either Moscow or Peking. Few nations have successfully "straddled the fence" for any appreciable length of time, and the states of Indochina have

been no exception. The emergence of Vietnam's pro-Soviet tilt in late 1977/ early 1978 released shock waves throughout the region. This tilt was quickly followed by the proclamation of China's support for the Pol Pot regime of Democratic Kampuchea.

The escalating border conflict between Kampuchea and Vietnam set the stage for the Soviet Union, by means of its relationship with Vietnam, to pursue its interest of expanding its influence in Asia - and thus dominate ideologically and geopolitically another nation bordering China. The following section of this analysis will examine the nature of the USSR-SRV relationship with an eye toward assessing the nature of Moscow's influence in Vietnam's Indochina policy.

c. The USSR-SRV Relationship

This section will examine the multi-dimensional nature of the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship. Its three parts will provide a descriptive chronology of the military dimension of the USSR-SRV relationship, a descriptive chronology of the economic relationship between Moscow and Hanoi, and, finally, additional dimensions of Soviet-Vietnamese relations not covered under these two headings.

Such an examination will help to further define the nature of Moscow's influence in Vietnam's Indochina policy.

(1) The Military Dimension. At the time of Hanoi's liberation of the South in May, 1975, the USSR was supplying 75% of North Vietnam's military hardware. China was supplying

15%, and Eastern Europe, ten percent. Whereas military aid then tapered off during 1976, assistance from the Soviet Union began to increase once again in 1977.²⁵⁸ As of mid-year 1977, diplomatic sources in Hanoi reported that the number of Soviet experts in country was 2,700 -- of which supposedly only about 40 were military advisors.²⁵⁹

The period from 1977 to 1978 witnessed a 100% increase in arms transfers between the two countries, and for the first time since 1975, Vietnam began to receive large quantities of arms and military equipment from the Soviet Union.²⁶⁰ The emergency deliveries of military hardware, which had been increasing since early summer in coordination with the escalating Vietnamese-Kapuchean border conflict, were transported to Vietnam by both sea and air routes.²⁶¹ Beginning in autumn, the emergency supplies escalated into a massive arms transfer operation.²⁶²

During 1978, the USSR increased Vietnam's military capacity by 50%; the latter's tank inventory climbed from 900 to 1,450 vehicles and self-propelled artillery increased from 90 to 290.²⁶³ Vietnam reportedly possessed 8,000 anti-aircraft guns, 500 SAMs, 2,000 anti-tank missiles and even thirty MiG-23/27s by years end.²⁶⁴ (The transfer of MiG-23s to Vietnam was also corroborated by the New China News Agency.)²⁶⁵

Vietnam's navy was also built up during this period. The Soviets sent two gun boats in December, 1978.²⁶⁶

This transfer came on the heels of a naval battle between the SRV and PRC on December 10 in which the Vietnamese used Soviet-supplied vessels.²⁶⁷

The year's arms transfer relationship was not limited to just military hardware. The number of Soviet military advisors increased dramatically in mid-1978. A Vietnamese Army corporal taken prisoner by Khmer forces in November reported that Soviet advisors were "all over Vietnam - particularly in the Army."²⁶⁸ According to intelligence sources, in late 1978 the Kremlin had ordered nearly 1,000 more advisors and technicians to Vietnam, bringing their number to almost 4,000.²⁶⁹ As a result of the massive military assistance supplied Vietnam by the Soviet Union, by year's end the 615,000 armed forces of the SRV were equal in number to, but better equipped than, the combined forces of the ASEAN states.²⁷⁰ In addition, Vietnam was the Far East Region's second largest arms importing country - with a total of \$US262 million (estimated in 1975 dollars), second only behind North Korea, and ahead of Taiwan. Vietnam received 11% of the region's total arms imports.²⁷¹

The military assistance link between the USSR and SRV continued to expand rapidly in 1979. Western analysts estimated that in the first six months of 1979, the Vietnamese received 90,000 tons of war material from the USSR, more than the amount Hanoi received from the Soviet Union during the

whole of 1978.²⁷² A visitor, returning to Vietnam after more than a year out of country, reported being struck by the profusion of brand-new Soviet materials - from command cars, heavy duty trucks and tanks, to MiG-21s.²⁷³ By 1979, the USSR was supplying 97% of Vietnam's military equipment, while 2% came from East Germany, and 1% from Czechoslovakia and Poland.²⁷⁴ Soviet assistance also provided Hanoi a string of radar stations built near the Chinese border.²⁷⁵

The SRV's air power capability was significantly augmented by the Kremlin during 1979. Fifty new Soviet made Badger (bombers) were reported on Vietnamese airfields, and these were protected by 125 to 150 MiG fighters and a new air defense system using SA-3s.²⁷⁶ Long range Soviet reconnaissance aircraft arrived at Danang in mid-April; missions were flown over Kampuchea, the Gulf of Thailand, and the South China Sea.²⁷⁷ Repeated sightings of these TU-95 Bear Ds flying out of Danang in support of the Vietnamese defense effort peppered the reporting period.²⁷⁸

Commencing in March, a dozen AN-12 transports began ferrying troops and military supplies throughout Indochina.²⁷⁹ In support of the Vietnamese war effort, Soviet AN-12 transport planes were making as many as 30 flights a day. FBIS reported that the Soviet Union was flying the military supplies to Vietnam via Calcutta.²⁸⁰ By late 1979, ten ships per month were arriving at Vietnamese ports with military cargo - averaging 1,300 tons each.²⁸¹

With respect to military and technical assistance, Western observers estimated that as many as 8,000 Soviet military and civilian personnel were in Vietnam - up from 2,700 two years earlier.²⁸² Apart from the Ambassador, two very senior Soviet officials enjoy similar ambassadorial status, and are stationed in Hanoi to supervise the disbursement of economic and technical aid, military assistance and training. Unconfirmed diplomatic reports indicated that, as of 1979, General Petrov Nikolai Alexandrovitch was the Soviet military assistance coordinator in Vietnam.²⁸³

It was originally believed that Soviet military assistance groups in Vietnam served chiefly in the field of communications and as cargo handlers. But in March 1979 the first group of Soviet "volunteers" arrived at Haiphong and Ho Chi Minh City to help unload the massive flows of military supplies.²⁸⁴ Soviet sailors also helped unload cargo at Ho Chi Minh City's port.²⁸⁵

It soon became apparent that the extent of Soviet military and technical assistance was even greater than originally believed. Soviet marine experts were enlarging port facilities and dredging the Saigon River.²⁸⁶ Soviet technicians in Danang assisted in refueling and maintaining the TU-95 Bear Ds.²⁸⁷ A substantial number of advisors turned out to be instructors at air force training schools.²⁸⁸ Additional advisors were training the Vietnamese army in the

use of new equipment, and the maintenance and operation of aircraft and ships.²⁸⁹

Such Soviet support as technical assistance, training, and the use of technicians is not surprising. What was shocking, however, were reports of Soviet pilots allegedly flying combat aircraft in the Cambodian War, and Soviet personnel engaging in actual fighting.²⁹⁰ The Thai military supreme command "confirmed" the presence of thirty Soviet Military advisors in Kampuchea.²⁹¹ Corroborating the numerous reports that Russians were being captured in the fighting, was the display of the bodies of Soviet advisors killed during the invasion.²⁹²

Soviet naval assistance increased the most rapidly during 1979. Moscow presented to the SRV at least five naval combatant vessels.²⁹³ During the period of open hostilities between Vietnam and China, the Soviets dispatched a fifteen-ship contingent to Vietnam's coast for the purpose of intercepting Chinese battlefield communications and relaying the intelligence to the Vietnamese.²⁹⁴ Several of the ships anchored at Danang and Cam Ranh Bay. In May, U.S. satellite intelligence indicated that a Soviet Foxtrot submarine had visited Cam Ranh Bay. Additional intelligence releases indicated that the Soviets were setting up electronic listening posts at the harbor. Such outposts would give the Soviets (and presumably the Vietnamese) the ability to keep track of U.S. and Chinese fleet movements in the South China Sea, and

provided the ability to pinpoint Chinese command headquarters.²⁹⁵

Pursuant to Vietnam's invasion and subjugation of Kampuchea, the PAVN (People's Army of Viet Nam) received an additional hardware transfusion - access to Khmer stockpiles. The Vietnamese captured twenty MiG-21s, two Il-28 bombers plus additional aircraft, tanks, and heavy guns.²⁹⁶

The Vietnamese also gained the use of Kompong Som, formerly known as Sihanoukville - a port of underestimated arms transport importance during the Vietnam War. Soviet freighters began unloading transportation equipment there by years end, 1979.²⁹⁷ Finally, as if to underscore an otherwise very profitable year for the SRV, Admiral Gorshkov made a December visit to Vietnam, and pledged increased Soviet military assistance to Hanoi.²⁹⁸

Vietnam entered the decade of the 1980s with the fourth largest standing army in the world. It is estimated that 47% of Vietnam's total state expenditures were attributed to defense; this equated to about \$US3.8 billion - or about 28% of the national income.²⁹⁹ As Vietnam remained deeply dependent on the USSR for all weaponry required in Kampuchea, it is estimated that Soviet aid for 1980 was nearly \$US2 billion - of which 55% was military aid.³⁰⁰

Soviet arms transfers to Vietnam began to ebb in 1980. In one of the few statements on Soviet military assistance to SRV during 1980, French sources reported the assignment of 3,000 additional advisors to Danang and Cam Ranh Bay.³⁰¹

As a result of the amount (and to an extent, sophistication) of Soviet naval assistance to Vietnam - particularly the transfer of coastal patrol craft which continued in 1980 - the Soviet Union had increased the potential intensity of naval warfare in Southeast Asia.³⁰²

The regional implications of Soviet arms transfers became more apparent as Vietnamese troops clashed with Khmer rebels and their troops on the Thai-Kampuchean border in June 1980. Reports in 1980 indicated that Soviet advisors (estimated at 1,600), in conjunction with Vietnamese troops, were running Laos "in all but name".³⁰³

While reports of Soviet military assistance declined in 1980, they all but stopped in 1981. SIPRI maintained that while there are no good numbers for Vietnam, Laos or Kampuchea, the military spending in the region must be very high.³⁰⁴ It was estimated that total SRV dependence had risen to between \$US3-6 million per day.³⁰⁵ Allegedly, the Soviets provided weapons for the 150,000 Vietnamese troops who remained on full alert at the Chinese border to guard against a repeat of the PRCs 1979 "lesson".³⁰⁶

In the regional context, the Kremlin's attempts to bolster its presence in Laos and Kampuchea included a gift of five fixed-wing aircraft and two helicopters.³⁰⁷

In summary, certain key statistics become apparent. During the decade of the 1970s, Vietnam emerged as the fifth

leading Third World importer of major weapons. (It is interesting to note that the first four and following three were all from the mid-East - Iran, Libya, Israel, Syria; then Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Jordan.) For the 1977-1980 period, Vietnam was the tenth largest Third World major weapon importing country, with 3.1% of the world total.³⁰⁸ Between 1975 and 1979 the Soviet Union shifted from supplying 75% of the SRVs military hardware to 97% - while China's 15% was terminated altogether. The report of 2,700 advisors in 1977 expanded into an upper estimate of 8,000 by 1979. In 1978 alone, Soviet arms trade to Vietnam doubled - which increased Hanoi's military capacity by 50%.

(2) The Economic Dimension. One of the most significant actions in establishing Hanoi's tilt toward Moscow was the Kremlin's approval and support for North Vietnam's final offensive to liberate the South in the Spring of 1975.³⁰⁹ China's prestige suffered greatly due to her original advocacy of moderation, restraint, and patience in further North Vietnamese liberation efforts (as opposed to unification by military force).³¹⁰ Moscow thus emerged as Hanoi's prime benefactor in the post-Paris Accords liberation and unification scheme.

As regional tensions seemingly subsided, the relative importance of Soviet-Vietnamese relations diminished somewhat during the 1975-1978 period. Yet, alarmed by the prospect

of increased Chinese influence in Southeast Asia coming on the heels of U.S. withdrawal from Indochina, Moscow extended promises of economic aid to Vietnam. It was generally believed that during this period Hanoi's attention was directed toward the domestic dilemmas of unification, modernization, and socialization. Pressing the advantage it had gained, Moscow urged the Soviet model for economic development (as opposed to the Maoist), and supplied an estimated \$US1.2 billion in economic aid during the first year after unification. At least 20% of the rice eaten in Vietnam - and possibly as much as 30% (2-3 million metric tons)- was being supplied annually by the USSR.³¹¹ (Moscow also attempts to meet Vietnam's chronic food shortage by supplying wheat, bought from countries such as Australia and India.)³¹² Hanoi depended on Moscow for other equally vital commodity aid such as petroleum, chemical fertilizers, and spare parts for transportation vehicles.

In a major postwar aid agreement negotiated in Moscow in October 1975, the USSR agreed to fund 60% of Vietnam's 1976-1980 Five Year Plan - at a cost of about \$3.2 billion. The agreement involved some 40 major industrial projects, chiefly in the fields of electrical power, oil and mineral exploration and exploitation, transportation, communication and industrial support for agriculture. In addition, the USSR agreed to sponsor 30,000 Vietnamese students and technicians in the USSR. Commercial air service between Hanoi

and Moscow commenced in late 1975. And during this period an average of 75 Soviet ships per week began calling at Vietnamese ports.³¹³

Even as Sino-Vietnamese relations improved somewhat in 1977 as compared to previous years, Hanoi's ties with the USSR remained close. By midyear, Moscow was supplying \$15 billion a year in economic aid to Vietnam, which amounted to approximately one half of the total assistance Vietnam was receiving from all sources.³¹⁴

A series of events destined 1978 to be a decisive year in terms of Soviet-Vietnamese relations. Having previously equivocated about joining COMECON, Vietnam reversed its position and, on June 29th, became the organizations tenth member. (That same month China terminated its twenty year-old assistance program to Vietnam.)

The major foreign policy development of 1978 between the Soviet Union and Vietnam was the signing of a twenty five year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in November. As a result of this agreement, Vietnam was firmly committed to the Soviet camp. (This Treaty will be addressed again later.) In addition to the Treaty, five other agreements dealing with defense, economic aid, technology, and cultural exchanges were signed. At the time, there were rumors in Moscow that the Treaty contained an unpublished protocol adding the "immediate military aid" phrase that appears in both the North Korean and Mongolian Treaties. It is known that some

sort of military protocol annex to the treaty was signed in November, but the nature of the protocol has not been made public.³¹⁵

By 1979, about 65% of Vietnam's total trade was with the USSR. In 1980, approximately 50% of Vietnam's exports were sent to the USSR as partial compensation for fuel, technical equipment, food, consumer goods, and military assistance. Vietnamese imports for 1980 approximated Rbl 800 million, two-thirds of which came from the USSR and about one-third from other socialist countries.³¹⁶ Soviet-Indochinese trade for the 1975-1981 period is listed on page 159.

After an apparent downturn in 1980, relations with Moscow seemed to improve somewhat in 1981. Through the period until 1981 it is estimated that approximately two hundred projects had been built with Soviet aid, and 60,000 Vietnamese had been trained in the USSR. In July significant economic cooperation and trade agreements were signed to cover the period 1981-1985.³¹⁷ During the five year period, the USSR would help Vietnam with more than one hundred projects. The announcement proclaimed that the Soviet Union would continue to assist Vietnam in ongoing projects such as: The Da River project, the Than Long bridge over the Red River, and the Xuan Mai concrete slab factory for prefabricated houses. Additional Soviet assistance would be extended in such projects as coal production, power generation and transmission, cement factory equipment and superphosphate fertilizer

production. Technical and vocational schools in such fields as communications and transportation, construction, and chemicals would be constructed with Soviet aid - and 2,000 Vietnamese students would receive training at Soviet vocational schools.

Under the economic and technical accord, the Soviets would help Vietnam build forty new projects in such critical areas as hydroelectric power and coal production, and harbor and railway improvements. Also under the new agreement, Moscow would "almost quadruple" its supply of equipment and machinery to Vietnam as compared to the previous similar period.

Concerning trade, the agreement stated that bilateral trade between the USSR and SRV would expand by 90 percent! Under its provisions, the USSR would increase shipments of oil products, fertilizers, motor vehicles, and road construction machines and equipment. Vietnam, in turn, would boost its exports of coffee, tea, vegetables, fruit, spices, rubber, timber and handicrafts.³¹⁸ And as in previous years, the agreement stated that the Soviet Union would provide cotton, wool and medicinal plants to be processed in Vietnam and returned to the USSR as finished products. Although no firm totals for the pledge have been forthcoming, Moscow had been requested to fund \$6 billion of the 1981-1985 Vietnamese Five Year Plan.³¹⁹

Information on financial assistance from COMECON to Vietnam is "rare", Nevertheless, it is known that Hungary has been assisting Vietnam with the construction of two cotton-spinning mills. East Germany has pledged assistance for a cotton mill and shoe factory (both for export), and aid in modernizing dockyards. The East Germans have pledged approximately Rbl155 million/year for such projects as a plant to produce prefabricated houses, a flat-glass mill, and general reconstruction.³²⁰ In the past, Hungary has supplied equipment for telegraph lines; East Germany, compressors and cranes; and Bulgaria, cement mixers.

When considering Soviet trade to the SRV it is prudent to remember that figures, and dollar equivalents, are difficult to verify and corroborate. This problem exists not only in the field of economic assistance; it was witnessed in the section dealing with arms transfer as well.

The shroud of secrecy in which most of these transactions are cloaked inhibits - to a degree - specific correlations between foreign policy determinations and aid and assistance.

The following data is provided as a benchmark for comparison, i.e. increasing or decreasing trade trends over a period; rather than as an authoritative representation of amounts which themselves are based on a mixture of fact, speculation, and extrapolation.

VIETNAM'S PERFORMANCE FIGURES³²¹

PUBLIC EXPENDITURE

As % of GNP	30
Defense as % of GNP	n/a
Defense as % of public expenditure	47
Education as % of public expenditure	n/a
Total expenditure (US\$m)	
1979	5,060
1980	5,330
1981	5,670
Total revenue (US\$m)	
1979	3,580
1980	3,860
1981	4,270

FOREIGN TRADE

Total foreign trade as % of GNP	9
% of energy consumption imported (net)	90
% of food consumption imported (net)	12
% of trade with Pacific region (except US and Japan)	1
% of foreign trade with the US	n/a
Merchandise exports (US\$m)	
1977	456
1978	482
1979	420
1980	360
1981	n/a
Merchandise imports (US\$m)	
1977	1,142
1978	1,159
1979	1,198
1980	1,023
1981	n/a

VIETNAM'S PERFORMANCE FIGURES
(Continued)

Balance of payments (US\$m)	
1977	-686
1978	-677
1979	-778
1980	-663
1981	n/a
<u>PRODUCTION & PRICES</u>	
GNP in US\$ (billions)	16.0
Per capita income (US\$)	290
Percentage average GNP growth, 1970-80	3
GNP at market prices (US\$b)	
1977	n/a
1978	n/a
1979	n/a
1980	16.0
1981	n/a
Agriculture as % of GNP	45
Industry as % of GNP	35
Gross capital formation as % of GNP	10
Capital-output ratio	n/a
Inflation (CPI) in 1980	30
1981 estimates	50
Money supply % growth	n/a

	With Communist Vietnam			With Cambodia			With Laos		
	Exports	Imports	Balance	Exports	Imports	Balance	Exports	Imports	Balance
1975	158.7	47.8	110.9	0	0	0	0	0	0
1976	232.5	63.6	168.9	0	0	0	10.6	0	10.6
1977	274.2	129.8	144.4	0	0	0	22.6	0	22.6
1978	305.5	152.3	153.2	0	0	0	11.6	0.2	11.4
1979	446.2	147.6	298.6	?	?	?	25.0	0.2	24.8
1980	454.9	157.5	297.4	?	?	?	37.4	0.3	37.1
1981	398.7	63.7	326.0	?	?	?	15.5	?	?

SOVIET TRADE³²²
(Million rubles)

(3) Additional Dimensions of Assistance. Although foreign military and economic assistance has become the most visible and important policy tool in expanding Moscow's interest in the SRV, the Soviets have also supported their client by other means. The joint Soviet-Vietnamese space flight of July, 1981 is one such example. This had significant propaganda value and served to raise the prestige of both the Soviets and Vietnamese in the eyes of the Third World nations. But the focus of this study is on Soviet assistance and implications for Vietnam's Indochina policy.

Throughout the building border conflicts (initially between Vietnam and Kampuchea, and later Vietnam and the PRC), Soviet media consistently gave Hanoi unequivocal support. This support served two functions: First, it served to strengthen the credibility of the USSR not only in Vietnam's eyes, but also in those of the Third World. Second, Soviet media support served to publicize the heretofore discrete Chinese assistance to the Khmer Rouge.³²³ Under the guise of supporting Vietnam, Soviet media thus advanced its regional objective of combating Chinese influence throughout the region. In this second function served by the Soviet media, the USSR apparently became the first major power to spin the local conflict into the web of the Sino-Soviet dispute.

Moscow's initial comment on the Vietnamese-Kampuchean border dispute appeared in a 31 December Tass report.³²⁴

The article endorsed Vietnam's line on the conflict and Hanoi's proposals for negotiations. Moscow media carried reports of Peking's support of Kampuchean aggression against Vietnam.

Eager to exploit Sino-Vietnamese differences, Moscow publicized the ethnic Chinese resistance to Hanoi's new economic policies - resistance which was developing throughout Vietnam in May, 1978. Soviet media stressed that the resistance was particularly strong in the Colon district of Ho Chi Minh City.

The following month Leonid Brezhnev linked the reign of terror and mass executions perpetrated under Pol Pot to the period of the Cultural Revolution in China.³²⁵

In the context of the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979, Pravda articles, in clear support of Vietnam, linked the PRC's military build-up to its expansionist aim throughout South-east Asia.³²⁶ China's alleged appetite for the region was a persistent subject of Soviet commentary.

One I. Aleksandrov article, published in February 1979, noted China's opening of a "second front" against Vietnam, ridiculed the PRC because of its failure to "break through to the Gulf of Siam or to encircle Vietnam".³²⁷ (Hidden in this statement is an apparent projection of the Kremlin's own failure to reach the (Persian Gulf).)

The border war between China and Vietnam was the first real test of the USSR-SRV Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.

Unclassified reports describe Moscow's support of Vietnam during its Chinese War as cautious. The USSR took no action that could have been interpreted as being brazenly hostile toward China. The Kremlin did, however, initiate a crash military assistance program. It supplied Vietnam with intelligence information, staged a quasi-naval show of force in support of Vietnam, and jockeyed troops along the Sino-Soviet border. The USSR also provided Vietnam a good deal of diplomatic and political support.

Critics of the Soviet Union, perhaps in attempts to sour its relationship with Vietnam, have painted the Soviet Union as unwilling to fulfill her treaty commitments during times of crisis. While the SRV was desirous of obtaining the most possible assistance from its patron, it apparently felt that the Soviet "check" of Chinese power was sufficient. Hanoi admitted that the Treaty acted as a strategic deterrent against China.³²⁸ It is also possible that Vietnam signed the Treaty to ensure a Soviet veto of the almost inevitable Security Council resolution that would (and in fact later did) demand the removal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea.³²⁹

It is helpful to recall that the Treaty demands only consultation during times of crisis. The Treaty signed between Moscow and Hanoi lacks the "mutual assistance" dimension which characterizes Soviet treaties with its other communist allies - and in this regard it falls into the category of

treaties that Moscow has heretofore reserved for non-communist nations. In fact, parallels have been drawn between the Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty and the treaties signed between the USSR and India. There is a striking similarity in the timing of the treaties; that with Vietnam was concluded just prior to its Kampuchea invasion, and India was pressured into signing its treaty prior to launching its military operations against Pakistan.³³⁰ In addition, it has been speculated that Moscow's desire to conclude such a treaty with Vietnam was, in part, a response to the Sino-Japanese treaty of the previous summer.³³¹

Considerations underlying Moscow's cautious approach throughout the Sino-Vietnamese fighting were intimated by Pravda in March, 1979. Commentaries inferred that maintaining "good" relations with Washington was a prime Soviet consideration in responding to China's attack. The Soviet desire to sign the Salt II Treaty is seen as a critical factor in this regard.³³² The Kremlin's cautious approach should be viewed, in part, as an effort to minimize the impact of the conflict on U.S.-Soviet relations.

In yet a third border conflict involving Vietnam - the conflict with Thai forces along the Thai-Kampuchean border in June/July 1980 - the Soviet Union once again backed Hanoi. In this case, the USSR criticized the press, and recognition these skirmishes were receiving, as a U.S.-PRC attempt to reverse the growing trend toward ASEAN-Indochinese normalization.³³³

Finally, for purposes of this discussion, Soviet support for its ally was manifested at the United Nations. Moscow's official position on the refugee situation was doctrinaire and callous, maintaining that the problem had been invented in Washington and Peking (to promote their own political designs) and that Vietnam was not responsible for the affair. Additionally, in January the Soviet Union, in a U.N. Security Council meeting, voted against hearing Sihanouk plea Kampuchea's case. In January and March, the Kremlin exercised its 111th and 112th vetoes in defeating resolutions on Vietnamese withdrawal from Kampuchea and the convention asking the termination of hostilities between Vietnam and the PRC.

In summary, the Soviet Union has actively and broadly supported the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Such support has been clearly demonstrated in the areas of military aid, economic assistance, propaganda support and solidarity at the United Nations.

d. Mitigating Factors in the Soviet-Vietnamese Relationship

Despite the bonds forged by their symbiotic military and economic relations, the USSR-SRV relationship has been punctuated by periods of strain.

The purpose of this section is to identify and describe the mitigating factors in the relationship which have

contributed to the friction between the two countries. This will be accomplished by first presenting a brief overview of the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship and later focusing on internal and external constraints which tend to retard coordinated USSR/SRV efforts in Southeastern Asia.

The Vietnamese are keenly aware of the Kremlin's duplicity as an ally. Moscow has sacrificed solidarity with its Vietnamese comrades to its own European interests on at least three major occasions during the post-World War II period.³³⁴ Such actions have contributed to Hanoi's skepticism and contempt of Soviet assurances. The SRV is also sensitive to its role as "The Vietnam Card" in Moscow's anti-China Asian policy.

Periods of tension in the USSR/SRV relationship have been apparent in the post-Vietnam War period - the temporal focus of this study. Such tension was apparent in 1976/1977, 1980 and late 1981. During the months of 1976/1977 the estrangement was largely rooted in ideological disagreement. The latter periods of 1980 and late 1981, however, were the consequence of economic factors and conflicting foreign policy interests in Indochina. Before addressing these mitigating factors and by way of introduction to the scrimmaging between the Soviets and the Vietnamese, an overview of what might be called the Soviet-Vietnamese "personality conflict" is presented.

(1) The USSR-SRV Personality Conflict. Douglas Pike has developed a most insightful assessment of the psychological

dimension of the USSR-SRV relationship. Although intangible, it is a mitigating factor which influences all dimensions of Soviet-Vietnamese relations. Pike maintains:

A great paradox operates at the subliminal level of Soviet-Vietnamese relations. If ever there were two alien cultures, they are Vietnamese and Russian. Yet the personalities thrown up by each culture have similar dark sides. Both are marked by devious mentality, the result in both cases of a conspiratorial and brutalizing history. Both have paranoid tendencies, manifested by unremitting suspicion of strangers and a general inability to trust. Both exhibit the phenomenon of the tortured soul, abundantly illustrated by a literature of despair. Both also have the ability to throw up an exclusive sort of flaming creative genius, in art and music. But these qualities of similarity, by their very nature, make the two cultures alien--hence the paradox.³³⁵

Thus what exists is a relationship between two alien cultures held together by bonds of necessity.

(2) Domestic Constraints On The USSR-SRV Relationship.

The following section will examine some domestic determinants of foreign policy decision making. It will focus on the mitigating dimension of ideology, economics, geography, and resources - factors which one might reasonably assume would serve to strengthen the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship.

Ideology: Early indications that the USSR-SRV relationship was experiencing trouble became evident in 1976. Much to Moscow's consternation, Le Duan came forward in support of the Eurocommunist movements. At the 25th Congress of the CPSU, the Vietnamese Secretary General praised "the diversified form

and method of struggle suitable for the conditions of each country to take the revolution forward to its final noble goal."³³⁶

The following year, Mikail Suslov, the late Soviet party theoretician, attended the Vietnamese party congress. He left before it ended, presumably because of disagreements over ideological issues - Hanoi's support for Eurocommunism cited above, and its initial refusal to become a full member of COMECON.

Ideology has never been a steel band when it comes to packaging relationships, and it is highly questionable whether it is a band at all in the Soviet-Vietnamese case. The degree to which ideological fraternity was a motive in the development of relations between Moscow and Hanoi is debatable.³³⁷

Indeed, it is clear that Soviet theoreticians tend to hold Vietnamese communism in low esteem, presumably because it departs so radically from the Soviet brand. Marxism for the Vietnamese true believer is not a guide but an icon.³³⁸ Pike asserts that this longstanding disparity in Marxist thought has always conferred on the Vietnamese communist-Soviet communist relationship the overtone of tenuousness, of being delimited and hedged on both sides, and above all, being transitory. Never has Vietnamese communism had an aura of true proletarian kinship with the USSR. Hence, there never has been any particular allegiance.³³⁹

Economics: It has been disputed that economics was a motive factor in the decision to develop Sino-Vietnamese relations. Vietnam has proved to be an economic risk for the USSR and the Kremlin has gained essentially no economic advantage from its relation with Vietnam. It is most ironic that the USSR, which is dependent on wheat imports itself, is exporting grain to Vietnam.

Indeed, whereas economics certainly was not a domestic factor favoring the establishment of relations it may well be a motive factor in their deterioration. The Soviet Union is already being throttled by the effects of over-centralized planning and lagging industrial and agricultural production, burdened by the Polish debt, and constrained by financing the war in Afghanistan.

In November 1981 Brezhnev reported that food output and distribution was the USSR's biggest problem.³⁴⁰ How then could they afford to export grain to Vietnam? The Soviet Union's financial burden has been further exacerbated by the fact that Moscow has had to allocate hard currency to purchase both grain and petroleum for Vietnam.³⁴¹ The USSR has been discretely selling large amounts of gold to make up for a currency shortage aggravated by 1981's grain shortage. Consequently, Moscow has been forced to reduce its aid to Southeast Asia. The price Vietnam pays for Soviet petroleum rose from \$4.00 to \$16.00 per barrel in 1981 and grain shipments have been decreased.

During an Indochinese leaders summit meeting in Moscow in 1981, Brezhnev underscored Moscow's economic difficulties and apparently urged the Southeast Asian trio to engage in diplomacy with ASEAN in attempts to solve the Kampuchea problem.

The greatest single domestic constraint on Vietnam's foreign policy has been its economic stagnation and near bankruptcy. Vietnam's dismal economic condition has been the result of a compounding effect between a series of factors. Natural disasters such as floods and droughts have crippled Vietnam's predominantly agricultural economy. This situation has been exacerbated by government mismanagement, poor planning, and corruption. Shortages of necessary logistical supplies such as seeds, fertilizers, and even electricity to run irrigation pumps have complicated the situation. In addition, problems with transportation and storage have resulted in spoilage, and thus robbed the Vietnamese population of products that have been produced. Such an array of problems have combined to create the economic dependence of Vietnam on the Soviet Union that was detailed earlier. A consequence of Vietnam's domestic nightmare which has served to exacerbate the tension between Vietnam and the USSR has been the stream of severe criticism from the Kremlin and the increase of Soviet advisors and technicians (which Vietnam has not desired).³⁴²

Economic and foreign problems in the USSR have decreased the availability of Soviet foreign aid. The effects of Poland and Afghanistan, while mentioned briefly earlier, cut even deeper in this regard. Poland has been a drain on Soviet resources - and perhaps has caused the Kremlin to shy away from increased commitments to the SRV. In addition to consuming Soviet wealth, the invasion of Afghanistan has called attention to the Soviet Union's expansionistic nature.

The military facilities that increased ties with Vietnam could potentially provide must have been an enticing jewel to the military elites. Indeed, present use of Cam Ranh Bay and Danang have greatly augmented the Soviet naval presence in both the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The Soviets have also established intelligence collection centers, communications facilities, and air station facilities in Vietnam. Not only do such facilities contribute to the regional objective of containing China, they directly threaten the U.S. naval presence in Subic Bay, Philippines. The military appears to have gained a trump card in the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship. Or have they?

Geography: Geographically, Vietnam is unable to satisfy the "traditional" Russian desire for a warm water port. Under the most ideal circumstances, Vietnam could but provide the USSR with only a warm water base. Whereas bases are somewhat more valuable than the support offered by a facility, they

fall short of the advantages provided by an established port. In order to satisfy commercial requirements of a port, the USSR must be able to ensure secure communications between the port and the Soviet Union's means of industrial and agricultural production. Rail lines connecting the Soviet Union and Vietnam run through China; the Sino-Soviet split has added greater distance to the physical separation between the USSR and Vietnam. To satisfy commercial requirements, a port must almost necessarily be contiguous to Soviet continental control.

Resources: The prospects of plentiful Southeast Asian offshore oil reserves have dimmed. Whereas the West Germans, Italians and Canadians have been unable to tap oil in the continental shelf and have consequently given up their exploration, the Soviets have only just recently (late 1981-1982) commenced their search.

Although it has been said that Vietnam maintained the most likely plots for Soviet exploration, their efforts will most likely also end in frustration.³⁴³ Not only is the projected output of minimal value, the drilling sites themselves are contested areas between Vietnam and China.

In summary, domestic factors such as ideology, economics, geography and resources cut two ways. Although they have qualities which serve to strengthen the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship, they nevertheless exhibit a mitigating effect

by either contributing directly to the estrangement of relations or significantly reducing the anticipated gains.

(3) USSR-SRV: Friction in Foreign Policies

Soviet and Vietnamese attitudes towards their respective foreign relations with other international actors have not always been in harmony. Vietnamese external relations have piqued Moscow on several occasions since 1975. Hanoi clearly initiated the Kremlin with its membership in the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and Asian Development Bank. Particularly relevant to this study was the divergence of views regarding the perceived role of ASEAN in Southeast Asia. Vietnam does not fully accept the Soviet view of ASEAN as an imperialistic creation. In addition, Hanoi's low-key stand on the building Polish crisis irked their Soviet ally.

Yet, these are relatively minor irritations in the broader context of Soviet-Vietnamese relations. The definitive factors affecting the relationship will emerge from Soviet foreign policy initiatives. Such initiatives are likely to fall under the rubrics of:

- 1) Increased Soviet bilateral relations with the Indo-chinese states of Laos and Kampuchea.
- 2) Efforts to improve Soviet-ASEAN relations.
- 3) Initiatives to improve Soviet-PRC relations.
- 4) Future USSR-US relations

A preview of the potential consequences of the first initiative emerged in 1981. When the Kremlin established

direct links with Laos and Cambodia - thus circumventing Hanoi. The Vietnamese leaders felt squeezed out of what they considered their natural sphere of influence in Indochina. Vietnamese aid could not compete with that of its Soviet ally. According to G.I. Chufin, a Soviet academic:

The Soviet Union supports humanitarian international aid to the Kampuchean people. Along with Vietnam and other socialistic countries, it is giving the People's Republic of Kampuchea considerable assistance on a bilateral basis in rehabilitating its economy and normalizing life as rapidly as possible. In 1979, the Soviet Union granted Kampuchea free aid amounting to 85 million dollars worth of commodities. Under the 1980 programme, free deliveries of goods will total nearly 134 million dollars, including 164,000 tons of food (of which more than 100,000 tons have already been delivered), 130,000 tons of oil products, 8 million metres of fabric, 420 automobiles, and various consumer goods. In addition, the Soviet Union is helping the PRK to restore a number of factories, medical institutions, and educational establishments. Funds earmarked for these purposes add up to more than 68 million dollars.³⁴⁴

Despite Soviet acknowledgement of Vietnamese aid, this imbalance spelled a loss of face for the Vietnamese in Kampuchea. The December, 1981 expulsion of Pen Sovan, number two man in the Kampuchean political hierarchy and Moscow's man in Phnom Penh, apparently for reasons of his pro-Soviet allegiances, provides an indication of the degree to which Hanoi will move to protect its interests. It is also indicative of the limitations in the Kremlin's control over Vietnam.

Improvement in Soviet-ASEAN relations and Moscow's support for Hanoi's occupation of Kampuchea are mutually exclusive. As long as the Kremlin supports Vietnam in such a manner, it

can not expect an improvement in relations with ASEAN. As ASEAN is clearly the larger prize (in terms of geostrategic value, productivity, and population), any Soviet initiative to improve relations with ASEAN collectively or bilaterally would mitigate against Soviet relations with Vietnam.

Recent Soviet initiatives toward China have made Hanoi very uncomfortable. Such initiatives serve to validate Vietnamese suspicions of their unreliable ally. Perhaps as an effort to register their concern with Moscow, Hanoi sent not Le Duan, but second-in-command, Truong Chinh, to Brezhnev's funeral. Le Duan did, however, send a message to Andropov expressing congratulations and confidence that the USSR would remain the "mainstay and reliable supporter of all forces of revolution"³⁴⁵ (thereby underscoring his concern in this regard). While the Kremlin has stated that improved relations with China would not occur at the expense of other countries, it is intriguing to note that Moscow has not firmly rejected China's demand that the USSR terminate its support of the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea.

The U.S. signal is an important factor in the Soviet Union's decision-making process, and Indochina is a region where Soviet, American, and Vietnamese interests converge. Should the U.S. maintain its hardline approach toward Vietnam it is reasonable that any improvement in U.S.-USSR relations would have a mitigating effect on Soviet-Vietnamese relations.

However, the death of Brezhnev and Reagan's commitment to resolving the questions of remaining MIAs in Indochina may be the potential seeds for change.

In summary, any relationship based on necessity, and not mutual respect and trust, is bound to splinter when forces conspire to change the nature of the need. Suspicion resulting from the legacy of Moscow's past sell-outs has caused Hanoi to view with concern changes in Soviet external relations.

Indications exist, particularly in political relations, that might suggest that Soviet influence in Vietnam is indeed restricted. The debate still rages as to whether Vietnam has in fact yielded port (vice facility) privileges in Cam Ranh Bay to the Soviets. Vietnam's expressed desire to limit the number of Soviet advisors in Vietnam also suggests less than total Soviet influence. Strains as a result of Soviet cut-backs in economic support to Vietnam would also tend to degrade Moscow's influence. Finally, the December 1981 expulsion of Pen Sovan provides indications of significant limitations in the Kremlin's control over Vietnam. The subject of influence, like the "proxy" theory, remains a question of degree.

e. Soviet Influence

Having examined the role and interest of the USSR in Indochina, the USSR-SRV relationship - and its mitigating factors - it is necessary to draw some qualitative conclusions about Soviet influence in Vietnam's Indochina policy.

The question of influence is directly related to speculation on the role of Vietnam may play as a Soviet "proxy" in regional affairs. While the extensive Soviet military and economic assistance provides strong evidence in support of the "proxy theory", this study has illustrated the difficulties in translating assistance into influence. Vietnam's fierce sense of nationalism and independence has a neutralizing effect on Moscow's heavy handed imperialism. To overemphasize the role of Vietnam as a Soviet surrogate is to misrepresent the historical process behind the indigenization of communism in Indochina."³⁴⁶

Where Soviet and Vietnamese interests run parallel, there is a tendency to see Vietnam acting as Moscow's "proxy". While this may not necessarily be false, this writer questions the value of such an identification - save for propaganda purposes. A danger of this view, however, rests in the transposition of such a notion to issues where Soviet and Vietnamese interests do not coincide, and thus perhaps obscuring a potential opportunity to exploit the differences between Soviet and Vietnamese interests to U.S. advantage.

Vietnam has survived Chinese expansionism, French colonialism, and American imperialism. It will certainly survive its "friendship" with the Soviet Union.³⁴⁷

f. Assistance, Influence and the Trend Toward
Federalism

There is no doubt that Soviet military assistance has provided Hanoi the tools with which to pursue its goal of greater regional solidarity. Soviet military assistance must thus be viewed as a substantial positive factor in the capability of Vietnam to carry out its regional policies. Economic assistance has played a similar role. But military and economic assistance is not directly translatable into influence - much less into the definition of regional policies. There is no basis to support the view that Soviet military and economic assistance is supporting the establishment of a Vietnamese-dominated Indochinese federation.

Nor do factors which mitigate against a closer USSR-SRV relationship necessarily imply a decrease in Vietnam's desire - or perhaps even ability - to pursue its goal of greater regional coordination. Indeed, Soviet efforts to increase their bilateral relations with Laos and Kampuchea would suggest that Moscow is not necessarily firmly committed to the concept of a Vietnamese dominated Indochinese federation. It must also be remembered that in the hierarchy of Moscow's Asian policy objectives, Moscow's China policy is preeminent. Any substantial improvement in Soviet-PRC relations is likely to witness a distancing in the USSR-SRV association. Thus, while the USSR-SRV relationship provides Hanoi the tools with which to pursue its policies in Indochina

most effectively, the USSR-SRV relationship does not define the policy. Nor does it necessarily suggest that the trend is toward federation - or even that the Soviets would unequivocally support such a trend.

IV. CONCLUSION

In many respects the assumption that Ho Chi Minh, or the Communist regime in Hanoi, was determined to dominate all of Southeast Asia - or at a minimum federate all of French Indochina - has assumed the standard of a "given". It has been established as a law of Asian politics against which all events are then verified and validated. Events in Southeast Asia are seen to somehow logically follow from this assumption. This analysis of the concept of an Indochinese federation and the long-term trend toward regional integration has illustrated the faults of such deductive reasoning.

The challenge of this study has been to follow this process in reverse. This study has attempted to proceed inductively, to gather and examine the broad base of facts surrounding the origins of the notion of an Indochinese federation, to follow their development, and to see where they lead -- toward federation or toward something else.

The thesis of this study has argued that removed from its historical setting, the concept of "Indochinese federation" has assumed an unintended connotation. Ambiguity and incomplete documentation surrounding the origins of the concept compounds this dilemma. Consequently, usage of "Indochinese federation" to explain recent developments in Southeast Asia infers biases which merit careful consideration. When these

deficiencies of context and ambiguity are ignored, the consequence emerges that Vietnamese actions in Indochina are potentially being interpreted within a limited spectrum of possible Vietnamese intentions.

This analysis has proceeded along two planes; it has examined the historical trend toward regional integration, and it has examined the specific concept of an Indochinese federation. The introductory chapter of this analysis identified a series of factors which facilitate or inhibit the trend toward federation. Jacob and Teune identified such elements as: Geographical proximity, social homogeneity of the peoples involved, shared functional interests, communal character of the people, governmental effectiveness, previous integrative experience, etc. as factors to be considered in the discussion of federation. Franck complimented the above list with factors such as: ideology, elite charisma, common language, similar culture, complementary economies, common challenge, etc. Many of these characteristics have been either directly described or alluded to throughout this study.

The intent of this analysis has not been to either evaluate or weigh each of these factors in any precise way. Instead, it has sought to develop a qualitative appreciation for the role such elements play in the trend toward regional integration in Indochina.

By way of a general summary, the many factors relevant to a discussion of federation can be divided into three broad categories:

1) Social

- a) ethnicity
- b) race
- c) language
- d) religion
- e) culture
- f) history
- g) consciousness of common heritage
- h) nationalism

2) Economic

- a) resources
- b) labor
- c) capital

3) Political

- a) governmental effectiveness
- b) ideology (communism)
- c) functional interests
- d) defense/external threat
- e) military interests
- f) elite charisma
- g) geopolitics

Regarding the qualitative equation for federation in Indochina it can be concluded that social factors, particularly primordial variables such as race, language, religion, culture, etc.

have a long-term mitigating effect on the trend toward greater regional cohesion. While economic interests of the three Indochinese states could be developed more effectively and efficiently through greater regional cooperation, it can not be assumed that economic interests will transcend the opposing forces of the social dimension. Political factors present a somewhat less clear-cut breakdown. While governmental effectiveness is generally lacking in all three states, Hanoi nevertheless is the leading political actor. The SRV will continue to promote administrative cadres in both Laos and Kampuchea who are sympathetic to her desires. Ideology is a somewhat capricious factor. But for the near and medium term Hanoi should be able to maintain and develop intra-party bonds.

What Hanoi must promote to enhance her position in both Laos and Kampuchea is the mutual belief in a common enemy, a common (anti) colonial heritage, and common future challenges.

The PRC remains the largest single extra-regional actor working to inhibit Hanoi's plans for regional cooperation. The USSR, on the the other hand, is the largest single extra-regional actor working to support Hanoi's desires.

Regarding the specific notion of an Indochinese federation several conclusions can be formulated:

- 1) The initial founding of the Indochinese Communist Party, including the selection of the Party name, was heavily influenced by the demands of the Moscow-directed Comintern.

- 2) Ho Chi Minh did envision some form of regional solidarity, perhaps even an alliance -- but such considerations appear in the context of the anti-colonial resistance struggle -- and are usually coupled to affirmations of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence. This writer has uncovered no document which confirms that it was Ho Chi Minh's "age-old dream", "will",³⁴⁸ or "vision"³⁴⁹ to establish a Vietnamese-dominated Indochinese federation.
- 3) The step-like trend toward "federation" in the late 1940s/early 1950s and the call for enhanced solidarity in the 1960s appear at a time when Hanoi is responding to an external threat; in such a context, the calls for greater solidarity between the three Indochinese states appears reactive.
- 4) No document has surfaced specifically describing the structural mechanics of the much speculated about Indochinese federation.

Questioning the fundamental need for a federation in Indochina, speculating on alternatives, and looking into the future, Philippe Devillers presents a reasonable Western assessment of the question of Indochinese federation in the present-day context:

There was -- and there is still today -- no need for an official political "federal" structure, which would certainly create troubles and also be wasteful, producing only dubious results. Even a coordinating body, like a 'political secretariat' created by the states on the ASEAN model, would be dangerous, for it could foster ethnic rivalries,

jealousies and suspicions. But some economic coordination committees (between sovereign states) could eventually be set up.

On the other hand, it is highly probable that cooperation mechanisms have already been set up at the Party level. In each Party's Central Committee, structures have been created for liaison with 'brother fraternal parties'. In each party, a special committee coordinates relations with the two others. It is through these channels (and also "Joint Commands") that consultations and common decisions are prepared, made and presented, for implementation to the national (State and Party) top levels. The experience and superiority of the CPV will assure it a leading role without the need to create a federal structure.

This is why it is almost certain that the Vietnamese will do their best to smooth relations between the three parties, to avoid any estrangement such as happened with Pol Pot's party, and to build an "Indochinese Association" which, though less populated and less opulent than ASEAN, will be more tightly linked and more effective. Future attitudes of the three Indochinese states on the international scene might be different, but they will undoubtedly be coordinated.³⁵⁰

Hanoi media describes the present network of LPDR-PRK-SRV "friendship" treaties, "cooperation agreements" and troop deployments as an "Indochinese unity bloc".³⁵¹ Perhaps this is the most appropriate way for Westerners to view the present regional system.

Why did Vietnam invade Kampuchea in December, 1978? There is no one reason -- there rarely is. A recent conference held at the Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University was unable to conclude a satisfactory response.³⁵² This study has referred to a number of contributing factors, not the least of which was Vietnam's perception of a threat to its security.

What relevance does a study such as this hold for those individuals concerned with the U.S. national interest, or even U.S. policy formulation? The relevance hinges on Washington's heretofore lethargic Southeast Asian initiatives in the post-Vietnam War era. U.S. policy in Southeast Asia has apparently paralleled Beijing's of late. Some have speculated that:

The reason for this seemingly ambivalent U.S. position lay in the Reagan administrations assessment of its Asian priorities. With the troublesome question of the future of the Republic of China (Taiwan) still beclouding Washington-Beijing relations, U.S. support for the PRC in the Kampuchean question seemed a particularly desirable and pacifying gesture to make...³⁵³

Of course, this has not been a study of U.S. Asian priorities, but nevertheless, the potential consequences of tacit approval for China's Southeast Asia policies must be acknowledged and assessed.

Despite its public united strategy, ASEAN is not of one mind regarding the principal threat to Southeast Asia. Thailand and Singapore see the primary threat as originating from a Moscow-supported SRV. Malaysia and Indonesia, on the other hand, see the PRC as the primary long-term threat to Southeast Asia. Justus M. van der Kroef maintains:

If Vietnam and its Indochinese allies were strong and viable but minimally dependent on the USSR, Malaysia and Indonesia would both view this as a desirable regional balance.³⁵⁴

Maintenance of the present U.S.-PRC parallel policy runs the risks of recrimination from Malaysia and Indonesia (for disregard of perceived threats to their security interests),

polarizing ASEAN, and sanctioning of a Chinese anti-Vietnamese policy that is likely to be increasingly confrontational and de-stabilizing to the region. Stability is in the interest of all Southeast Asian nations.

At the conference held at the Institute of Asian Studies referred to earlier, Y. Sakamoto, Secretary-General of International Peace Research, University of Tokyo, raised a unique perspective on the Kampuchean situation. Mindful of the situation that Kampuchea faces (the prospect of either continued Vietnamese occupation or prolonged civil war if Vietnam were to withdraw), Sakamoto suggested that in this context peace can stand higher in importance than self-determination.³⁵⁵ While this proposal poses real problems if generally extended to the international system, might not it be the foundation for prudent dialogue between the ASEAN and Indochinese states in the future?

The introduction to this analysis noted the common perceptual feature between the Domino Theory and 'Indochinese federation'. This linkage heralds a final note of caution for those individuals concerned with U.S. interests in Southeast Asia. The sensitivity generates from the self-f fulfilling possibilities arising from continued reference to the Domino Theory.³⁵⁶ The relevance of the below hypothesis to present considerations of Indochinese federation, and by extension of Hanoi's purported "plans" for all Southeast Asia becomes apparent:

During the next few years at least, international relations within Southeast Asia will be characterized by both real and imagined stress, but the predictions of the domino theory are most likely to occur if the non-Indochina states of Southeast Asia, in reaction to domestic political cleavages and superficially understood external evidence, behave as if the assumptions of the theory are correct; hence the need for new assumptions and language which provide alternatives to those of the domino theory and, thus, facilitate the avoidance of a self-fulfilling prophecy.³⁵⁷

The alternative which this study suggests is the decoupling of U.S. and PRC policies regarding Southeast Asia and the tacit support of ASEAN-generated options which call for the resumption of talks between ASEAN and the Indochinese states on the basis of mutual respect, and recognition of each other's security concerns. The first objective of such talks should be the reduction of tensions in the region.

APPENDIX A

- Prehistory: skulls and fragments indicate northern Vietnam to be a region of racial diversity (Australoid, Melanesia-Papuans, Melanesia, Indonesians)
- 300 B.C. : emergence of first permanent settlements in northern Vietnam
- 221 B.C. : kingdom of Ch'in brings to an end the period of Warring States; China develops as a centralized empire
- 218 B.C. : Emperor Ch'in Shih-huang-ti stages an expedition into country of Yueh (pronounced Viet); indigenous tribes forced to flee
- 207 B.C. : taking advantage of anarchy in China brought on by Ch'in Shih-huang-ti's death, Governor Chao T'o of Yueh territories proclaims himself King of Nan-Yueh (Nam Viet)
- 202 B.C. : founding of Han dynasty
- 196 B.C. : Han recognizes Nan-Yueh in exchange for Han's suzerainty over the region
- 111 B.C. : Wu-ti occupies and incorporates Nan-Yueh into Han empire; province stretches from present-day Danang (approximate) north to Kwangsi Province called Chiao, or Chiao-chih
- 1st Century A.D.: beginnings of Funan - centered at lower course and delta of Mekong
- 40 A.D. : Trung sisters spearhead rebellion against Chinese
- 43 A.D. : Ma Yuan, Chinese general, pacifies rebellion. Nan-yueh once again administered as a province. Large numbers of Chinese migrate to this region.
- 192 A.D. : Vietnam founded
- 192 A.D. : beginnings of Champa (Lin-Yi), centered in province where present day Hue is located
- 200 A.D. : Vietnam welcomes Buddhist missionaries, welcome extended to followers of Tao and Confucianism
- 220 A.D. : Fall of Later Han dynasty
- 446 A.D. : T'an Ho-chih, governor of Tongking (i.e., Chiao), in response to raids from Champa, captures their capital at Hue and extracts 100,000 pounds of gold. Cham capital later relocated at Danang.
- 550 A.D. (approx): dismemberment of Funan/ beginnings of Chenla or Cambodia; first instance of "push to the south".

- 541-603 A.D.: period of revolt and unrest for Ly of Tang King. Provincial capital moved to site of present-day Hanoi. Territory once again pacified under Sui dynasty. Continuing raids by Champa on Ton King
- 622 A.D. : Tang dynasty reorganizes administration boundaries and government of Ton King
- 679 A.D. : Ton King exercises general protectorate over An-nam to the south
- 706 A.D. : Cambodia divides into Land Chenla (northern half) and Water Chenla (southern half)
- 722 A.D. : Vietnamese revolt against China, revolt aided by Chows and Khmers (from Land Chenla)
- 750 A.D. (approx): political center of Chamnpa moves further south to Nha-trang
- 802-850 A.D.: beginnings of the kingdom of Angkor
- 907 A.D. : Tang dynasty falls, end of effective control over southern provinces
- 938 A.D. : Ngo Ouyen, espousing "nationalist" course defeats Chinese and re-adopts former name Nam Viet
- 950 A.D. : Khmer armies raid Champa
- 954-968 A.D.: Vietnam rulerless during Twelve Su-quan period
- 968 A.D. : Dinh Bo Linh gains control over Nam Viet and renames it Dai Co Viet. Accepts vassal status in exchange for China's recognition of his newly independent state
- 988 A.D. : from this period on, Champa is subject to increasing pressure and attacks from the north
- 1054 A.D. : Cao Doi Viet changes name to Dai Viet
- 1076 A.D. : despite allied efforts of China, Cambodia, and Champa, Vietnam forces China to deal with Vietnam on an "equals" basis. Dai Viet forces Champa to abandon her northern provinces
- 1113-1149 A.D.: during reign of Suryavarman II (for whom Angkor Wat was built as a funerary temple), Khmer armies advance to their farthest point east, occupying northern Champa
- 1177 A.D. : Champa launches naval assault up Mekong and pillages Angkor
- 1203-1220 A.D.: Champa becomes a Khmer province
- 1218 A.D. : Khmers and Chams, acting in concert, threaten Dai Viet

- 1226 A.D. : Emergence of Siam as western power prevents Angkor further conquests in Champa
- 1260 A.D. : beginnings of Mongol invasions
- 1268 A.D. : Dai Viet complains to Kublai Khan of Khmer and Cham attacks
- 1282 A.D. : Khmers defeat Mongol incursion
- 1283-85 A.D.: Mongols invade Champa via the sea (Vietnamese refuse to permit Mongols to pass over their territory)
- 1283 A.D. : Mongol army enters Cambodia
- 1285 A.D. : Marco Polo visits Champa
- 1295 A.D. : Thai of Sukothai ravage Cambodia
- 1306 A.D. : Cham king marries Vietnamese princess in exchange for two provinces north of Col des Nuages
- 1313 A.D. : Dai Viet, acting as sovereign protector, defends Champa against Siamese raid
- 1318 A.D. : Dai Viet places a Vietnamese military commander on throne of Champa; he in turn liberates himself
- 1350-1430 A.D.: Angkor and Ayutthaya in near permanent state of war
- 1353 A.D. : beginnings of Laotian kingdom of Lan Chong. Angkor seized by Ayutthaya and ruled by Siamese prince
- 1357 A.D. : Angkor regains independence
- 1361-1390 A.D.: Champa launches a series of successful raids against Dai Viet
- 1393 A.D. : Angkor falls once again to Siam
- 1407 A.D. : China under Mings annexes Dai Viet outright; supports Chams
- 1418 A.D. : Le Loi, head of peasant family, leads 10-year resistance against Chinese
- 1428 A.D. : Le Loi accedes to throne, accepts China's suzerainty
- 1431 A.D. : Angkor abandoned, Khmer capital re-established at Phnom Penh
- 1441 A.D. : Champa falls into rapid decline
- 1471 A.D. : Vietnamese king Le thanh-tong forces Laotian kingdom to recognize his suzerainty
- 1515-1526 : Trinh, Nguyen, and Moc struggle for power in Vietnam, Vietnam partitioned into two political districts

- 1620 A.D. : Cambodian king, Chei Chetha, marries Vietnamese princess, daughter of King Sai Vong of the Nguyen dynasty
- 1620-1673 A.D.: intermittent fighting between Trinh and Nguyen
- 1623 A.D. : consequent to efforts of Vietnamese princess' efforts, Vietnamese custom house established at Prei Kor (Saigon). This factor accelerates Vietnamese settlement of Mekong delta
- 1660 A.D. : Trinh rule area of Red river delta, Nguyen control the south; both sides regard Le as legitimate emperor
- 1672-1691 A.D.: fratricidal struggle for succession to throne weakens Cambodia, both Siam and Vietnam aiding opposing brothers intervene in Cambodia's internal affairs in exchange for their aid. Ensuing struggle dominates most of 18th century. Vietnam occupies most of Mekong delta through slow but steady infiltration
- 1674-1774 A.D.: century of relative peace in Vietnam in which Trinh administers in the name of Le in the north, Nguyen expands into Cambodian provinces of Mekong in the south
- 1679 A.D. : Ang Non, Khmer ruler of Saigon, attempts to seize Cambodian throne. Rulers in Phnom Penh enlist Siamese aid and Ang Non
- 1685 A.D. : Cambodia requests Vietnamese aid to suppress Chinese refugee leaders and freebooters. Vietnam forces Cambodia to recognize Nguyen overlordship in exchange for assistance
- 1700 A.D. : Laos kingdom divided between Luang Pra-bang and Vienchang. Vietnam and Siam vie for the control of Laos
- 1719 A.D. : Cambodian kings acknowledge their vassalage to Siam by payment of annual tribute
- 1758 A.D. : Vietnam has acquired from Cambodia all territory later known as Cochin China (Portuguese name for Nguyen territory).
- 1765 A.D. : Territory of Nguyen vassals extended beyond present Viet-Cambodian boundary
- 1773 A.D. : Tay Son rebellion. This period of Vietnamese weakness enables Siam to increase her influence in Cambodia
- 1777 A.D. : Tay Son rebels capture Saigon, kill all Nguyen (unrelated to Nguyen ruling family) except Nguyen Anh.
- 1784 A.D. : Nguyen Anh receives aid from Siam
- 1787 A.D. : Nguyen Anh effects an alliance between France and Cochin China
- 1802 A.D. : Nguyen Anh crowned sovereign of a united Vietnam as Emperor Gia Long

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
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
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- 1806 A.D. : Cambodian kings, while receiving their crown from Siam, pay tribute to Vietnam
- 1811 A.D. : King Ang Chan of Cambodia seeks aid from Vietnam to thwart his brother's ambitions on the crown - who is being aided by Siam
- 1813-1833 A.D.: Ang Chan flees to Saigon under pressure of Siamese attacks, enlists aid of south Vietnamese general Truong Minh Giang. Ang Chan reassumes throne. General remains and Vietnamese garrison installed at Phnom Penh
- 1831 A.D. : Siamese troops occupy Phnom Penh. Minh-Mang (Gia-long's successor) sends 15,000 troops to Cambodia and drives out Siamese
- 1834 A.D. : upon death of Cambodian king Ang Chan, the Vietnamese president Ong Khma-Mang, by order of Minh-Mang, places prince Ang May on throne. It "became obvious" that Minh-Mang intended to absorb Cambodia into 33 provinces with new names attached to Cochin China. Cambodia falls under suzerainty of Vietnam.
- 1845 A.D. : Siamese forces place Ang Duong on Cambodian throne.
- 1846 A.D. : peace treaty between Siam and Vietnam brings Siamese influence to Cambodian court.
- 1854 A.D. : in attempts to ward off further Siamese encroachments, Ang Duong seeks French aid. Nothing materializes.
- 1859 A.D. : King Norodom assumes throne of Cambodia
- 1862 A.D. : Treaty between France and court at Hue permits French presence in eastern Cochinchinese provinces.
- 1862 A.D. : French admiral Bovard visits King Norodom. He is tasked with establishing Vietnam's ancient rights of suzerainty over Cambodia in order to counteract Siamese claims.
- August 1863: French establish protectorate over Cambodia (1863 Treaty)
- December 1863: Norodom secretly signs treaty with Siam undermining provisions of French 1863 Treaty.
- 1867 A.D. : Franco-Siamese Treaty cedes provinces of Battambang, Siem Reap and Sisiphone to Siam.
- 1877 A.D. : Le Myre de Vilers, Governor of Cochinchina, notes that it is in France's interest to give greater encouragement to the immigration of Vietnamese into Cambodia. He believes that within 50 years Vietnamese would constitute the most important element of Cambodia's population. When that situation had been achieved, Cambodia, and the Cambodians, would no longer present a problem. "We will lose our time in trying to galvanize this race that a fatal law seems to have condemned to disappear."

1908 A.D. : French census reveals 60,000 Vietnamese in Cambodia - out of a total population of less than one million.

APPENDIX B

A. French Policies

2. Declaration of the Provisional French Government Concerning Indochina March 24, 1945

The Government of the Republic has always considered that Indochina was destined to have a special place in the organization of the French community and to enjoy freedom in keeping with its stage of evolution and its capacities. The promise of this was made in the Declaration of December 8, 1943. Shortly afterwards, the principles of general application set forth at Brazzaville clarified the intention of the government.

Today Indochina is fighting: the troops composed of a mixture of Indochinese and French, the elite and the populace, whom the maneuvers of the enemy cannot deceive are lavishing their courage and employing their resistance for the triumph of the cause which is that of the entire French community. Thus, Indochina is acquiring new rights to the place to which she is called.

Its former intentions having been confirmed by events, the Government considers it its duty, beginning now, to define what shall be the status of Indochina when it has been freed from the invader.

The Indochinese Federation shall form with France and the other parts of the community a "French Union", the interests of which abroad shall be represented by France. Indochina shall enjoy within that union, liberty of its own.

The nationals of the Indochinese Federation shall be Indochinese citizens and citizens of the French Union. On that basis, they shall have access, without discrimination of race, religion or origin, and with equality based on merit, to all the federal posts and positions in Indochina and in the Union.

The conditions under which the Indochinese Federation shall participate in the Federal agencies of the French Union, as well as the status of citizen of the French Union, shall be fixed by the Constituent Assembly.

Indochina shall have its own Federal Government, presided over by the Governor General and composed of ministers responsible to him, who shall be elected from among Indochinese as well as from among the French residing in Indochina. Under the Governor General, a Council of State, composed of the highest personalities of the Federation, shall be charged with the preparation of Federal laws and regulations. An Assembly, which shall be elected according to the manner of voting most suited to each of the countries of the Federation and in which French interests shall be represented, shall vote taxes of all kinds, as well as the Federal budget, and shall deliberate on bills. Commercial and good-neighbor treaties which concern the Indochinese Federation shall be submitted to it for examination.

Freedom of the press, freedom of association, freedom of assembly, freedom of thought and belief and the democratic liberties in general shall form the basis of the Indochinese laws.

The five countries which form the Indochinese Federation and which differ among themselves in civilization, race and traditions, shall keep their own character within the Federation.

The Governor General shall, in the interest of each, be the arbiter of all. The local Governments shall be improved or reformed; the posts and positions in each of these countries shall, in that country, be especially open to its nationals.

With the aid of the mother country and within the systems of general defense of the French Union, the Indochinese Federation shall organize land, sea and air forces, in which the Indochinese shall have access to all ranks on an equal footing with the personnel coming from the mother country or other parts of the French Union.

Social and cultural progress shall be developed and accelerated in the same direction as political and administrative progress.

The French Union shall take the necessary measurements to make primary education obligatory and effective and to develop secondary and higher education. The study of local language and thought shall be closely associated with French culture.

By the setting up of independent and efficient [system of] work inspection and by the development of trade unions, the well-being, social education and emancipation of Indochinese shall be constantly sought.

The Indochinese Federation shall enjoy, within the framework of the French Union, an economic autonomy which will enable it to attain its full agricultural, industrial and commercial development and to carry out, particularly, the industrialization which will permit Indochina to cope with its demographic situation. Thanks to this autonomy, and without any discriminatory regulations, Indochina will develop its commercial relations with all the other countries and especially with China, with which Indochina, the entire French Union, intends to have close friendly relations.

The statute of Indochina, as it has just been presented, will be put into final form after consultation with the qualified agencies of liberated Indochina.

Thus the Indochinese Federation, within the system of peace of the French Union, will enjoy the liberty and organization necessary for the development of all its resources. It will be in a position to play in the Pacific the role to which it is entitled and to make effective in the whole of the French Union the quality of its best elements.

Source: Journal Officiel de la Republique Francaise, pp. 1606-1607, March 25, 1945.

3. Franco-Chinese Agreement
Concerning Sino-Indochinese Relations
February 28, 1946

The French Government and the Chinese Government, equally desirous of strengthening their traditional bonds of friendship and, in conformity with the terms of the Franco-Chinese exchange of notes of March 13, 1945, resuming and developing the economic relations of Indochina with China, have resolved to conclude an agreement for that purpose and have designated as their respective Plenipotentiaries:

The Provisional Government of the French Republic:

His Excellency M. Jacques Meyrier, Ambassador of the French Republic in China

The National Government of China:

His Excellency Dr. Wang Shih Chieh, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China

Who, after having communicated to each other their full powers, found to be in good and due form, agreed upon the following provisions:

Title I. Conditions of Establishment

Art. 1. Chinese nationals shall continue to enjoy the rights, privileges and exemptions which they traditionally possess in Indochina, particularly as regards entry and exit, the tax system, the acquisition and possession of rural and urban real property, the keeping of commercial accounts, the establishment of primary and secondary schools, the practice of agricultural occupations, fishing, inland and coastwise navigation and other free occupations.

Art. 2. The treatment which Chinese nationals shall enjoy in Indochina as regards the right to travel, to reside and to engage in commercial, industrial and mining enterprises, to acquire and possess real property, shall not be less favorable than that enjoyed by nationals of the most favored third country.

APPENDIX C

III The Kampuchean Authorities; Allegation about a So-called "Vietnam-dominated Indochinese Federation with Only One Party, One State, and One People" is Completely Groundless

The history of 100 years of foreign domination experienced by the Indochinese peoples has proved that the imperialists, whether they were the French colonialists, or the Japanese fascists or the U.S. imperialists, all used Indochina as a theatre of war, applied their traditional "divide-and-rule" policy, used one country as a springboard for aggression against another, and used one people to fight another, with the aim of conquering all three countries. The solidarity of the peoples of the three countries against their common enemy was an objective requirement of the revolutionary cause of each people, a factor of decisive importance in winning victory in the national liberation struggle as well as in the long-term cause of national defense and construction carried out by each people. To be lasting, this solidarity must be based on equality and mutual respect, it must serve the national interests of each country, and conform to the interests of the world people. The Indochinese Communists in the past, as well as the leaders of the three Parties and three countries later on, did all they could to build and foster the militant solidarity and fraternal friendship between the three nations, while scrupulously respecting the fundamental national rights of each people and the independence of each Party.

The consistent policy followed by the Vietnamese Party and Government with regard to the two fraternal countries and Parties is to foster "militant solidarity and to promote long-term and friendly cooperation with them on the basis of respect for the fundamental national rights of each country". With regard to Kampuchea, now as in the past, in hard times as well as in the days of victory, Vietnam's policy is consistent and its feelings are unchanged: solidarity with and wholehearted support to Kampuchea, respect for its independence, sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity, political system, independent and sovereign line, and non-interference in its internal affairs.

With its correct line and actions as well by its concerted fight against the common enemy, Vietnam has done its utmost to contribute to the lofty solidarity between the three nations and to fulfill its international duties towards the common cause of revolution.

All true revolutionaries, and patriots are dutybound to defend and promote this lofty solidarity. Only the imperialists and world reactionaries are striving to undermine it.

Why then have the Kampuchean authorities distorted history and called white black in slandering the Socialist Republic of Vietnam? "The Indochinese Federation" is history, and for the past twenty years and more has never been referred to. If the "Indochinese Federation" question really stands in the way of the friendly relations between the two countries, why then do they not agree to sign with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam "a treaty in which they undertake to respect each other's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, to refrain from aggression, from the use of force or the threat to use force in their relations with each other, from interference in each other's internal affairs, and from subversive activities against each other, to treat each other on an equal footing, and to live in peace and friendship in a good neighbourly relationship," and "a treaty on the border question on the basis of respect for each other's territorial integrity within the existing borders,"

as proposed by the Vietnamese side on February 5, 1978? The fact that they resurrect this historical matter just as they have done with the historical question of territory between the two countries, is but a stratagem to arouse national hatred and enmity. The policy of fanning national hatred and enmity between Kampuchea and Vietnam and sabotaging the friendship between the two peoples is part of their policy of creating border conflicts with neighbouring countries, applying a closed-door foreign policy, enhancing narrow nationalism and rejecting international and regional cooperation (such as cooperation on the Mekong River). The Kampuchean authorities' foreign policy is aimed at serving their intensified repression of the people in their country and their purging of revolutionaries and patriots opposed to their erroneous line; it is also aimed at consolidating their power and diverting public opinion at home, which has become indignant at their criminal domestic policies.

In undermining the traditional solidarity between the three countries, the Kampuchean authorities are not only betraying their people's close comrades-in-arms but also cutting across their people's sacred feelings and national interests. Although the imperialists have been forced to withdraw from Indochina, they have not given up their vicious intention to sabotage the independence and peace of the three Indochinese countries. By undermining the militant solidarity between the three peoples, the Kampuchean authorities are committing a crime which is encouraged by the imperialists and world reactionaries, and for which they must be held fully responsible to their own people and to history.

The Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam affirms the following:

1. "The Indochinese Federation" is a question which has passed forever into history. As of 1934 after Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea regained their national sovereignty and territorial integrity and were recognized by many countries in the world, it has no longer been mentioned by the Laotians, the Kampucheans or the Vietnamese. Holding high the banner of national independence and socialism, the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam once again affirms that there is no such question as the Indochinese Federation.
 2. The Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam unswervingly honours its commitments in the Geneva Agreements on Indochina (1954) and the Geneva Agreement on Laos (1962), the Paris Agreement and the Act of International Conference on Vietnam (1973) as well as other international documents it has signed concerning its relations with Laos and Kampuchea: strict respect for the independence, sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity, political system and the independent and sovereign line of the two fraternal countries - Laos and Kampuchea -, respect for the independence of the People's Revolutionary Party of Laos and the Communist Party of Kampuchea, and non-interference in the internal affairs of Laos and Kampuchea. It is prepared to sign a treaty on mutual respect with Kampuchea and a treaty concerning the border between the two countries as proposed in its February 5, 1978 statement.
 3. The Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam will continue to make every effort to preserve and strengthen the militant solidarity and fraternal friendship between the Vietnamese and the Kampuchean peoples, and between the peoples of the three countries on the Indochinese peninsula.
- The Vietnamese people are confident that in the end justice will prevail, and the solidarity and friendship between the Vietnamese and Kampuchean peoples will prevail.

Hanoi, April 7, 1978

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23. Patrick M. Morgan, Theories and Approaches to International Politics: What Are We to Think?, 3rd ed., (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1977), p. 191.
24. Duchacek, p. 199.
25. Morgan, p. 202.
26. Philip Jacob and Henry Teune, "The Integrative Process", in Jacob and James Toscano (eds.), The Integration of Political Communities (Lippincott, 1964) pp. 11-12, 16-45, quoted in Morgan, pp. 202-203.
27. Franck, p. 26.
28. The author defines these terms in Franck, pp. 171-173.
29. Franck, p. 169.
30. Duchacek, p. 343.
31. Russett's work notwithstanding, see: Morgan, p. 197.
32. New York Times, 18 January 1978, p. 3.
33. Milton Osborne, "Kampuchea and Vietnam: A Historical Perspective", Pacific Community, 9 (April, 1978): 249.
34. The origins of Vietnamese society have been clouded by time, while it possesses more than two thousand years of recorded history. Ho Chi Minh wrote a history of Vietnam that dated its origins to 2879 B.C. See: Alexander B. Woodside, Community and Revolution in Modern Vietnam, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1976), p. 1.
35. Flooding, lack of manpower, and other indirect consequences of the Second World War combined to produce a modern-day shock to this fragile balance; the consequence was 2 million Vietnamese dead by starvation. See William J. Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1981), p. 83.
36. John T. McAlister, Jr. and Paul Mus, The Vietnamese and Their Revolution, (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1970), p. 33.

37. It might be maintained that Champa was such a case - but the existence of the Cham population in Vietnam would argue against it. Genocide is not characteristic of the region.
38. Georges Coede's, The Indianized States of Southeast Asia, (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1968), p. 68.
39. Ibid., p. 237.
40. See chronology, Appendix A, items dated: 1306 A.D., 1620 A.D., and 1623 A.D.
41. Coedes, p. 34.
42. Ibid. Of course there are exceptions - the modern day Overseas Chinese being one such notable exception.
43. This is the Thai perception, a viewpoint that is maintained by a number of other Asian notions.
44. McAlister and Mus, pp. 31.38.
45. Ibid., p. 38.
46. Alexander B. Woodside, Vietnam and the Chinese Model: A Comparative Study of Nguyen and Ch'ing Civil Government in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 9.
47. Ibid., p. 12.
48. McAlister and Mus, p. 32.
49. Ibid., p. 47.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid., p. 1.
52. Ibid., p. 63.
53. Vietnamese Communism in its comparative dimension has been dealt with at length in William S. Turley, ed., Vietnamese Communism in Comparative Perspective (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1980)
54. Nguyen Khac Vien, Tradition and Revolution in Vietnam (Berkeley: Indochinese Resource Center, 1975) p. 46.
55. Ibid., p. 50.
56. Ibid., p. 47.
57. Ibid., p. 26.

58. Stephen B. Young, "Vietnamese Marxism: Transition in Elite Ideology", Asian Survey 19 (August, 1979), p. 773.
59. McAlister and Mus, p. 113.
60. Ibid., p. 160.
61. Young, p. 770 states: "It is my contention that Marxism in Vietnam resulted from the adoption of western colonial norms by some members of a neo-Confucian Vietnamese elite and is antagonistic to the peasant nationalism of the bulk of the Vietnamese population. To the extent this assertion is correct, the major premise underlying scholarship in Vietnam for 100 years - that Vietnam was the 'Smaller Dragon' - must be revised."
62. This will be discussed in detail in Part III.
63. Foreign Broadcast Information Service -- Asia and Pacific (FBIS - A&P) Daily Report, 13 April 1978, p. H.1.
64. Ho Chi Minh, Selected Works Volume II, (Hanoi: Foreign Language Publishing House (FLPH), 1961), p. 147.
65. Bernard B. Fall, ed., Ho Chi Minh On Revolution Selected Writings, 1920-1966 (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1967), p. ix.
66. Douglas Pike, History of Vietnamese Communism, 1925-1976 (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), p. 1.
67. Ibid., p. 3.
68. William J. Duiker, The Comintern and Vietnamese Communism. Papers in International Studies Southeast Asia Series No. 37 (Athens, Ohio: Center for International Studies, Ohio University, 1975), p. 16.
69. Pike, p. 9.
70. B. G. Gafurov and G. F. Kim, ed., Lenin and National Liberation in the East (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1978), p. 260.
71. Ellen J. Hammer, The Struggle for Indochina 1940-1955 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1969), p. 81.
72. Pike, p. 12.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid. Ho Chi Minh opposed the colonial implications of the word "Indochinese".
75. Ibid.
76. Pike, pp. 154-155, note 15.

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78. Ibid., p. 157.
79. I. Milton Sacks, "Marxism in Vietnam", in Frank N. Traeger, ed., Marxism in Southeast Asia: A Study of Four Countries (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1959), p. 136.
80. Kampuchea Dossier I (Hanoi: Vietnam Courier, 1978), p. 95. See also: FBIS - A&P, Daily Report, 7 April 1978, p. K.12.
81. Traeger, p. 131.
82. William J. Duiker, The Comintern and Vietnamese Communism, p. 38.
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84. D.G.E. Hall, A History of South-East Asia, 4th ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), p. 705. See also David Joel Steinberg, ed., In Search of Southeast Asia: A Modern History (New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1971), pp 199-210.
85. John F. Cody, Southeast Asia: Its Historical Development (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1964) pp. 428-430, p. 549. While in the context of the centralization process, Cody refers to "the French administration of the Indochinese Federation" it is believed that he is doing so in the colloquial sense.
86. Hammer, p. 26.
87. Ibid., p. 31.
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91. Ibid, p. 152.
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93. Allan B. Cole, ed., Conflict in Indo-China and International Repercussions: A Documentary History, 1945-1955 (Ithica, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1956), pp. 40-41.
94. Hammer, p. 160.
95. Ibid., pp. 160-161.
96. Ibid., p. 161.

97. Ibid., p. 165.

98. "Statement of the Foreign Ministry of the Provisional Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, October 1945." Reprinted in Gareth Porter, ed., Vietnam: The Definitive Documentation of Human Decisions., Vol. 1, (Stanfordville, N.Y.: Earl M. Coleman Enterprises, Inc., 1979), pp. 81-82.

99. Reprinted in Traeger, p. 158.

100. Fall, p. 214.

101. I. Milton Sacks maintains that during this time period the greatest danger to the Viet Minh leadership resulted from the presence of the Chinese occupation army - and the KMT supported Viet Nam Revolutionary League, and Viet Nam Nationalist Party (VNODO), which arrived in its wake. These parties, certain of their Chinese backing, launched repeated attacks on the Communist-controlled Viet Minh leadership. The dissolution of the ICP was viewed a necessary concession in the neutralization of their opposition. See: Traeger, pp. 156-158.

Offering a supplemental variant to the above assessment based on his survey of later Party histories, William J. Duiker maintains that "The reason given by the Party, though perhaps not complete, is persuasive. By apparently abolishing the Party, the leadership hoped to allay nationalist suspicions of the new provisional government". See William J. Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam, p. 112.

Gareth Porter sees the event as but one step in a series of events: "In order to placate the Chinese, whom they feared would try to overthrow the Viet Minh government and replace it with anti-Communist, pro-Chinese parties, ICP leaders decided to formally dissolve the Party and offer to reorganize the government to include representatives of those parties in November, 1945. See Porter, p. 89.

102. Quoted from "To Our Fellow-Countrymen in Nam Bo Before Going to France for Negotiations, May 31, 1946", in Ho Chi Minh, Selected Writings: 1920-1969 (Hanoi: FLPH, 1977), p. 66.

103. Refer to earlier discussion of Franco-Vietnamese relations.

104. Quoted from "Answers to questions put by Leo Figueres" (July 20, 1950), in Ho Chi Minh, Selected Works III (Hanoi: FLPH, 1961), p. 206.

105. "Answers put by the press regarding U.S. intervention in Indo-China", (July 25, 1950), Ho Chi Minh, Selected Works III, p. 210.

106. The first had been the Macao Congress in 1935.

107. Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam, p. 142.

108. McAlister and Mus, p. 125.

109. "Report by Truong Chinh to the Second National Party Congress, February 11-19, 1951". Extract reprinted in Porter, pp. 336-37.

110. P.J. Honey, "North Vietnam's Workers' Party and South Vietnam's People's Revolutionary Party", Pacific Affairs 35 (Winter, 1962-63): 377.
111. "Political report read at the Second National congress of the Viet Nam Workers' Party held in February 1951", in Ho Chi Minh, Selected Works III, p. 264.
112. Porter, p. 337.
113. "Platform of the Viet-Nam Workers' Party, February 19, 1951". Reprinted in Porter, p. 340.
114. Ibid., p. 343.
115. "Platform of the Viet-Nam Workers' Party, February 1951". Reprinted in Allan W. Cameron, ed., Viet Nam Crisis: A Documentary History, Volume I: 1940-1956, (Ithica, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1971), p. 174. (Underline added by this author.) Note: to clear up any ambiguity, the Chinese characters for "federation" in this document should be checked.
116. This belief reflects the author's research.
117. "At the Congress for the Unification of Viet Minh and Line Viet" (March 3, 1951), in Ho Chi Minh, Selected Writings, pp. 130-32.
118. Cameron, p. 174, note 11.
119. Ibid., pp. 183-184.
120. Ibid., p. 183.
121. In a telephone conversation with P.J. Honey on 26 November 1982, the author learned that the documents were still under French protection and thus difficult to view. Honey saw the documents shortly after they were captured by the French in Ton King.
122. P.J. Honey, Communism in North Vietnam: Its Role in the Sino-Soviet Dispute, (Cambridge, Mass: M.I.T. Press, 1963), pp. 169-170.
123. Ibid., p. 170.
124. Ibid., pp. 170-71.
125. Archimedes L. Patti, Why Vietnam? Prelude to America's Albatross (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1980), p. 407.
126. Ibid., pp. 400-401.
127. Ibid., pp. 400, 410.
128. Ibid., p. 409.
129. Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam, p. 147.

130. If the authenticity of the secret document is questioned, which is not necessarily unreasonable given the propaganda efforts at the time, such a document would serve to focus attention on the communist threat to all of Indochina. This would help shift the perspective on the conflict from one of France's effort to re-establish her colonial presence in Indochina to France's effort to stem the growing threat of communism. Particularly in the wake of events in Korea, the appeal of this latter perspective to those individuals who might be interested in extracting increased U.S. support must have been evident.

131. Honey, Communism in North Vietnam, p. 171.

132. See Frank N. Trager, Why Vietnam? (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1967), p. 230., note 5 to Chapter Five.

133. Ibid., p. 117.

134. Honey quoted in Trager, p. 117.

135. Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam, p. 142.

136. Honey, Communism in North Vietnam, p. 169.

137. Porter, p. 328.

138. "Appeal on the Occasion of the 5th Anniversary of the Nation-wide Resistance War" (December 19, 1951), in Ho Chi Minh, Selected Works III, pp. 298-99.

139. "The imperialist aggressors can never enslave the heroic Vietnamese" (January, 1952), Ibid. p. 315.

140. "On the Day of the Tet Festival", Ibid., p. 304.

141. "Appeal on the Anniversary of the August Revolution and National Day" (Sept. 2, 1952), Ibid., p. 360.

142. "Speech opening the meeting celebrating March 3rd Day", Ibid., pp. 385-86.

143. "Appeal on the Occasion of the August Revolution Day and National Day", 1953, Ibid., p. 394.

144. "Report to the third session of the First National Assembly" (December 1, 1953) in Ho Chi Minh, Selected Writings, p. 162.

145. Paul Langer and Joseph J. Zasloff, North Vietnam and the Pathet Lao: Partners in the Struggle for Laos (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 54.

146. Robert F. Randle, Geneva 1954: The Settlement of the Indochinese War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1969), pp. 206-207.

147. Langer and Zasloff, p. 55; Randle, p. 488.

148. Langer and Zasloff, p. 56.
149. Randle, p. 488.
150. Ibid., p. 535.
151. Ibid., p. 488.
152. Langer and Zasloff, p. 55.
153. Ibid., p. 58.
154. Randle, p. 506.
155. Ibid., p. 343.
156. "Report to the 6th Plenum of the Viet Nam Workers' Party Central Committee" (July 15, 1954), p. 182.
157. Porter, p. 338.
158. Fall, p. 294.
159. "Opening Speech at the Thrid National Congress of the Viet Nam Workers' Party", (September 5, 1960), Ho Chi Minh, Selected Writings, p. 260.
160. Fall, p. 358.
161. "Report to the Special Political Conference", (March 27, 1964), Ho Chi Minh, Selected Writings, p. 277.
162. "Address to the Second Session of the Third National Assembly of the DRVN", (April 10, 1965). Ibid., p. 299.
163. Fall, p. 361.
164. The case that Ho Chi Minh's statements might to some degree be reactive is not without some substance. In 1964 Ho pledged Vietnam's support to the Indonesian people who were struggling against the establishment of a "greater Malaysia" bloc created by the imperialists with a view toward retaining their privileges in Southeast Asia and to be used by them as a springboard to attack the national liberation movement in the Vietnamese area.
165. This writer's assessment.
166. "Testament" (May 10, 1969), Ho Chi Minh, Selected Writings, p. 359.
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168. Joseph J. Zasloff, The Pathet Lao: Leadership and Organization (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Company, 1973), p. 5.
169. Ibid.

170. Geoffrey C. Gunn, "Foreign Relations of the Lao People's Democratic Republic: the Ideological Imperative", Asian Survey 20 (October, 1980): 992.
171. Zasloff, p. 12.
172. Ibid., p. 12.
173. Ibid., p. 13.
174. Ibid., pp. 13-14.
175. Ibid., p. 5.
176. Langer and Zasloff, p. 107.
177. Ibid., pp. 120-123.
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179. Ibid.
180. Ibid., p. 10.
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182. Gunn, p. 1007.
183. Richard Nations, "Inside the bitter borders", FEER, August 19, 1977, p.9.
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187. Kampuchea Dossier, p. 67.
188. Nayan Chanda, "That's far enough, says Hanoi", FEER, August 19, 1977, p.11.
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191. Chanda, "Far enough", p. 11.
192. Ibid., p. 12.
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194. Black Book (or Black Paper): Facts & Evidences of the Acts of Aggression and Annexation of Vietnam against Kampuchea. (Phnom Penh: Department of Press and Information of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Democratic Kampuchea, 1978) p. 25, note 1.

195. Except where noted otherwise the following information comes from the Black Book.

196. Chanda, "far enough", p. 12.

197. FBIS, Trends, 5 January 1978, p. 10.

198. Black Book, pp. 19-20.

199. Ibid. p. 20.

200. Ibid., pp. 20-22.

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202. Ibid., p. 132.

203. Ibid.

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205. Ibid.

206. Ibid., p. 35.

207. Ibid., pp. 39-50.

208. Ibid. p. 92.

209. FBIS, A&P, 6 January 1978, p. K1.

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345. Mary Wisniewski, "The Brezhnev Legacy", FEER, November 19, 1982, P. 8.
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348. Subsequent to North Vietnam's liberation of the South, Pham Hung, Vice-Premier and VWP Politburo member said: "If in the past we defeated French colonialism with the Dien Bien Phu campaign, today, with the total victory of the Ho Chi Minh campaign, we have ended United States neocolonialism in our land, Vietnam, and completely fulfilled the sacred testament of our beloved Uncle Ho." Van Tien Dung, Our Great Spring Victory (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977), p. 256.
349. In what is in many respects a good work, N. Khac Huyen fails to identify Ho's "vision" and whether it was accomplished. In addition, Huyen, on page 220, maintains: "The name of the party itself, Indochinese, Not Vietnamese, testifies to his [Ho's] ambition." This study has demonstrated this statement to be inaccurate. See: N. Khac Huyen, Vision Accomplished? The Enigma of Ho Chi Minh (New York: Collier Books, 1971)
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356. See Jerry Mark Silverman, "The Domino Theory: Alternatives to a Self-fulfilling Prophecy", Asian Survey (November, 1975): 916, and Earl C. Ravenal, "Consequences of the End Game in Vietnam", Foreign Affairs (July, 1975): 651-667.

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